REX Shocker
Thread Starter
REX Shocker
I recently witnessed an atrocious landing (we all have our bad ones) by a REX crew at Grafton, NSW. The thing that makes this one stand out in my mind is the poor decision making which lead to the equally poor touchdown.
The approach was made from the south with a 7 - 10 KT southerly blowing. Those familiar with Grafton will be aware of the considerable slope down towards the North.
the aircraft rolled considerably due to the turbulence on late final and floated like a cork until its eventual touchdown at least two thirds of the way down the strip. The only impressive part of the event is that the crew actually managed to prevent an over-run. It was clear that the aircraft still had a great deal of momentum when turning to backtrack.
The only reason I am posting this is to ask, "how does a crew allow a situation like this to occur without making an early decision to modify their original intentions" surely the writing was on the wall for them when observing the prevailing conditions.
L
The approach was made from the south with a 7 - 10 KT southerly blowing. Those familiar with Grafton will be aware of the considerable slope down towards the North.
the aircraft rolled considerably due to the turbulence on late final and floated like a cork until its eventual touchdown at least two thirds of the way down the strip. The only impressive part of the event is that the crew actually managed to prevent an over-run. It was clear that the aircraft still had a great deal of momentum when turning to backtrack.
The only reason I am posting this is to ask, "how does a crew allow a situation like this to occur without making an early decision to modify their original intentions" surely the writing was on the wall for them when observing the prevailing conditions.
L
We have been considering this scenario recently in our simulator sessions under the heading "baulked landings".
The aim of the training was to get across the message that an approach/landing could be rejected even after touchdown (so long as reverse hadn't been selected) and that we should never think in terms of being "committed" thus making the reject decision harder.......
The aim of the training was to get across the message that an approach/landing could be rejected even after touchdown (so long as reverse hadn't been selected) and that we should never think in terms of being "committed" thus making the reject decision harder.......
Last edited by ETOPS; 6th Dec 2012 at 07:53.
Thread Starter
ETOPS, that would be a move in the right direction. Perhaps more focus should also be placed on the decision making process of multi-crew operations. I do believe that what I observed was borne of naievity or even ignorance on behalf of the crew concerned.
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Did you question the pilots about the quality of their approach?
No, probably not.
The point is, unless you are actually involved or are on the crash investigation team, it is difficult to meaningfully question the decisions of the operating pilots. Insufficient data on which to start a thread criticising the professionalism of others. IMHO
No, probably not.
The point is, unless you are actually involved or are on the crash investigation team, it is difficult to meaningfully question the decisions of the operating pilots. Insufficient data on which to start a thread criticising the professionalism of others. IMHO
Thread Starter
@bacp, the quality of the approach and resultant arrival was more than enough evidence for my appraisal. No matter the methodology or process, the result was far from an acceptable standard. My question is simply " How does a crew of two allow an aircraft to end up in such a position"?
