Engine Failure after V1

[M.85]

Hi guys,

If an A/C has a problem ie engine failure past V1 and plenty runway available(10000ft remaining),would it be safer to keep it on the ground rather than climb and make things more hairy with dealing with the emergency in the air?(ie heavy,nasty wx)..
Should this be discussed in the T/O brief if such an occasion occurs?
I agree that one should obey OPS by the books..but would such a lateral thinking be omissed ?

Thank you for your inputs?

M.85

[john_tullamarine]

Not an easy matter to evaluate by the pilots. Consider -

(a) while a first approximation of distance can be made using simple analyses, the real world may be somewhat different due to variations in acceleration/deceleration. However, the case may be reasonable for a low weight, low V1 takeoff on a runway with plenty of spare distance.

(b) at high weights/OAT etc the planned takeoff may be brake energy limited .. in which case a post-V1 reject may have predictable rather than successful results.

(c) the practical difficulties for long-habituated line pilots to invoke a novel and unpractised technique. The experimental test pilot is trained to do this sort of thing .. while the line pilot is habituated to practised responses. This is not to suggest that the line pilot is inferior ... merely that real world training and habituation regimes make for some difficulties in making seat of the pants decisions at very short notice. I have seen some line pilots do this sort of thing in very impressive style .. and others who would be better served by remaining well within the trained envelope.

(d) there is a body of historical evidence which suggests that the outcome generally is more successful if the aircraft continues the launch. This gives the pilots more time to consider their options and, importantly, means that a landing can be planned using ALL the runway with emergency services in attendance.

Obviously there are cases where the reject might have been better .. but we have to approach these sorts of questions from the view of overall risk assessment and reasonable probabilities - to base one's decision-making processes on exceptions probably is not a successful life strategy for most of us.

[ejector seat]

Has anyone considered what would have happened if the AF concorde which crashed in July 2000 had rejected the take off (even though post V1) instead of trying to pull her into the air while still short of V2?

I've not seen any discussion of the exact distance remaining and their chances of coming to a full stop, but I find it hard to avoid a gut feeling that perhaps there might have been a few survivors if they'd aborted. Hindsight is everything, but once it left the ground the outcome was guaranteed, surely...

[lomapaseo]

I'm not a fan of lateral thinking when there is a book of knowlege to follow based on learned experience and designed parameters.

In fact to encourage such thinking is to encourage an increase in the major cause of accidents (now 75%)involving powerplants which is "Inappropriate Crew response" to a perceived engine failure.

I'll admit that the book of knowledge was chock full of ignorance coupled with inappropriate application in training syllabus, but some of this ignorance perpetuated the lateral thinking which got us into trouble to begin with.

We should be beyond this now since we have updated the book of knowledge in the FAA/JAA initiative under PSM+ICR referenced elsewhere in this section under a very similar thread topic.

In other words we need less lateral thinking and instead more updated book learning and training application.

With that said the inference of aborting beyond V1 should be in the far corner of a pilots inner physic and not to be briefed.

[PPRuNe Towers]

I utterly believe in SOPS and thought through orthodoxy but I do have a real nagging feeling regarding the last three major turboprop engine fires on take off.

Two in Canada were 'go minded' and crashed fighting their way around the circuit/pattern - spar burnthrough.

The 'lateral thinker' (HS748 - Stansted, UK) stopped on the ten thousand foot runway after a post V1 decision.

I promise I'm not stirring it - just thinking aloud.

Regards
Rob Lloyd

[M.85]

Dear all,

Thank you for your comments ..its always good to get professional advice.
The question was asked in my latest interviewat Netjets.
I answered the lateral thinking,but the brief needed.
I believe one should obey to SOPS but coming from a small freight dog world flying somewhat light aircrafts,i often thought about the idea of aborting at or after v1 (V1 calculated merely by temp and weight on a chart)if major problem occurred..engine flame out..
Also,the safety minded airlines may forbid such practice and i dont blame them either.
I believe this thinking may have come from flying in a not well organised and trained company..flight training was in A/C and not simulator and single pilot..
I didnt want Netjets to think i wasnt SAFE but couldnt lie either,ive been trained in a certain way of thinking but not rejecting other more regular way to handle emergencies.

Safe Flying,

M.85

[redsnail]

This very topic has been kicking around the crew room(s) of late.
The thing that concerns me with "lateral" thinking is that it isn't briefed. If you have a nice long runway and a smallish turboprop then by all means brief the PNF that stopping post V1 is an option or else confusion will reign. There has been discussion of a re-land after V1 and a engine/failure etc. The thing with that is now you are in "no man's land". As has been said, us line pilots aren't test pilots and there's no performance figures published on what we are about to attempt. I kicked around some figures the other day and the distance required to safely stop was quite long. Much longer than many of the crew think. I can see the point about the fire burn throughs and it's better for the wing to fall off when on the ground but that sort of problem doesn't happen *that* often.
What worries me is that some captains are now starting to think that it is better to chuck the aircraft back on the ground and "it'll be ok". Well, no, not really. At the risk of teaching the learned readers here to suck eggs, the aircraft is now going faster than the probably V ref, certainly not in a landing configuration and with a lot less runway than would have been available if a circuit had have been done.

Lateral and flexible thinking is fine so long as the crew are both in the loop and there's been some reasonable thought gone into it.

#I fly a smallish turboprop. I have yet to sample the delights of a jet.

[safetypee]

Sorry dept chief pilot Pprune, but its back to stirring the dunnies for you.

Re HS 748 at Stanstead, I could not find any reference in the accident report to lateral thinking or conscious decision making in the Captains decision to land back. Whilst the pros and cons for doing so may debated at length when on the ground, in the air the crew call the situation as they see it, preferably compared against standard operating procedures and experience. If the 748 crew were so convinced that the aircraft was not capable of continued flight then the decision to land ahead was fine, but I suspect (IMHO) that the aural and visual cues of this event overtook a rational evaluation of the situation.

As has been stated previously, in all but very exceptional circumstances the safer option is to continue the take off after V1. In addition to training crews to follow well thought-out procedures, they should be given training in the awareness and assessment of distracting cues. These cues should include ambiguous engine displays, sound, vibration, and external light (fire) at night. A big bang at rotate is more than likely a tire burst and not the over reacting choice of ‘bomb’ (based on probability). The safest course of action with an engine failure/problem/unknown event at/after V1 is to fly the aircraft; at a safe height evaluate the situation and then decide what the most likely cause of the problem is and then act on that judgment.

I would be concerned if M.85’s question was interpreted as flight with an engine failure was ‘more hairy’; many pilots do not have an appreciation of the safety margins that exist for non normal flight. Provided the aircraft is operated in accordance with the manufactures procedures, the certification standard provides for a very safe operation; this assumes that crews do not over react and “start thinking laterally”. Lateral thinking should be reserved for those extremely rare events (once in two lifetimes?) where there is no procedure: cf Capt Al Haynes DC-10 accident.

Please read the PSM+ICR project report: - ICR is Inappropriate Crew Response i.e. not following procedures. I quote for accidents for turbofan aircraft … “over 70% occur during the takeoff and climb phase of flight”. “The dominant phase of flight for all turboprop propulsion system malfunctions is Takeoff –this accounts for half of the accidents”.

[Tinstaafl]

Unless one has compelling reason to believe the SOPs are inappropriate for the situation or don't cover it, then my money is on SOPs. The historical evidence is that SOPs are more likely to lead to a more favourable outcome.

[Captain Stable]

zerouali- I suspect you might! :E

I agree with Tinstaafl generally.

There is nothing, however, in any Ops Manual to say you may not operate in a manner outside SOPs. They might not cover the situation, or the captain may decide that they are not appropriate in the situation at that moment.

Put simply, the captain always may exercise his discretion and operate any way he likes. He would, however, need a very good reason, and be prepared to defend his decision later - be it on the carpet in the CP's office, hat on and with no tea or biccies, or in a court or coroner's inquest.

The incident @ STN with the HS 748 was one such situation. The skipper knew his aircraft, which (like almost all 748's) was a tired, knackered old thing which was unlikely to be able to stagger round a single-engine circuit. He also realised very rapidly that he did not have a simple engine fire - he had a catastrophic failure threatening the whole airframe.

He broke SOPs and saved the lives of all on board.

PS - Towers - as far as I remember, he didn't actually stop on the runway. He re-landed, which took it beyond the runway but still within the airfield perimeter, which collapsed the nosegear.

[Omark44]

Many moons ago I remember sitting on the tarmac at Malaga watching a Spantax DC10 taking off. The nose wheel came up and the oleos of the main gear extended then suddenly the aircraft slammed back down on the ground and careened off the end of the runway, smashed into a small building and caught fire.
There were several fatalities and it is a sight one cannot forget even now.

Apparently they suffered a nose tyre burst but thought it was a catastrophic engine failure so elected to try and stay on the ground, had they got airborne they could have gone out to sea, dumped and returned to a possible nose wheel failure on a long, foam covered runway somewhere.

The Spanish authorities defended the abort decision on the grounds that the DC10 had a bad safety record!

[PPRuNe Towers]

Your recollections are correct Capt S - I know the skipper and he did land back on the runway. 20 + years experience on that type.

A stirring defence of orthodoxy above - remember I did place very careful caveats at the beginning of my post. Entirely worthwhile in my opinion just to get a bigger audience for the PSM+ICR report. Meanwhile Danny and I still await the publication of the immense Luftansa report which we were allowed to preview some 20 months ago.

Thing is, the nagging feeling still hasn't gone away. In the specific area of turbo-prop engine fires from generous runways it must be tremendously gratifying to follow orthodoxy and find your mainspar burns through on the circuit. Of course you can imediatiately slap me down with the history of false fire indications or rejects that became fatal over-runs if it helps you support catch all solutions for the industry.

Perhaps, just perhaps, in memory of those Canadian crews if nothing else, there are areas of orthodoxy that need to be challenged in an era of tremendous peer pressure, standardised training and company expectations.

As discussed in the auto-pilot thread Ops manual sections on flexibility in operations are easily overwhelmed by long term company culture.

I will, of course, bow to your list of civilian turbo props safely carrying a major engine fire around the circuit to an orthodox, professional and safe conclusion over what - the last ten years say? Is orthodoxy serving this particular section of the aviation community? Is generic, catch all perceived and received opinion for both turbo fans and turbo props effective in the light of the accident record in this specific area?

It troubles me that not a single response had directly addressed what happened to the two Canadian crews who experienced the airframe failing - no (that's too clinical and detached) - melting while actually practicing what you're preaching from the comfort of your computer chairs. I want you to reassure me that my magpie memory is entirely incorrect and I've filtered out a plethora of gloriously successful conclusions to similar events in recent years.

Where safety is concerned I am more than happy for you to slap me to the ground with data. A bit of hubris is good for all of our souls.

Yours, as ever, stirring the dunny, :ouch: :ouch: :ouch:

Rob

[safetypee]

Captain Stable; to the dunnies with Pprune!

It is totally incorrect to give the impression that tired old aircraft will not perform as designed and certificated. Consideration of reduced performance due to an ‘old aircraft’ should not clutter the decisions required after engine failure. There was nothing to show that the STN HS748 would not have flown as well as any other aircraft type with one engine inoperative. The condition of the aircraft engine / structure with that particular fire is open to debate; the Captain made a decision and kept to the plan. Fine; in his opinion at that time, and up there doing it, the circumstances appeared to warrant a landing straight ahead.

The aircraft did leave the paved surface which collapsed the nose leg. However with some very good cabin crew work both in pre fight briefing and during evacuation everyone escaped. But what if leaving the runway there had been damage to the exits or fuselage structure preventing or delaying evacuation … would the engine / wing fire have been brought under control in time? We would be having a different discussion now – think about it whilst you are with Pprune on the pan.

[PPRuNe Towers]

It is totally incorrect to give the impression that tired old aircraft will not perform as designed and certificated.

Ummmm, I'm wondering why our lovely flight planning software and sexy fmc's have performance decrement sections within them? In my time on the line real life analysis has consistently caused highly experienced engineeering and flight planning bods far above me in the food chain to enter default decrements in the order of 3 and 4% on brand new airframes. They are further tweaked over the years - never in a positive direction during my time flying. My personal best is one airframe that, over an extended period, used 17% more fuel than the fleet average which already had the allowance over 'book' I've mentioned.

Believe me - in a corporate world dominated by bean counters they aren't exactly furthering their careers by insisting on this..........

Additionally, whether military of civil, any of us flying within a fleet of ostensibly identical aircraft for any length of time know two things. At any given time there is an aircraft on the fleet suffering glitches and problems at a rate far greater than the rest.

We also know that, performance wise, there is alway a 'dog' amongst them.

This, I know, makes uncomfortable reading. We gain great comfort in empirical data apparently bolstering our confidence with a magical application of science, statistics and the hard graft of good performance people.

But - have you flown the company dog this week? - It's real. They exist.

Regards
Rob

[M.85]

Dear all,

Amazing this pprune site..I must say i am quite impressed with the level of knowledge and english vocabulary used in this thread...eventhough i do not understand all words..
Even if aborting after V1 for a major incident came to my mind,i dont think i would have the guts to land on the same runway after rotation was made...Having been called "big balls or nutter after landing in not catholic weather,i believe once in the air,you are commited to fly,except of course if both engines fail and dont let you:ugh:
Keep up the info,its delicious.

Safe flying,

M.85

[LOMCEVAK]

Unless you are operating at precisely balanced field conditions, you will always have a range of V1s available to you. The minimum V1 will be determined by your capability to get airborne if you continue (Vgo), the maximum V1 by the capability to stop (Vstop). The problem is that we only brief a single V1, and it varies between companies, and even fleets within companies, whether a minimum V1 is SOP (often favoured as the "go" option is statistically safer) or what is often (incorrectly) referred to as a "balanced" V1, which is mid way between Vgo and Vstop (which gives a margin for error in both senses and reduces the problems of being Vmcg limited). It is feasible to stop above your nominal (briefed) V1 up to the maximum V1, but as you invariably do not know what that is this may not be a sound idea. If you are in a turboprop and have 10,000 ft of runway ahead of you at rotate, the practicality is that V1 max is probably above your unstick speed. However, if you do not have the performance figures to back this up...........!

[safetypee]

Rob, on the way back from the dunny,
Consider which performance documents your team use for the different performance calculations and which manufacturer / service-provider provided them. For certificated performance (JAR-25), the performance information in the flight manual covering engine out take off, flight path etc, has several built in assumptions (net / gross) that look after most variations. Of course there was the annual air check which caught and rouge aircraft, but no so now days.
The operational performance (fuel flow, range, etc) normally originates from the manufacturer. A reputable manufacturer will incorporate an engine / airframe degradation factor for age, or they should state the assumptions that have been made; others or service providers (in ignorance) may publish no corrections. Of course operators can make their own adjustments to this data depending on experience, maintenance condition of the airframe, and operational technique.
With respect to the thread and the edification of others, the engine out takeoff calculation should always provide the published performance for the operating conditions. Therefore crews should not be distracted by unwarranted concerns as to whether the aircraft will fly / climb or not. More likely is that the crew will be greatly surprised by the apparent lack of performance with an engine out in limiting conditions when compared with every day operations. The limiting climb gradient, engine out (WAT), may only give 200 ft/min climb, far short of the 2000 ft/min skyrocket seen on a cold day with a light aircraft. So after V1 continue the take off but do not be surprised by the performance. If not convinced or just to top up experience, try a WAT limit engine out climb in the sim.

[BOAC]

Just to throw another log on the fire :D

Like Towers, I also know the STN captain well and have spoken to him at some length about the incident. He told me that the opinion of the investigators was that with the intensity of this particular fire, the main spar would probably have burnt through half-way down the downwing leg with the loss of all on board. Old aircraft or brand new would probably have made very little difference.

So, the debate remains open, but in my book that guy was 100% right. Excellent job.

PS That does NOT make it right all the time, of course!

[Captain Stable]

I suspect that we are missing one very useful piece of information here, for those who regularly fly machines like twin turboprops out of megarunways.

V1, as has been shown above, is not a particularly useful datum. It purports to be the final stop/go speed (purists, yes, I know that's a gross oversimplification - please let it pass). We all know it's not.

What would be more useful is, for any given runway, at any given weight, temperature, inside leg measurement etc., the highest speed at which we can still abort and stop before we plough through the fence onto the golf course or sewage works.

Given almost any failure of my aircraft, I would far rather abort on the ground and call an engineer to stroll over than to have to try to sort anything out in the air. But if I've passed V1 with still 9,500 feet of runway ahead of me, and the FO is expecting me to go after he's called a failure, I'm a bit stuck, since SOPs tell me I really ought to lift off. Why?.

[BOAC]

Captain S - the problem is that it will never be that simple!

All fine if you are still on terra firma. The trouble is that the aircraft will be airborne at speeds above V1 on these runways, and in various states of gear and height. I would suggest it is impossible to define, and it boils down to being the captain - and that is what they pay us for? You have to hope that 20/20 hindsight will prove you right for once!

[john_tullamarine]

Most of the posts here are playing with the one idea .. risk assessment and mitigation.

Book figures are based on a range of assumptions which may vary somewhat from the real world situation on the day.

If the takeoff is not limiting or near limiting, then the crew have real world options, most of which are not documented for their assessment.

In general, history suggests that to continue offers a better chance of a successful outcome than does stopping... but there will be specific instances where a "non-standard" option will be deemed better by the Monday morning quarterbacks .. that's the nature of the real world.

The question which the captain always should reflect upon is "what option gives me the highest likelihood that I will have a satisfactory outcome ?" .. and, more often than not .. that is to follow generally accepted standardised and practised procedures.

As I have been guilty of claiming before .. there are NO guarantees .... only probabilities and risk mitigating approaches to the management of problems.

[Fright Level]

Surely on a long runway, min V1=Vr and in that situation in my company we omit the V1 call, simply call rotate. As there has been no V1 call, would it not be P1's discretion to land ahead?

[411A]

Some years ago, an SV 737 had an engine fire indication just at Vr, (actual engine fire as I recall).
The Captain lowered the nosewheel, closed the throttles and stopped on the runway. As this was at Doha (15,000 feet long), not a problem.

The Captain was criticized rather severely by the 737 fleet manager for not continuing the takeoff, however the VP flt ops (somewhat older, and certainly wiser) suggested that, in his opinion, the Captain excercised good judgement, and indeed that is why the company pays him the big bucks.

Further comments from the fleet manager were not entertained, forthwith.

[lomapaseo]

however the VP flt ops (somewhat older, and certainly wiser) suggested that, in his opinion, the Captain excercised good judgement, and indeed that is why the company pays him the big bucks

That story reminds me of the post incident investigation interview that I was part of that was conducted with a Sr VP of Operations, following a near accident.

During the interview I had posed a question to this chief about the Capts decision process and was basically told that the captain is the captain.

As far as I was concerned that was sufficient for me to conclude that we had found the weak link in the causal findings and it was the Sr VP of Operations, and not the Captain.

[411A]

Indeed lomapaseo, the Captain is the Captain (Commander), and is employed as such because, in the companies judgement (and regulatory approval), he has the qualifications.
Have found over the years (many years actually) that a few First Officers really don't appreciate these facts...but then again, that is their problem.

The Captain is ultimately responsible...as in, the buck stops there.
Companies that appreciate these ideas, have always been rather well run, in my experience.

[lomapaseo]

411A you missed the point again, but you got your point across for the 100th time.:O

[kansasw]

In response to ejector seat's question

"Has anyone considered what would have happened if the AF concorde which crashed in July 2000 had rejected the take off (even though post V1) instead of trying to pull her into the air while still short of V2?

"I've not seen any discussion of the exact distance remaining and their chances of coming to a full stop, but I find it hard to avoid a gut feeling that perhaps there might have been a few survivors if they'd aborted. Hindsight is everything, but once it left the ground the outcome was guaranteed, surely..."

I am but a simple SLF without pretense to aviation expertise; nonetheless--A) I am sure the question has been considered; B) as I remember reports following the event, the plane is loaded with 100 tons or tonnes take your choice of fuel on takeoff, and the fuel alone accounts for a large fraction of the total weight of the outfit, and once it gets up toward takeoff speed, stopping on the runway or a little beyond is simply not an option, there is simply no capability on the aircraft with any combination of brakes, reverse thrust, or whatever, to undo the momentum and stop the thing on the ground within runway/overrun limits. IE once up to speed with that plane, you are committed to lifting off and sorting out the problems in the air, and any attempt to stop is a guaranteed fireball.

If anyone would care to explain to me how to put quoted passages in the little box in smaller type, as I see in other posts, I would be grateful.

[lomapaseo]

If anyone would care to explain to me how to put quoted passages in the little box in smaller type, as I see in other posts, I would be grateful.



I could tell you but then I would have to break all your fingers:O

Just type the word "quote" inside those square looking brackets on your keyboard being sure to include a "/" character before the quote in the ending bracket.

It should look like this when you're finished

(quote) kjgkk hjjlkhlk jhll (/quote)

only be sure to use the square looking brackets instead of the parenthesis

[G5wannabe]

Very interesting post as I am still in the single pilot mode transversing into the CRM mode and lacking formal CRM training in the sim...several responses come to mind while reading:

1.) From reading post accidents and conducting informal studies in accidents and from reading the experts books, NTSB, FAA, Dr. So-So, etc, Is that whenever the crew conducted a pre-departure or pre-landing brief everyone was one the same page which accounted for a higher probability of whatever happened that everyone was able to call home afterwards...lateral thinking or following the SOP's rail. Our SOP states in bold type that "this is a written guideline and the Captain should exercise due diligence and common sense in the maters of safety." When we used up 2500' (?-wx, etc.) and fly at 95kts (never could see that 97kts on my side)V1/Vr are basically the same. When we fly out of a 5000' rwy we know that if there is a bang @ V1/Vr we'd pray the wing doesn't melt before we land. When flying out of KAMA (13,502’) we'd have 10,000 left there really is no need for discussion unless (…stir…stir…) we are no climbing through 1000‘AGL and reaching 160 kts.

2.) The AF accident~ (Did anybody watch the special on the Discovery Channel several weeks ago titled something like "Concorde: Accident in the making"?) If I remember they used roughly the same length of RWY as Amarillo, TX. I have no idea as I didn't take notes but IMHO what their V1 was that day only that it was faster than mine…probably at cruise. They ate up a lot more runway, in a lot less time, than we do on our worst day. The program also mentioned, as the reports that they also had a blown left main tire and but what they (the official report) didn’t mention prior to the tire causing the fire was the left main strut assembly was falling apart so the plane during was veering to the left of centerline prior to the fire. Basically due to the center piece falling off (?), the asphalt took the rubber off the tire causing the blow-out, causing the fire. From the pilots point of view, putting myself in their shoes, while trying to keep the airplane from waiting to go left; I would have seen a rather large company B747, waiting to cross my rwy getting bigger by the half/second out my window. From the pictures on TV the skid/burn marks on the runway clearly show a track going to the grass, to the left side of runway. Hence the Capt pulled the nose at V1, diverting a double plane accident on the airfield, because he sure couldn’t keep the plane on the runway centerline. Once the Concorde was air born no more veering to the left BUT if he kept it on the runway I’d image he would have hit the B747 just forward on the wing after going through the grass.

Comparing my King Air to the Concorde is like apples to oranges, I just know this that I don’t know or have enough experience to argue with a captain, in a crisis situation if he departed (laterally) from the OPS. I agree with 411A…The captain is the boss. I trust the OPS to be written by the individual(s) who has blown tires, lost engine cowlings at FL310 and experienced more than I have first hand. Not just read about like I have and personally I really should follow the OPS whenever possible. As far as Air France is concerned, if the tire blew, didn’t cause a fire, I don’t think they would have been able to successfully land the airplane with a missing left main gear assembly and the outcome would have still been less than satisfactory for the Concorde. The shape of the other tires can only be specualted but I'd summerize that they where pretty beat up.

Thanks for the education…
:ok:
An embarrased armchair Capt.

[Captain Stable]

Iomapaseo - rest assured that your point did not go unmissed among other readers! :ok:

[calypso]

I know this is a bit of a digression but I have finally bitten and must reply to 411A. I apologise for hijacking the topic.

A pilot I know was called one night for an ambulance flight. The flight was to a non IFR airport to pick up an organ for a transplant. Upon arrival to the airfield the FO asked about the destination weather, the captain (also the chief pilot) replied that it wasn't brilliant but lets go (in fact the WX was below catI). They departed in haste (well it was an ambulance flight afterall). After a short 30 minutes flight they arrived at the destination aerodrome and sure enough the visibility was around 400m. As there was no published IFR approach the Capt. said that he will do a GPS approach of his own design (I have done this many times before....) on short final the AC hit a pylon and after several bounces came to rest inverted on top of a house (fortunately empty at the time). The Capt. died instantly, the Fo hanged inverted from his harness for 3 hours in the dark awaiting help, immersed in the smell of flowing Kerosene (he survived but he lost a leg). Reading his recollection of events I don't recall reading that he was comforted by knowing that the buck had stopped with the Capt..

I pray that if I ever show one hundredth of such foolishness there is somebody there to stop me. Yet with you 411A I Know it is a waste of time.

I feel better now. My apologies.

V1, ah yes...

[foundation digger]

What an astonishing collection of posts.

V1 has nothing to do with sops.

V1 is a cetification requirement.

All public transport aircraft will be able to demonstrate performance in accordance with certification requirements, regardless of age.

Older aircraft do not perform as well but that is taken into account.

A certification module should be part of the professional licence and would help pilots understand background.

No failure i have ever had has been fully covered by check lists and sops, experience and common sense are essential components in arriving at the correct decision.

All crew members must be involved (if Possible)

[411A]

calypso,

And your point is...?

Suggest your friend should have gone sick when rostered with the Captain, as surely the (your friends) decision process was not impared before the flight...:sad:

Takes two to tango. One to lead, the other to follow.
A very few folks have strange ideas, and most companies have found out about these few.
Some however have super seniority, and are indeed difficult to get rid of...but are found out eventually, dead or alive.

Hopefully the latter.

Got the picture?:suspect:

[alf5071h]

One of the themes in this thread is that crew make conscious decisions and judgments about go/no go after V1.

A captain ‘rejected’ a take off at V2+10 and 50ft after lift off. His description of the event was that the aircraft vibrated so severely that he thought that it would not continue to fly. The circumstances were far beyond anything that he had experienced before, had been trained for, or could ever envisage.

The landing straight ahead on a long runway was uneventful, except for the ‘explosively’ damaged tyre that had caused the event.
However, in discussions following the incident debrief, it was indicated that if the take off had been on a short or ‘emotive’ runway (LCY) then his decision would have been to continue to fly.

Thus how does the length of runway affect a judgment as to the aircraft’s fitness for continued flight? Is this a conscious evaluation of the relative risks, or an unconscious reaction to the prospect of a higher risk?

Whatever the reasons, this Captain and others (and I hope you the readers) are now aware that severe events beyond any of your previous experiences can occur at takeoff. Some further experience can be gained by training in the simulator and relating such events as this.

I cannot recall any RTO accident where rejecting after V1, that the aircraft was not fit for continued flight; even the HS 748 at Stansted. Thus the balance of risk (carefully thought-out before flight) is that for those unconscious decisions above V1 it is safer to fly. SOPs and training instill appropriate actions, but they are also required for judgment situations.

Good background reading is in the FAA/Boeing Takeoff Safety Training Aid.

Risk figures for rejected take off; extracts from TSTA:-
33% of accidents occurred on runways that were wet or contaminated.
58% of accidents were initiated at speeds in excess of V1.
75% of accidents still had full takeoff power available.
76% of accidents did not involve engines.

[BOAC]

alf - I cannot recall any RTO accident where rejecting after V1, that the aircraft was not fit for continued flight; even the HS 748 at Stansted.

It might be of interest to you to talk to the guy concerned in that one. He was ADAMANT that the inspectors thought the wing would have quit before re-landing. The fire was EXTREMELY intense, and with this 748, near the main spar. I accept that we are into 20/20 hindsight here, but time was not on his side there.

PM me for further if you wish.

[alatriste]

Very interesying replies regarding this topic. As general rule all SOP call for a go decision when engine failure or any mafunction is recognized at or after V1. That is right, but we -as commanders- have the last choice.
You can still comply with the general rule when increasing V1 to Vr in certain conditions.
If you are taking off from a long runway, where you are well below the runway limited weight (RLW), you can check the corresponding V1 for this RLW and compare your actual Vr for your ATOW, if this Vr speed is much lower than V1 for RLW, you can very confidently equal your actual V1 to Vr. Take off is rejected while on ground. It is just a non balanced take off.
As far as this is briefied prior to take off, I think this procedure is much safer than going airbone with an engine failure, with 7.000 feet of tarmac remaining, just to be back on earth 10 minutes later.

[FJJP]

In a 4-jet, I once rejected just beyond V1 - a large flock of birds crossed the nose and impacted on both sides of the ac. Birds had gone down 2 of the engines, one on each side. We rolled gently down the runway, allowing the brakes to cool before clearing the runway onto the taxyway at the end. The t/o was obstacle limited, which was the V1 we were using. There was no requirement to calculate the range of V1s.

Beaing in mind what happened to the E3 in Alaska, where the ac hit birds on t/o and the crew continued as per SOP and subsequently crashed, maybe the V1 range should be calculated as an aid to the captains decision-making process.

Having said all that, there is no substitute for experience and thinking about the 'what if?' scenario, discussed and practised in the simulator before strapping the flying machine to one's butt.

[lomapaseo]

Beaing in mind what happened to the E3 in Alaska, where the ac hit birds on t/o and the crew continued as per SOP and subsequently crashed, maybe the V1 range should be calculated as an aid to the captains decision-making process.

I'm not sure how this incident ties in to the thread subject.

According to the CVR these guys were long long past V1 and at Vr when they struck the birds.

[trytofly]

Always an interesting subject and one I have discussed many times with other pilots. I haven't read all of the posts on this thread, and so mine may be a repeat.

I have been flying since 1980, and professionaly since 1989. I have in that time read or heard of stories that seem to support all arguements, both ways. Of all these the AF Concorde incident has been the most influential.

I have always questioned the V1 philosophy. I believe it is as dated as the whole performance package that a professional pilot is expected to study and digest. It is born from aviation of a wholly different technology, cabability and knowledge, and is now one of the few areas that remains so engulfed in tradition no one of influence seems prepared to challenge.

Along with this it ( performance ) is made so incredibly complicated that most do not understand it anyway.( though many think they do ).

However, I do believe that V1 ( or at least the principle behind it ) should remain for pilot info. but that the decision to go or stop be left to the pilot in charge on the day. What was going through the minds of those French pilots as they rotated a fiercely burning, underpowered, slow flying, out of control ( etc ) aircraft into completely unknown territory. God bless them.

History shows that both stopping and going after V1 has saved and killed. Let the pilot make the decision. (Until then..do as you are told............ or explain later if you're still around to do so.)

There may be no right or wrong...which is what makes this an emotive subject.

Best of luck. ( and there lies a clue )

[jc2354]

Weren't the accidents at JFK of a PeoplExpress 747 and TWA L1011, all due to rejected take-off after V1?

[411A]

The TWA L10 at JFK was actually airbourne...throttles were closed and the aircraft landed.
A perfectly flyable aircraft.
However, there was a stickshaker (false) just at liftoff.
Have given this scenario in the simulator, and the pilots seem to cope quite OK.

[BOAC]

trytofly - (like the name:D) agreed. There can never be 'legislation' or 'orders' to cope with this topic. It is part of what you take on when you take command.

I agree with others that we do not have a real idea of the ACTUAL stopping performance for a given runway in many cases where V1 is raised to Vr (back to the idea of VSTOP?), but it should be remembered that we are discussing an airborne 'abort' here really, and that has a huge area of uncertainty.

As someone else has said, there's those who died stopping above V1 and there's those that died continuing above V1.

There is a danger the whole subject will become too complex and too much of a training and certification issue to make it more of a hazard than leaving it to the Grim Reaper?

[john_tullamarine]

Following on from BOAC, consider that the AFM data and all the charts your airline produces or purchases are based on presumptions which will differ (to a greater or lesser extent) from the book on the actual day.

He who trusts unquestioningly in the book figures will, sooner or later, have a fright or worse.

Far better to have a general understanding of what this is all about and then be able to make sensible risk assessments from day to day and pad the particular takeoff appropriately, consistent with company reality.

Using V1/Vr = 1.0 (ie V1 = Vr) is not a problem provided that the AFM gives data for this case, as many do.

... and we all have seen the end of the runway disappear under the nose .. still on the ground ... and have (just possibly) had our doubts as to the probability of stopping in some circumstances ....

[timzsta]

I will say one thing:

rules are for the obedience of fools and the guidance of wise men.

[Captain Stable]

timzsta - who decides who falls into which category? The pilot himself? What do you do with a fool who thinks he is a wise man and breaks the rules foolishly?

I don't condone any platitude which gives a slick justification for breaking rules.

Rules are there for a reason. If the rules do not cover a given situation, then yu are breaking no rules by using your professional judgement.

Anyone who deliberately goes against the rules will be held answerable for the consequences. He must have a good reason to do so.

[lomapaseo]

rules are for the obedience of fools and the guidance of wise men.

Rare do we indeed have the wisdom of the basis for the rules flying in the cockpit to interpret when and where they apply.

Thus it is foolhardy to ignore the rules without ever understanding them.

[BlueEagle]

I see that you are a PPL and airline wannabe, I find your statement:

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
rules are for the obedience of fools and the guidance of wise men.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

quite frightening.

Fools will obey rules because they don't understand them, only that obedience is required, wise men will be guided by them because they understand their necessity and will, as a consequence, obey them. .

The expression you have quoted is only a comment on the variation of acceptance and not, as is widely thought, a comment on whether to accept or not. (It is also a cop-out used by people who have a problem with authority!;) ).

[john_tullamarine]

At the risk of steering the thread off topic, the past several posts lead to a number of areas where a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing.

One area of significance is that of MEL operations.

The MMEL is developed with input from a variety of stakeholders, cut down to the operator's MEL, and then interpreted by the people at the coal face.

With a single MEL situation, operation iaw with the MEL is probably covered pretty well by the MMEL deliberations. Doesn't always work well, though ... as a for instance one airline some years ago on the 737 (as I recall), misread the MEL provisions in respect of nacelle VGs/chines and had an aircraft floating around the system for quite a few days with one chine missing .. a windshear encounter could have proved quite interesting ...

Operation with MULTIPLE MEL snags is a whole different ball game and, I suggest, the average pilot or mechanic is not well placed to make a comprehensive determination as to whether or not it be reasonable to take such a bird on the next sector ...

[Yankee_Doodle_Floppy_Disk]

I thought of this discussion when reading the following article:

Those Dreadful POHs (Part 1) (http://www.avweb.com/cgi-bin/udt/im.display.printable?client.id=avweb&story.id=186015)

As the author points out, even the rules were written by a human. That person would have tried to cover every situation, but to do so is impossible. Some situations haven't been invented yet.

[India Four Two]

A interesting report, pertinent to this thread, is the
TSB Report (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/1995/a95h0015/a95h0015.asp) on a DC10 aborted takeoff after V1 at Vancouver in 1995.

An extract from "Section 1.14.2.3 Decision Making on Flight 17" states:


The captain's decision to reject was based on the fact that he did not recognize the initial sound and subsequent thumping noises, and that, because he thought the bang could have been a bomb, he had concerns about the integrity of the aircraft and its ability to fly. Also, the captain stated that, based on the rejected take-off provisions in the DC-10 Flight Manual and on a fatal DC8 accident that he had witnessed, he had developed a mental rule to not take an aircraft into the air if he suspected that there was aircraft structural failure.

[ssg]

I can tell there are a lot of potential crashes in this forum out there....

Ofcourse if you had plenty of runway, wheels on the ground, lose an engine post V1, pull the other throttles back, stop the aircraft.

Trying to continue the flight, put out the fire, try to get some climb gradient out of your one last engine, in the soup, and try to navigate back to an ILS or whatever is just silly, unless it's the best option.

Obviously given weather conditions (zero, zero), no ILS, mountains all around, and a go decision means flying over to another airport, vs stopping the aircraft on the ground...which decision would a smart pilot make?

SOPS are just that...standard operation procedures. What happens when things aren't standard?

Keep in mind if the plane is under max gross, and you did all your balanced field calcs, and you figured the climb gradients, and performance specs for the single engine climbout, and the subsequent hold, and approach, and possible no flap landing, ect, then for sure go ahead and fly the aircraft off.

I have deleted a paragraph here as it contained a modicum of intemperate comment.

When considering the Concorde crash and the decisions of the pilots, it is essential to keep in mind that the situation was extreme and the pilots (as is generally the case) only had a part of the story and had to make their decisions in a very short timeframe. Certainly, the situation was well outside the certification boundaries and whatever decision was taken was going to have a high probability of unpleasant consequences.

Having taken the decision to continue the takeoff, there is ample evidence to indicate that the crew did a first rate job in the stick and rudder work under extremely difficult circumstances.

Consideration of whether a different decision may have produced a better outcome will, and can only, remain a moot point.

Please, ladies and gentlemen, in this forum we strive for rational observation and comment. We will not tolerate posts (or parts thereof) which are grossly intemperate.

JT

Now we don't have the Concorde program.

Have fun.

[Chokdee]

ssg,
some of your comment's are well out of order. You seem very self opinionated and perhaps a little critical of others around you. However, it's a start having found the CRM forum !!.

[trytofly]

ssg

what a load of tripe.

My guess is you've never flown a multi crew airliner and don't really understand the term SOP's. I may be wrong, but that's the impression I get from what you've written.

SOP's help a pilot under pressure when it's all going wrong. They are the bottom line, they help to keep a level of control whilst the mind is working overtime trying to deal with a problem, and they cover 'most' conceiveable events. They also give a commander discretion, whereby he is given the authority to operate 'outside' of SOP's if he feels it is required for safety, and during those non conceiveable events.

They are absolutely not there purely for when it is all going 'standard'.

[M.85]

JT:ok:

M.85

[M.85]

One more related question here...
Having read thorouly about V1,V2 etc..I have remembered that if the Balance field available is greater than the Balance field required,a RANGE of V1 is possible,to be between VGO and VSTOP.
VSTOP being the LAST speed at which one cqn stop the A/C within the TODA,if V1 is BEFORE VSTOP...isnt the difference in speed between the two an extra margin to stop after an engine failure?I can understand the margin to be only a few knots.
Also,if slush at the end of the runway,a smaller V1 is given.
How can a pilot know how these V1 speed have been calculated??

Thank you again,

M.85

[miss d point]

mmmmm,
might be somewhat different with a heavy jet where often company policy and airmanship dictates that you use de-rated t/off pwr to save high engine egt's and therefore extend engine life.

V1 is if de-rating calculated so that you can stop before the end of the tarmac, it may well be the case that yes you could stop after v1 but you as a line pilot signing loadsheets etc etc you don't know that to be the case, therefore stick to the sopa's.

V1 and V2 are often no more than 2-5 kts apart on a transport a/c and therefore since v1 is the speed at which the first actions to bring the a/c to a stop should have already been carried out,
by the time you recognise a failure at v1 and made a decision to stop you will probably already be well past v2 and with a 100+ tons of airliner you are well into no mans land and out of a job.

regards

[alf5071h]

It appears that some or all of us should update our RTO training.

Files from the Boeing / FAA RTO Training guide are here:

Summary viewfoils (http://uk.geocities.com/[email protected]/Viewfoils.pdf) 752 kb


Section 2 RTOs, V1, decisions, performance, etc (http://uk.geocities.com/[email protected]/Section2_24.pdf) 1.8 mb Caution large file; use right click 'Save Target as' option.

Section 2 Wheels, brakes, calls, CRM, etc (http://uk.geocities.com/[email protected]/Section2_42.pdf) 1.5 mb Caution large file; use right click 'Save Target as' option.

ALF

[4dogs]

Timzsta,

Interesting that nobody commented on your misquotation and consequent inability to even grasp the significance of the correct quote:

"Rules are for the blind obedience of fools and the guidance of wise men"

Captain Stable and BlueEagle have dealt with the essential elements of the debate most adequately.

V speeds are certification speeds based on the engine failure scenario. Their relevance to other events that may occur at critical times is limited to a very important parameter - the energy state of the aircraft during the take-off phase.

Having an indication of whether the aircraft can stop or go is important to your decision making, almost as much as knowing when the indications are no longer relevant. Similarly, we need to be careful in translating the lessons from accidents in certain types into something more generic. While the risks of wing spar burn-through during an uncontrolled engine fire may affect some aircraft, will that justify a greater probability of overrun accidents in many other unrelated types because folks emotively ignore the longer history behind our current thinking on being "go" minded within sensible parameters.

SOPs create a decision framework to aid in the safe development of airmanship and useful experience. They provide some certainty in an occupation teeming with variables and choices. The best advice is to thoroughly understand why they direct you in particular ways - there is little progress without understanding the problem that the SOP tries to resolve or avoid.

Stay Alive

[M.85]

hi alf,

I cant open the file you gave us about the 737 v1 decisions,wheels...etc.
Do you have a website address?

Thanks,

M.85

[SLFguy]

:ooh: Spooky!! The Clash just played 'Should I stay or should I go now' on the radio while I was reading this thread!!

[M.85]

Did you hear it before,at or after V1?
Your answer lies in the question...IF you read all this thread:eek: :E

M.85