Those of you blaming the person running the company in Joburg are doing so unjustly and it is totally disappropriate at this time. He might of had his share in the past, however this does not automatically mean anything to what happened now - he has absolutly no control for an aeroplane flying into terrain - he did not force them to fly and he trusts crew to make their own deceisions as that is what they are getting paid for.

This crew was by no means incompetant, especially the skipper would take no cr:mad:p from anyone - not even his boss. He was respected greatly by everyone in the company and was most probably the most senior captain of all.

Something terrible has happened here, nobody knows why or what had happened so stop writing such far fetched bullsh:mad: This did not happen because the crew did not have Jeppcharts etc. or was not equipped with essentials or experience. Until we do not know what or who is to blame, we should not accuse anyone in public until proven guilty.

I'm sure this will be respected.

The skipper was a friend of mine and I was only asking about him the other day. Rest well in heaven.

B-1900 crash DRC
 

Unfortunately some operators send crews with little or no experience of flying in DRC.
The eastern part of the DRC is a very tricky to fly ,no only because of terrain but nasty weather and poor ATC.

I personaly think that sending inexperienced pilots there is just no the right thing to do.
Many experience pilots flying in DRC still respect the weather and the terrain .

If you are a young pilot with little experience Congo is NOT the place where you wan't to built experience; my personal point of view of course.

fly safe

The skipper was neither young nor inexperienced and whilst agreeing with the gist of your post in general it's not relevant here.

I agree with Propellerpilot. No one knows what happened and frankly we may never really know. No point slinging mud. When I say slinging mud I'm refering to posts regarding the operator, not the previous post.

Rags said, 'In bad weather a CFIT in that area is a good possibility. There is no approach into Bukavu and no beacons.'

That is the most ridiculous thing I have ever heard, CFIT is only a 'good' (I think you mean high) possibility because one decides to go below the MSA, in the abscense of any nav aids or approaches, when the weather is LESS than VMC, and unfortunately therein lies the problem with that part of the world, which was my initial question,

Is there pressure to get the job done, otherwise I am struggling to understand why an experienced and competant crew, as it has been said already, would enter into the gamble of descending below the MSA in bad weather while aware of the terrain below.

I am not trying to aportion blame on to the crew, but something must have influenced them to try to get in, and as it has been written already, I am sure they were aware as everyone who has posted is, just how perrilous the Goma region can be in bad weather.

I disagree with Gooneybird somewhat because as she said there is a good chance the facts will never be known, then it is down to sensible discussion and debate to try and understand what may have caused this so it doesnt happen to others.

The trouble is south coast without reliable information we may never know. It could have been anything from mechanical failure to a culture of using makeshift approaches. It's all guesses and therefore hardly worth the effort of writing.

It's been a long time since I was in that region, is there really no approach? I seem to remember there being one?

What about a probability, that there was a mountain wave and extreme downdraft from thunderstorm or microburst activity that made them lose a lot of hight in an instant? or maybe the control-surfaces got damaged by extreame turbulence and became uncontrollable. Could that be possible ?

Just a month ago, I had a personal conversation with this very captain himself about exactly this subject because I wanted to learn something - he explained the dangers of this particular region and the problems of flying into Goma in IMC (which is basically next door) in great detail. This man had over a thousand of hours on type and has flown in the region and knew what it takes to fly there. It would surprise me, if they really did go below MSA volountarily, if not clear of terrain. Rudi was just about to upgrade to captain himself and has also had his share of Congo experience before this tragedy struck.

There used to be an GNSS Approach published in the Jepp. 2006 Don't know if it has been withdrawn. However ZS aircraft and crew as far as I know, have to be certified to use thease approaches and GPS is not permitted as a sole reference for navigation.

GNSS
 

Yip, there is a GNSS app, with a step decend. They could have been "out-of-step" It happens so darn easily, maybe a bit of complacency. One tend to forget a step decend if you think you know the plate, ive seen it in my own experience. Doing a letdown with a citation in west Africa - reduced visibility, but with the ground and runway insight. I told my FO to stay on the letdown as its good practise. Asked him if he would like to brief me on the plate and he replied with "i know the procedure" He went out of step with me keeping visual contact outside. Obvioulsy there was a reason for the step and I told him to look up - there was a huge hill right infront of him! Great experience and a good lesson. As I said, it happens so bloody easily!

The past week has seen 2 plane crashes involving ZS reg planes one at rand airport and now this, everybody died, 20 people gone............................this added to the almost countless number of fatal general aviation accidents that have occurred in the past 12 -24 months.

As pilots there's a small part of us that says we would make a better decision if placed in the situations that lead to all these crashes and hopefully we all will. We all need to start taking our flying more seriously and understand our limitations and that regardless of whatever experience we have there is always going to be situations or combination of events/circumstances that will be above our personal limitations.



My deepest sympathy to all the families

Would the airplane have had a CVR or FDR?

Thanks,

jt

My deepest sympathy to all the family and friends of the passengers and crew. Even though I did not personally know anybody involved, it is always a very sad day to hear of an accident like this one.

To answer JTrain's question, a B190 is equipped with both a CVR and a FDR. I'm just not sure whether anybody will actually analyse them.

Prop Job

GPS approaches
 

Can anybody quote of attach a SACAA document that allows ZS registered aircraft to do GPS approaches !!!

Should be interesting to see whether the insurance company will pay Cemair, Hull insurance or any insurance after their investigation.

Does the UN not provide flight crews TAF's and Metars for the destination and alternate wx

I think that depends entirely on whether the legislation governing the operation of the aircraft mandated either one.

The problem is, what legislation governed the flight, and what regulatory authority provided the oversight? The American FAA, because Air Serv (an American Part 91 operator) sold the tickets and hustled the charters? The South African CAA, in light of fact that the beneficial owner of the aircraft and the company that supplied the crew (Cemair) is South African? The policies and practices of the AOC holder (presumably Star Air Cargo, also of ZA)? The legislation of the DRC, the country where the aircraft was based and and also the point of origin and destination of the flight?

Or... did this entire rather convoluted arrangement manage to fall between the cracks and, as a result, was never supervised by any regulatory authority?

On page 1 of this thread, reference was made to ZS-OLD. Earlier this year, I observed that the Air Serv / Cemair aircraft operating in the DRC was ZS-OLG.

Does anyone know with certainty what the registration (and MSN) of the aircraft was?

This is Africa... T/storms are huge and like all T/storms, are dynamic, are localized and move/ develop and dissipate in short spaces of time... That part of the world (eastern Congo) is probably the most testing I've flown anywhere.... (and that includes the arctic in winter). High ground, vicious weather and little or nothing in the way of support... It's flying country that is very intollerant of mistákes in judgement or a sloppy approach to flying.... and even the best crews ( and these two were probably among the best out there by all acounts) can come to grief doing what they've done many times before and survived.... maybe they got caught in a violent down-draft... maybe they lost control due to getting too close to an abnormally large cell... maybe we'll never know.
It can happen to the best of us... unless we always elect to stay on the ground. whenever conditions are less than ideal... and they're rarely ideal in eastern Congo.

Devastating news. My thoughts are with the familys of those involved. I do not doubt that they did everything in their power to stay safe in an incredibly difficult environment.

Crew obviously not professional
 

1. Found out that UN does provide crews with wx and Bukavu is a UN operated airport. So they would have had a current TAF if they asked for it.
2. There is a high Grid MORA or as some have confused as the MSA, one has to have a published approach to get a MSA
3. ZS aircraft flying outside SA even for other contacting states are still under SA airlaw for operating aircraft. Therefore they cannot do GNSS approaches
4. Aircraft would have to have GPS coupled to HSI and be TSO129C approved
5. Crews would have to have the approved GNSS training if and when the SACAA approves GNSS approaches.
6. The Insurance company will probably not pay out any Insurance
7. The passengers families could sue the companies involved (Air Serv and Cemair) together with the Pilots estates

So for those of you wanting to fly like cowboys in Africa .... you might pay with your life

Aic 40.9

RNAV ARRIVAL AND NON PRECISION APPROACH
TRIALS AND DEMONSTRATIONS

1. This AIC intends to notify the ATM community that ATNS will be commencing with RNAV arrival and NPA trials and demonstrations in accordance with the ICAO planning targets and SARPS.
BACKGROUND
2 The global Air Navigation Plan, Doc 9750, guides the regions in their quest towards full implementation of CNS/ATM Systems. Improvements in navigation have already seen the progressive introduction of RNAV fixed routes as is mentioned in Doc 9750 and implemented in SA AIP ENR 3.3 – 5 paragraph 3.3.6. Further to this the introduction of RNAV arrivals and NPA’s must compliment the fixed RNAV routes.
3. The world-wide CNS/ATM Systems Implementation Conference held in 1998 mandated the regional planning process and implementation of the systems.
4. Doc 9750 stipulates that the AFI region must introduce fixed RNAV ATS routes progressively from 1994 through to 2010. This has been achieved in certain areas. RNAV arrivals for the AFI Region must be progressively introduced from 2003 onwards to 2010. This phase is in planning for trials and demonstrations.
5. AFI Doc 003 from where the National Airspace Masterplan obtains planning targets states that fixed RNAV ATS routes must be progressively introduced from 1999 onwards and that this must be followed by the introduction of GNSS based procedures with GNSS currently being accepted as part of the RNAV equipment for consideration.
6. The South African National Airspace Masterplan encourages the progressive introduction of RNP 1 from the year 2003 onwards.

GENERAL

7. ATNS, in order to complement the fixed RNAV routes, intends to trial and demonstrate RNAV arrival procedures commencing at the exit waypoints established at the end of the fixed RNAV routes. The RNAV arrival procedure will terminate at the beginning of the existing and conventional precision approach, alternatively, under agreed to conditions, will terminate on the planned GNSS NPA.

8. The trials and demonstrations for the RNAV arrival procedures and GNSS NPA’s will be conducted at the following airports:

• FACT – runway 01 only

• FADN – runway 24 only

• FAJS – runway 03R only

9. In order to participate in the above-mentioned trials and demonstrations airline operators will have to comply with the undermentioned minimum aircraft equipment.

• GNSS type receiver compliant with TSO C129-A with automatic turn anticipation and way point sequencing (RAIM monitoring is compulsory).
CONCLUSION
10. Airline operators who comply with the above-mentioned minimum aircraft equipment requirements and which are interested in participating in the trials and demonstrations are invited to register their interest with: - - 2
• General Manager: Air Traffic Management (Planning & Standards) ATNS ISANDO
E-MAIL : http://www.pprune.org/?emailimage=c9...6158ac17cbc5b3
FAX : 011 392 3946
11. ATNS will ensure that participants receive an RNAV arrival procedure operation manual for the trials and demonstrations after entering into a memorandum of understanding between the two parties, which will contain the conditions as approved by the SACAA

Why even bother with a crash investigation. It seems Heli-jet has got all the answers. Heli-Jet, were you there? Were you in the cockpit when things started to go South? Obviously not, so I would appreciate it if you don't jump to conclusions so quickly. Obviously what you are explaining is a possibility, but it is only that, A POSSIBILITY. In that part of the world there are a number of other things that could cause this.

Blame Games
 

Guys people died here, let us not investigate the crash yet, let us not jump to conclusions & let us not blame the crew. God forbid if I was in that cockpit seconds before impact.

However what I would like to say CLEARLY is that all aviators should rather look at the organizational methodologies that led to this disaster becasue once again people died.

And its not good enough for Suzanne Musgrave to say:

No Air Serv personnel were involved in the crash, group spokesperson Suzanne Musgrave told AP by telephone from Warrenton.

She said the plane was being flown by a South African commercial company, Cem Air.

Nor is it safe, good form or in any way professional to tag onto AOC's as ASI havent got one to start with and just like Cemair is being blamed for "blood on hands", ASI have a very sullied reputation becasue to date they have had:
1X C210 go down in Uganda
1X B200 have a gear failure = 100% mechanics error in West Africa.
IX Heli Pilot shot & killed in Afghanistan
1X Caravan totalled in Mozambique
1X Otter totalled in DRC
1X Heli side swipe a mountain in Afghanistan

And now 17 dead people; is that what its going to take to clean out this rotten apple barrel?

The above "blood on hands" is what normally happens when you are a nickel & dime organization with millions of dollars wasted, no AOC no Oversight etc.

I wish that this "killing of aircraft & crews" will stop when ASI closes its doors and stop riding the coat tails of others :ugh:

Any good lawyers out there to start filing suit?

Prop job .... let it make it simple for you

B1900 have two engines, unless there is a catasthophic failure, they continue flying. If well maintained B1900's don't fall out of the sky.
IF rated Pilots, should know about Grid MORA, ( cumulo granite not good that's why there is Grid Mora)
WX bad in Bukavu, no Approved approach in Bukavu - wihout VMC conditions.... go to alternate and wait it out.

Insurance investigators will probably check maintenance records to see whether there were any oustanding MEL's .... sorry what am I thinking pilots in Africa don't write up defects, then when it bites them in the ass everybody says what great guys they were and how they are so professional and how they don't take any cr.p from their employers.

Prop Job at a tender age of 23 let this be a lesson for you ... nobody forces you to fly, and aircraft just don't fly into the ground or drop out of the sky. You as PIC are accountable and have to set a good example for your SIC. There are legal ramifications, it is a pity they don't teach or emphasis this with airlaw.

The DRC CAA has a GNSS approach and so does the SACAA into Bukavu both differ with steep approach (glide angles) and if you where in a B1900 on the missed approach single engine you would be flying to the crash site.

Jeppesen does not have either of these approaches in their data base, therefore when you load up your FMS or GPS data card you will not have them there to do the approach. There are legal ramifications and Jeppesen is not stupid.

Pilots seem to think that you can take these third world approaches and load the waypoints into their GPS's and then fly the approach. The problem is that when you do that you only have enroute accuracy which is 5nm instead of the 0.3nm accuracy required in APPROACH MODE. That is why you need a RNP stand alone FMS or a TSO145 stand alone GPS in your aircraft to do a GNSS approach where there are no other approach aids such as Bukavu. Accuracy is important when using the GNSS and remember to check your RAIM before you do the approach.

Grizzly that's why you need training before you blast off into GPS lala land. I sure would like to see you explain your way out in a court room using your logic ... I quote you "The RSA pilot licence no longer specifies rated approach types, so as long as the crew were current on GNSS approaches, they were legally entitled to fly the approach in IMC below the MSA"

Pity you cannot ask the Russians that flew into the side of the montain in Bukavu back in 2006 using their hand held GPS's. Why they didn't get the required training to do a GPS approach. I am sure the insurance investigators will be looking at the B1900's GPS to see what they had and if it was legal.

The UN issued a memo to all flight crews in August 2006 not to do a GNSS approach into Bukavu because of everything I have said above.

Grizzly you are demonstating your lack of knowledge of GNSS requirements for:
1. Aircraft requirements
2. Crew training
3. Operating the GNSS for the approach
4. Legal requirements to fly the said approach

All I can say is be careful before you use the GNSS on an approach anywhere in the world .... do your homework !!!!!!

How do you know that they didn't have the TAF?
How do you know what kind of approach they were flying and what equipment they had on board or what training the pilots have had? How do you know what the insurance company will do or what they will figure out about the crash? Do you already have the transcripts of the CVR? Was there even a CVR?

Having flown into and out of Bukavu for a period of 4-5 years, just over 10 years ago, with B1900 and B200, it reminds me of a story I witnessed. (Many stories in Bukavu alone)

I landed in Bukavu in rain 1995, NDB approach, half tar, half gravel runway in those days and was hoping for a quick turn around. I called for start and was told by ATC “Standby, we have two B737 inbound”.

I listened out and watched the first B737 Air Zaire land. The ATC began asking the second one his position, to which he was not able to give exact details. Tower cleared him for approach and I continued to standby for start. After ten minutes, or so, the second B737, says “field in sight” to which he was cleared to land, however no one could see him. The first B737 asked the second guy what was his position and he said he had landed. No second B737 could be seen anywhere.

Then the first B737 captain asked the second (missing) B737 guy what was the runway heading and elevation of the runway he was on, to which the other guy responded.

It turns out that the second B737 over flew Bukavu, landed on the other side of Lake Kivu, in Kemembe Rwanda, into a 1400m strip, where SAFAIR L100 was operating from. An extremely short strip, high elevation for a B737. I was asked by ATC to overfly Kamembe and confirm that the B737 was on the airfield, which I was able to confirm. I am sure some of the SAFAIR guys will confirm this story of the B737 which was at the end of their runway. (Hey Paulo!)

This B737 landed in the wrong country, which was at war with Zaire in those days and on the wrong side of the lake, into the wrong runway, of wrong direction and wrong elevation and claimed to have completed and NDB app field insight and landed 5 nm away. It took years to get the B737 out, a piece agreement between two countries, unloaded to make it very light and it was flown to GOMA, refueled and back to Kinshasa.

The point is, it is very easy to screw up anywhere no matter the size or the experience of the crew or aircraft!

We all try to be professional with tools we have to work with! How we carry out the duties as individuals, is a different story!

Goffel wrote ... "Apparently it was CFIT.......Gear was apparently down and hit terrain on the descent.(8 nm's from touchdown)."

Will be interesting to see what the CVR and FDR reveals.

The Goma Caravan (KAS) crash a couple years ago .... investigator reported that the Captain's wife (passenger) was found still strapped to the PIC seat when they arrived on the crash site.

guys and girls...it was NOT an UN operated a/c. it was operated by Airserv Intl. the airserv crews do not have access to any UN facilities!
they have to make use of the no good congolese weather service and pay $10 for...that is IF you get any weather!

Heli-Jet

I think is not difficulty to do an approach in bad weather if you know how to use OBS MODE.
I'm russian pilot and I fly in RDC 14 years.

http://i048.radikal.ru/0809/1d/8268bf0bce20.jpg

This is Bukavu RNAV GNSS approach chart.

http://s46.radikal.ru/i112/0809/b5/92acd767d2cf.jpg

Heli-Jet:

Respectfully, may I point out that your posts are coming across as a bit 'belligerent'. You certainly have considerable knowledge to contribute to this discussion, but please, let's keep the focus on What is right and not on "Who was right".

Before you hit the 'post' button, review what you have written in your messages from a CRM perspective, drawing upon your knowledge in that area.

Thanks for your consideration of this request. It is, after all, a pretty somber topic - and a lot of the people who are participating here knew the crewmembers.

I'm a bit perplexed by that observation. My understanding of how navigation information is published, according to ICAO practice, is that it works like this:

1) The regulatory agency for the country in which the approach exists approves the approach, which is actually written in ARINC 424 compliant text, not pictorial form, then publishes that information.

2) Commercial organizations that publish navigation information, such as Jeppesen, then depict that information as they wish to (pictorially, by text, or in electronic database format) and promulgate it to their customers. Airlines that are sufficiently large may also create their own documents from the original information published by the state in which the approach is located.

No organization other than the regulatory authority of the state in which the approach is published, or an air carrier acting with the approval of their regulatory agency, may modify the content of the published information in any way. In other words, all that organizations such as Jeppesen do is add value by publishing the information in an easy to read or easy to access format.

I could accept that the CAA of the DRC has published an approach for Bukavu - it's in their country - but I cannot comprehend how the South African CAA could publish an approach for Bukavu unless it was an exact rendition of the data promulgated by the DRC CAA.

As for the approach not being in your electronic database - that is not, by itself, proof that Jeppesen has not published it. Some electronic databases are abridged to keep the file size to a minimum, for example, by excluding airports with runways below a certain length. Very modern aircraft with fully integrated avionics will not even present an approach to the pilot if the aircraft does not have the equipment required to fly the approach (in other words, what's the point of an aircraft displaying a DME-DME approach if it only has one DME in it?) The best way to check to see if Jeppesen has published it would be to check in a printed Jeppesen manual that you know has complete coverage of the DRC.

http://i425.photobucket.com/albums/p...MAairport1.jpg http://i425.photobucket.com/albums/p...crazi/FZMA.jpg

As we are all aware it is a sad thread, a number of people have lost their lives and their families have lost loved ones.

It becomes even harder because some people who are posting also knew the people concerned, so emotion also plays a part in peoples' objectivity.

When it is someone we know who has died, it can sometimes seem impossible that they could have made a mistake or could have been at fault.

As it has already been said, all the facts are not known, so it falls to speculation.

However, the known facts are,

1.The crew decided to descend below the grid MORA.
2.They were in mountainous terrain.
3.The weather was bad.
4.The outcome.

We all have to make decisions and live with them. We all try to make the best decision possible given the factors present, the situation, our knowledge and many other factors.

Most of the time we make good decsions and sometimes bad decisions can be made. Sometimes good decisions are made and then an external factor which could not have been forseen can override what was initially a good decision.

Basically, I am sure the crew in question made a decision, was it the best one, that is open for debate, but they made it and tried their best to make it successful and as already said, none of us were there and therefore will never know what made them arrive at their decision.

All we can do is accept they made one, whether it was a good one or a bad one.

While I certainly don't want to jump to any conclusions about the accident under discussion, there are a few important points that should be clearly understood, or expanded upon about modern (RNAV/GPS/GNSS) navigation methods that don't appear to be well-enough understood within the industry, and in particular, within the (very challenging) deep-dark African contract environment.

To be reasonable, I am obliged to admit not having operated under such conditions for some time, and as a pilot for a major airline, I am certainly not exposed to the highly variable conditions that contract pilots need to deal with on a daily basis.

That said, and as someone who has been heavily involved with the development and implementation of RNAV operations throughout the African continent, there are a few really important points, which I feel, should be made, and which may just help others to stay safe out there.

1. All South African registered operators require SA-CAA approval to conduct RNAV / GNSS operations. This approval is required for safety reasons, and any accident relating to the use of such nav' techniques would come under intense scrutiny by both the CAA and, of course, all related insurance companies. These will quite likely include the pilot’s life insurers.

CAA approval includes aircraft certification / technical compliance, pilot training, and organizational support issues.

2. The cockpit resource management aspects associated with such approaches are significantly different from the usual Radio-Nav operations which most of us were trained in, and warrant careful SOP development. Pilot situational awareness can very easily be lost during such operations, and this must be well catered for when planning, and training-for such a capability.

3. Electronic Navigation databases MUST be thoroughly checked for data integrity before being released for line use. Such checks are required over and above the basic quality checks, which are performed by the providers (EG: Jeppesen). The Nav databases change every 28 days, in accordance with the ARINC-424 cycle, and should be updated accordingly. This is often not done by operators in "far-off" places, and database integrity will certainly be compromised as a result of this reality. An out-of-date navigation database should not be used for IFR navigation... EVER.

Please forgive me if I sound like a smart-alek in this post, but the safety considerations surrounding RNAV operations are more involved than what many "smaller" (respectfully) operators realize. My advice to pilots operating in such an environment would be to avoid using this technology until the company has provided proper training, and the AOC is endorsed by the CAA for RNAV / GNSS operations.

Be careful... and don't allow yourselves or your colleagues to be lulled into an unsafe operation due to a lack of training or proper process. Your lives are worth more than that.

Safe flying folks!

Pitch&Fan.

The Jeppesen GNSS approach is for RWY 35. The first waypoint is at or above 11'000 feet before the step letdown SW of airport. Apparently, the wreckage is located 8 nm NW of the airport at 10'000 feet, right on the top of the highest mountain range when you come in from Kisangani. If you make a FliteStar route FZIC-FZMA direct GPS, the crash site is spot on the route. It was raining heavily in the region at that time.

Very sad to hear about this one. My thoughts are with the family and friends of those lost.

I have flown into Bukavu many a time, it is quite scary in bad weather. I made sure to keep visual contact with the ground at all times and tried to have an escape route at all times Never had a go at the approach that was posted.

RIP Lads :(

Bakavu jungle Jepp
 

I see here is jepp plates posted for bakavu. Can anyone post the Airserv jungle jepp for bakavu. I know they do have JJ for all rwy's they operate to in DRC with their own revised MSA. I have seen them.

I doubt very much that a JJ exists for Bukavu... I never saw one during my time with ASI though it's possible that one exists from the days prior to Jepp plates including the airport in its modern form. JJs are produced by and for operators utilizing small strips for which no approach has been listed. They do not (in my experience) detail any form of 'grandmothers let-down', they simply give a brief basic layout of the airstrip showing areas of concern to pilots ... a hill... runway slope ... people / cattle in the vicinity etc. I've constructed them myself and have never detailed any form of suggested let-down, including only a very generous MSA from each sector. Bukavu is a major airport (for that region) with published approach plates and would not warrent a JJ.
I hope you weren't implying that ASI or any other respected operator laid out their own MSAs or procedures that ran contrary to accepted practices.
Bush flying requires flying skills not commonly found (or taught) outside of areas of extreme remoteness. Those skills are adapted, practised and polished over time and if the pilots are cautious, dedicated, develop good judgement and are not too unlucky they become sought after professionals.... they are not cowboys, they simply aquire over time, skills that are not ordinarily found outside of those remote regions, being it the Congo, Alaska or some vast desert. The flying doesn't suit everybody and I've had the experience of flying with people from cosseted airline backgrounds who while being very competant in their own field found it impossible to make the mental adjustment to operations away from their familiar, civilised environment. They simply thought it dangerous and were unable to make the mental leap required to become accomplished in the field of remote area operations.
This form of flying can never attain the safety margins enjoyed by scheduled airline ops and if the operators were forced to adopt those procedures then flying in remote areas would cease altogether.
To a large extent the pilots flying in these regions are their own policemen and their own safety inspectors... the majority that I've had the privilege to work with became extremely adept at fulfilling those posts while achieving a very acceptable rate of success in getting the job done.
My best wishes to all of them who have now moved on and especially to those still out there... Stay safe guys.

Bush flying requires.....etc

Absolutely the spot on, the best distinguishment between airline ops and bush ops I ever read.

I second that, an awesome and realistic post...one of the first on this thread :ok: