Of 25 yr-old commanders and heavy equipment
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Well I am also not a youngster and also not a sky god although I do not mind when people call me one.
I guess though that the sky god you use in your example has a better chance of being correct than the youth.
'I did it the hard way and so should you' is not a kindly attitude I think.
I guess though that the sky god you use in your example has a better chance of being correct than the youth.
'I did it the hard way and so should you' is not a kindly attitude I think.
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Copied from another site,but I think incidents like this highlight the fact that when things are going normal, having 400hr co-pilots next to you is fine,its when things go pear shaped that you need experience next to you to back you up!!!
Age is not the issue,but amount of experience at the time,btw I got command on a medium at 24.
Just ask the guys at Express!
Ryanair captain flew unstable approach days after son's death
By David Kaminski-Morrow (Flight Global)
Quote:
Investigators believe a newly bereaved Ryanair captain's psychological state, combined with his co-pilot's inexperience, led to an unplanned and highly unstable approach to Rome during poor weather conditions.
Italy's ANSV investigation agency says the captain's three-month-old son had died just a few days before the Niederrhein-Rome Ciampino flight, but he had not informed anyone of the situation, partly out of concern for his job.
The ANSV, which has just released details of the September 2005 incident, adds that the co-pilot of the Boeing 737-800 - who had just 300h on type from 475h total - had not previously flown in adverse weather conditions.
The crew had already been forced to weave a path around storms during a prolonged attempt to land at Ciampino. But instead of diverting to its alternate, Pescara, the crew opted for an unplanned diversion to Rome Fiumicino.
The investigation agency says the crew failed to brief properly for this, and did not update the flight management system during the turbulent conditions, resulting in the pilots' rapidly losing position awareness.
While south of Fiumicino and being flown manually, the jet started turning right at 3,880ft (1,180m) in preparation for the 34L approach. It crossed the extended 34L centreline, but continued to veer to the right, crossing the centreline of 34L again.
The ANSV says the co-pilot failed to switch radio frequency to Fiumicino approach and instead requested descent to 2,000ft. As the aircraft was heading for the parallel 34R approach path, controllers ordered an immediate descent to 1,000ft because this approach was in use by a Club Air flight.
The 737 crossed the 34R centreline at 1,650ft, about 5km (3nm) behind the Club Air flight, and controllers instructed the Ryanair crew track left and realign with the 34L approach.
But the crew was not informed that they were flying too low - 770ft below the correct profile of 2,200ft - and the situation deteriorated as the aircraft, according to the captain, entered a violent downward microburst. The 737 recrossed the 34R extended centreline, while still about 11km south of the runway, at just 370ft before finally abandoning the approach and diverting to Pescara.
It landed with 1,250kg (2,750lb) of fuel, from an initial upload of 8,200kg that covered the flight minimum, plus 950kg for contingency.
The ANSV says the unplanned diversion left the crew "without a definite strategy" and a "largely absent" decision-making process. Loss of situational awareness meant the captain, already in a poor psychological state, was forced to concentrate solely on flying the aircraft, with the co-pilot able to provide only limited support - although the ANSV credits the co-pilot with prompting the final decision to abort.
Issues about access to timely weather information and the need for better minimum safe altitude warnings, as well as the possibility of fatigue, are also highlighted by the investigation.
Ryanair changed its operations manual following the incident to emphasise the flight safety implications of personal trauma, and the importance of notification to flight operations management.
Age is not the issue,but amount of experience at the time,btw I got command on a medium at 24.
Just ask the guys at Express!
Ryanair captain flew unstable approach days after son's death
By David Kaminski-Morrow (Flight Global)
Quote:
Investigators believe a newly bereaved Ryanair captain's psychological state, combined with his co-pilot's inexperience, led to an unplanned and highly unstable approach to Rome during poor weather conditions.
Italy's ANSV investigation agency says the captain's three-month-old son had died just a few days before the Niederrhein-Rome Ciampino flight, but he had not informed anyone of the situation, partly out of concern for his job.
The ANSV, which has just released details of the September 2005 incident, adds that the co-pilot of the Boeing 737-800 - who had just 300h on type from 475h total - had not previously flown in adverse weather conditions.
The crew had already been forced to weave a path around storms during a prolonged attempt to land at Ciampino. But instead of diverting to its alternate, Pescara, the crew opted for an unplanned diversion to Rome Fiumicino.
The investigation agency says the crew failed to brief properly for this, and did not update the flight management system during the turbulent conditions, resulting in the pilots' rapidly losing position awareness.
While south of Fiumicino and being flown manually, the jet started turning right at 3,880ft (1,180m) in preparation for the 34L approach. It crossed the extended 34L centreline, but continued to veer to the right, crossing the centreline of 34L again.
The ANSV says the co-pilot failed to switch radio frequency to Fiumicino approach and instead requested descent to 2,000ft. As the aircraft was heading for the parallel 34R approach path, controllers ordered an immediate descent to 1,000ft because this approach was in use by a Club Air flight.
The 737 crossed the 34R centreline at 1,650ft, about 5km (3nm) behind the Club Air flight, and controllers instructed the Ryanair crew track left and realign with the 34L approach.
But the crew was not informed that they were flying too low - 770ft below the correct profile of 2,200ft - and the situation deteriorated as the aircraft, according to the captain, entered a violent downward microburst. The 737 recrossed the 34R extended centreline, while still about 11km south of the runway, at just 370ft before finally abandoning the approach and diverting to Pescara.
It landed with 1,250kg (2,750lb) of fuel, from an initial upload of 8,200kg that covered the flight minimum, plus 950kg for contingency.
The ANSV says the unplanned diversion left the crew "without a definite strategy" and a "largely absent" decision-making process. Loss of situational awareness meant the captain, already in a poor psychological state, was forced to concentrate solely on flying the aircraft, with the co-pilot able to provide only limited support - although the ANSV credits the co-pilot with prompting the final decision to abort.
Issues about access to timely weather information and the need for better minimum safe altitude warnings, as well as the possibility of fatigue, are also highlighted by the investigation.
Ryanair changed its operations manual following the incident to emphasise the flight safety implications of personal trauma, and the importance of notification to flight operations management.
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experience
I would rather my family fly with an experienced 25 year old who has been an instrument flight instructor , some single-pilot light twin time, who has actual handling hours than one who has been taught takeoff-autoflight-short final disconnect,which is the norm now in most airline policy manuals.
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Am Also From Benin
I would like to know a rough estimate of how much the F/O are paid in Nigeria? Also, are newly employed F/O allowed on the international route or they are positioned to fly local only? please mate a better advise would be appreciated
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Suitcaseman you seem to lack understanding in the case above concerning Ryanair.
Firstly the aim of courses such as CRM is an attempt to teach pilots to identify when they aren't able to fly if not mentally fit to do so. This however is a difficult judgment to make by the crew member as it is the brain that must decide if the brain is not fit, how can this decsision be made if the brain is unfit.
Some responsibility does then fall on the operator to decide if it should be scheduling such a person. Hence their recommendations mentioned at the end of the article.
Your second point is equally as ignorant and lacks once again understanding. All the points you mentioned can be identified as 'mentally unfit to fly' errors as opposed to age related errors.
The point is that in this case with the captain not performing because of unforeseen circumstances, what was needed was a competent co-pilot.... say perhaps someone who had droned around in a twin for some time would have been better.
Firstly the aim of courses such as CRM is an attempt to teach pilots to identify when they aren't able to fly if not mentally fit to do so. This however is a difficult judgment to make by the crew member as it is the brain that must decide if the brain is not fit, how can this decsision be made if the brain is unfit.
Some responsibility does then fall on the operator to decide if it should be scheduling such a person. Hence their recommendations mentioned at the end of the article.
Your second point is equally as ignorant and lacks once again understanding. All the points you mentioned can be identified as 'mentally unfit to fly' errors as opposed to age related errors.
The point is that in this case with the captain not performing because of unforeseen circumstances, what was needed was a competent co-pilot.... say perhaps someone who had droned around in a twin for some time would have been better.
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Having a young captain is not the same thing as having an inexperienced captain. A pilot flying for 5 years on a 737 with 4000hrs and shows the necessary ability to make sound decisions should not be restricted to the right seat coz of his age. I have flown in the past with mature captains who have no experience beyond the daily routes they have always flown, I do realise they might be the exceptions to an otherwise realistic situation of Age and experience coming hand in hand..However I believe that pilots above the age of 60 should be restricted to being sim instructors or cruise relief pilots so as to pass on their experiences, at that age there is no need to put so much stress on ourselves, rather take life easy all dues to the industry have been paid so now enjoy passing on the wisdom. What age do you think a pilot should be a TRI/TRE?
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Guess I didn,t fully explain myself, SORRY GUYS> I feel they can impart more knowledge to others when they have the time to do so. I see more and more experienced guys not having the time or motivation to impart experiences to crew coz they only want to fly and go home. If they are placed in positions to reduce their work load I feel they would love to impart loads of wisdom. Can you imagine an experienced captain on the jump seat, he can see all the ways to advise without sounding condesending and making the crew feel they are on a check ride or being evaluated. I have nothing against pilots over 60 I believe competence should trump age anytime.
