Virgin Nigeria
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Virgin Nigeria
It is rather unfortunate that hotmj43 was critisized on an earlier post.He was only relaying some facts about how V/K got into this situation. Unfortunately, after the company started, it was voiced out that the it didnt seem like structures were being put in place for a long term venture.At that time, it was out of place to mention such.
The things you would expect an Airline to pursue for a long term plan were not being done. An example is building , or acquiring a Hangar for the maintenance base. Most things were being outsourced i.e. being contracted to other companies at exhorbitant costs. It was much later that it started to occur to people that these stop gap measures, which were supposed to be temporary were becoming permanent, and seemed to be facilitating the "fast track ambitions" of some individuals, at the expense of the company, and the loyal staff. It seemed like these people did not care whether the company collapsed or not, provided they achieved their goals. They were getting into outrageous deals , at the expense of the company.
Did anybody wonder how/why the initial D/FO left a Company he had just helped to build, without waiting to see positive the results of his work? Did anybody wonder how/why the initial CEO left a Company he had just launched, barely a while ago? The truth is that there were some forces at work which were not visible to everybody.
Regarding the issue of Captains that applied for a job, were assessed and then taken as first officers,the initial C/P was being criticised. The truth is that the assessment and recommendation was conducted by GECAT. I am not using this opportunity to vouch for, or vilify the process. All I can say is that "the powers that be" , were manifesting at an early stage . A lot of rumours and heresay have been going around, and I believe the earlier post was one of the victims.
Contrary to what was mentioned on the post, the C/P was never part of the A-340 course at Virgin Nigeria.The Pilots selected for the A-340 course eventually began their course. Allmost all the Pilots selected for the Captains position were sidetracked into the F/O's position. Some of these Pilot's had even flown Airplanes big as, or bigger than the A-340 with thousands of hours. What is the big deal about flying an A-340. The A-340 was being turned into the "next generation space shuttle" . Information available indicated that this process was heavily steered by some individuals that are from a company, which is one of the share holders.
The initial C/P was the only remaining shield that acted as a barrier between the SHARKS, and the future of Virgin Nigeria with its staff, who had a lot at stake, having put their future in the hands of the Company, out of trust. That is why he was unpopular with these powerbrokers.He was not fired from the Company. He did follow a very noble cause.
It seems like, some of us from the outside, have a good view of events that have transpired, since the inception of V/K. Have you forgotten the changes in the Nigerian Aviation environment that took place, with the emergence of V/K. Without V/K, things would return to "Status Quo".The truth is that Nigeria needs V/K as well as the other Airlines.
Good luck Virgin Nigeria
The things you would expect an Airline to pursue for a long term plan were not being done. An example is building , or acquiring a Hangar for the maintenance base. Most things were being outsourced i.e. being contracted to other companies at exhorbitant costs. It was much later that it started to occur to people that these stop gap measures, which were supposed to be temporary were becoming permanent, and seemed to be facilitating the "fast track ambitions" of some individuals, at the expense of the company, and the loyal staff. It seemed like these people did not care whether the company collapsed or not, provided they achieved their goals. They were getting into outrageous deals , at the expense of the company.
Did anybody wonder how/why the initial D/FO left a Company he had just helped to build, without waiting to see positive the results of his work? Did anybody wonder how/why the initial CEO left a Company he had just launched, barely a while ago? The truth is that there were some forces at work which were not visible to everybody.
Regarding the issue of Captains that applied for a job, were assessed and then taken as first officers,the initial C/P was being criticised. The truth is that the assessment and recommendation was conducted by GECAT. I am not using this opportunity to vouch for, or vilify the process. All I can say is that "the powers that be" , were manifesting at an early stage . A lot of rumours and heresay have been going around, and I believe the earlier post was one of the victims.
Contrary to what was mentioned on the post, the C/P was never part of the A-340 course at Virgin Nigeria.The Pilots selected for the A-340 course eventually began their course. Allmost all the Pilots selected for the Captains position were sidetracked into the F/O's position. Some of these Pilot's had even flown Airplanes big as, or bigger than the A-340 with thousands of hours. What is the big deal about flying an A-340. The A-340 was being turned into the "next generation space shuttle" . Information available indicated that this process was heavily steered by some individuals that are from a company, which is one of the share holders.
The initial C/P was the only remaining shield that acted as a barrier between the SHARKS, and the future of Virgin Nigeria with its staff, who had a lot at stake, having put their future in the hands of the Company, out of trust. That is why he was unpopular with these powerbrokers.He was not fired from the Company. He did follow a very noble cause.
It seems like, some of us from the outside, have a good view of events that have transpired, since the inception of V/K. Have you forgotten the changes in the Nigerian Aviation environment that took place, with the emergence of V/K. Without V/K, things would return to "Status Quo".The truth is that Nigeria needs V/K as well as the other Airlines.
Good luck Virgin Nigeria
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Clifford, Others, finally resign
News from Thisday just in, Clifford and a 5 other executive managers (from Virgin Atlantic) have submitted their resignation. Olumide will take over as CEO from early June.
I think it's about time the current management admits failure. It's time to avoid blaming the government, Virgin Atlantic, or whatever easy target. It's time to try turning this airline around, and yes, I believe keeping the Virgin brand is essential, but they must clean up their image and PR, as these have gone very bad lately.
Good luck for Olumide.
I think it's about time the current management admits failure. It's time to avoid blaming the government, Virgin Atlantic, or whatever easy target. It's time to try turning this airline around, and yes, I believe keeping the Virgin brand is essential, but they must clean up their image and PR, as these have gone very bad lately.
Good luck for Olumide.
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Virgin Nigeria Crisis Deepens as 6 Executives Quit
•Olumide named new MD
05.25.2009
THISDAY Investigation
Ever since Virgin Nigeria Airways (VNA) announced the suspension of its long-haul flights from Lagos to London and Lagos to Johannesburg, its fortunes have gone from bad to worse.
The once proud airline, credited with upping the ante and setting new standards for domestic air travel in the country, is about to lose six members of its senior management staff comprising executive directors and other senior executives.
Some of them were seconded to the Nigerian airline by Virgin Atlantic Limited (VAL) under a Technical Services Agreement (TSA).
The top executives who have resigned their appointments with effect from this month are the Managing Director/CEO, Conrad Clifford; Chief Operating Officer, Kevin Dudley; Director of Safety, Alistair Henry; Director of Ground Operations, Yves Gilbert; Director of Maint-enance, Jim Barnes; and Mr Ronnie Classen who also was contracted to the airline in an executive capacity.
Yesterday, the airline announced that the Deputy Managing Director, Captain Dapo Olumide, will become the new Chief Executive Officer on June 18, 2009.
The mass resignation of the senior executives along with other management staff of VNA is linked to among other factors the harsh global operating environment that has dogged the aviation sector, the inability by the airline to raise badly needed working capital to revamp and expand its operations, and shareholder issues that hindered the sale of 42 per cent of VAL’s shares to United Bank for Africa (UBA) Plc and Afrinvest Limited, a Lagos-based investment firm, in September last year.
Since the airline was fully constituted in March 2005, it has had a co-branding and distribution/point of sale relationship with UBA, in addition to domiciling its operating accounts and salary accounts with the bank.
The relationship shortly afterwards evolved when it became clear that VNA would have to secure a bridge facility from banks, because its initial working capital from shareholders’ funds had been eroded by the TSA and lease agreement it had with VAL.
Even though VAL invested almost $25 million in VNA in lieu of its 49 per cent stake in 2005, it immediately took back most of the money through exorbitant management and leasing fees, thus leaving the Nigerian company with insufficient working capital.
On this basis, VNA requested UBA for a bridge facility of $20 million to cover working capital financing and aircraft guarantees. The facility was subsequently restructured to a $40 million loan for a 24-month period.
One of the main conditions for the approval of these facilities by UBA was the irrevocable domiciliation of all sales proceeds generated locally with UBA and the execution of a right of set-off on the company’s accounts with the bank.
In early 2007, discussions began between VNA and UBA involving the re-financing of the company through a zero coupon bond issue of $100 million for working capital and to pay off outstanding debts to VAL.
By this time, VNA owed VAL royalties amounting to $11 million for the use of the Virgin brand under a Trade Mark Licence Agreement.
The facility given the company by UBA was then withdrawn and replaced with a global facility in February 2007 which covered an overdraft facility of $26.5 million, a bond and guarantee facility of $13.5 million, and bridge facilities of $5 million (available in Lagos) and $20 million (available in New York).
All these were granted by UBA to enhance its cash flow and augment working capital requirements. There was also a bank guarantee facility of $10 million for the Umrah and Hajj operations.
By late 2007, VNA’s board then determined that its exposure to UBA was too high and advised the management to look for cheaper ways of refinancing the airline.
The decision coincided with VAL’s decision to sell down its equity in the Nigerian company from 49 per cent to 7 per cent.
VAL, like all airlines around the world, was contending with the harsh operating climate and was under pressure from its equity partner, Singapore Airlines, to divest from other loss making ventures.
On the advice of Afrinvest still in 2007, VNA decided to undertake a private placement, followed by an initial public offer at a future date.
The airline was convinced that through this arrangement it could raise $300 million, which would enable VNA settle its loans and still have working capital to pay at least for two of the brand new Embraer aircraft it had ordered from Brazil.
In the interim, attempts to sell VAL’s shares through a private placement were proving unsuccessful.
Initially, VAL tried to sell the 42 per cent of the shares in VNA for $85 million to UBA without the knowledge of the board of the Nigerian airline.
The sum was later negotiated downwards to $55 million despite the objections and court injunctions by the company’s shareholders, who were by this time aware of the deal.
When that failed, the shareholders later consented to the sale on the condition that First Bank of Nigeria (FBN) Plc partners UBA in the transaction.
FBN, however, got frustrated with delays and pulled out, leaving UBA as the sole interested party for VAL shares by April 2008. UBA then offered VAL $24 million for its shares and $11 million to pay for the outstanding royalties for the use of the Virgin brand, totalling $35 million.
As all this was going on, VNA was haemorrhaging badly, compelling its management to seek the assistance of Afrinvest to acquire the shares and re-inject the proceeds of $35 million from the sale into the VNA, pending the time the private placement and IPO takes place.
But UBA went to court to stop the deal with Afrinvest, and insisted that it must be part of the transaction.
In order to save the airline, UBA and Afrinvest agreed to partner on the deal by acquiring the 42 per cent VAL was offering for $35 million.
Both firms (UBA and Afrinvest) were meant to hold 50 per cent each of the shares that were to be sold by VAL, and warehouse same as underwriters to the transaction until such a time they could be offloaded through a private placement and IPO.
But the timing for the transaction couldn’t have been worse. UBA and Afrinvest had consented to pay for the shares on September 30 2008, but failed to pay the amount owing to the global credit crunch.
In frustration, VNA went back to UBA for another facility that was needed to pay for the first Embraer aircraft which was ready for delivery.
Given the stricken situation in which it found itself, VNA’s board had to sign away a full asset debenture of all its assets as part of the conditions under which its facilities would be rolled over by UBA and fresh funds amounting to $35 million be made available for the Embraer aircraft.
Today, VNA is indebted to UBA to the tune of $203.5 million, was compelled to lay off several workers late last year, suspended its long-haul flights in January, has seen its aircraft fleet reduced from 10 to five, and is in danger of losing the Virgin brand.
On top of all these, it is still grappling with how to recapitalise its operations.
Sources on VNA’s board who have been privy to the airline’s attempts to get out of the woods, said the situation got to a head, forcing Clifford and other expatriate executives to resign after failing for almost three years to turn the airline around and make it competitive.
A non-executive director of VNA, who confirmed Clifford’s resignation, feigned ignorance of the resignation of other key staff with the airline, maintaining that they are contract staff whose contracts may not have been renewed on expiration.
He defended UBA’s role in the entire Virgin saga, and explained that had UBA not insisted on the full asset debenture, it would have been in violation of CBN credit guidelines.
“UBA played a significant role in funding the company, without which it may not be alive today. Its demands were not out of the ordinary as any other bank would have done likewise under the same circumstances,” the source said.
The director was confident that VNA can still be turned around, and that plans were underway to conclude the deal on the sale of VAL’s share which would then be sold through a combination of a private placement and IPO.
“The environment today is different from what it was a year ago. We are confident that the company can still be recapitalised to enable it pay its obligations to UBA and expand the business,” he said.
On whether VAL will withdraw the Virgin brand, the director said VNA’s directors had advised the British airline not to withdraw the brand as this could devalue VNA and dampen investor interest in its shares.
VAL, he said, had accepted the advice in good faith.
“As long as there is an acceptable plan for payment of the backlog of royalties due VAL for the use of its brand and safety standards are adhered to, VAL has no intention of pulling its brand,” he said.
Announcing Olumide as the new CEO in a press statement yesterday, VNL Chairman, Mr. Felix Ohiwerei, said the appointment had been approved by the board.
Olumide, who joined the airline late last year as Deputy Managing Director, had the oversight responsibilities for Commercial Planning, Sales and Marketing, Cargo, and Corporate Aviation and he brought with him 25 years of aviation experience as well as a brief period in banking.
The new CEO is an aviation professional who earned a Bachelor of Science degree from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Florida, USA in 1980 after which he joined Aero Contractors in 1982.
Following many successful years, he was appointed the Deputy Managing Director in 2002 at which point he transformed the original company vision from an exclusively B2B model to the more demanding and more modern B2C approach.
Prior to joining Virgin Nigeria, Olumide had a brief stint as a banker with the Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), specifically in the area of Transport Infrastructure project development.
Making the announcement in Lagos, the outgoing Managing Director, Clifford, said: “I am thrilled that Capt Olumide is taking over from me. We have worked together in these past months and I am certain of his capabilities. He worked with me firstly as the Chief Commercial Officer and as Deputy Managing Director.”
Clifford also said: “Virgin Nigeria Airways will indeed be repositioned as he comes in as Chief Executive with years of experience in airline administration especially now that the business has been restructured to focus on its profitable domestic and regional service”.
Reacting to the appointment, Olumide said: “I am coming on board at a period when the global airline industry is going through challenges but with the rest of the hard working team, I am sure we will further position the airline and make it safe and profitable.
“We will keep premium to safety and passengers’ comfort at all times and our passengers should look forward to an airline that adds value. This is our promise”.
•Olumide named new MD
05.25.2009
THISDAY Investigation
Ever since Virgin Nigeria Airways (VNA) announced the suspension of its long-haul flights from Lagos to London and Lagos to Johannesburg, its fortunes have gone from bad to worse.
The once proud airline, credited with upping the ante and setting new standards for domestic air travel in the country, is about to lose six members of its senior management staff comprising executive directors and other senior executives.
Some of them were seconded to the Nigerian airline by Virgin Atlantic Limited (VAL) under a Technical Services Agreement (TSA).
The top executives who have resigned their appointments with effect from this month are the Managing Director/CEO, Conrad Clifford; Chief Operating Officer, Kevin Dudley; Director of Safety, Alistair Henry; Director of Ground Operations, Yves Gilbert; Director of Maint-enance, Jim Barnes; and Mr Ronnie Classen who also was contracted to the airline in an executive capacity.
Yesterday, the airline announced that the Deputy Managing Director, Captain Dapo Olumide, will become the new Chief Executive Officer on June 18, 2009.
The mass resignation of the senior executives along with other management staff of VNA is linked to among other factors the harsh global operating environment that has dogged the aviation sector, the inability by the airline to raise badly needed working capital to revamp and expand its operations, and shareholder issues that hindered the sale of 42 per cent of VAL’s shares to United Bank for Africa (UBA) Plc and Afrinvest Limited, a Lagos-based investment firm, in September last year.
Since the airline was fully constituted in March 2005, it has had a co-branding and distribution/point of sale relationship with UBA, in addition to domiciling its operating accounts and salary accounts with the bank.
The relationship shortly afterwards evolved when it became clear that VNA would have to secure a bridge facility from banks, because its initial working capital from shareholders’ funds had been eroded by the TSA and lease agreement it had with VAL.
Even though VAL invested almost $25 million in VNA in lieu of its 49 per cent stake in 2005, it immediately took back most of the money through exorbitant management and leasing fees, thus leaving the Nigerian company with insufficient working capital.
On this basis, VNA requested UBA for a bridge facility of $20 million to cover working capital financing and aircraft guarantees. The facility was subsequently restructured to a $40 million loan for a 24-month period.
One of the main conditions for the approval of these facilities by UBA was the irrevocable domiciliation of all sales proceeds generated locally with UBA and the execution of a right of set-off on the company’s accounts with the bank.
In early 2007, discussions began between VNA and UBA involving the re-financing of the company through a zero coupon bond issue of $100 million for working capital and to pay off outstanding debts to VAL.
By this time, VNA owed VAL royalties amounting to $11 million for the use of the Virgin brand under a Trade Mark Licence Agreement.
The facility given the company by UBA was then withdrawn and replaced with a global facility in February 2007 which covered an overdraft facility of $26.5 million, a bond and guarantee facility of $13.5 million, and bridge facilities of $5 million (available in Lagos) and $20 million (available in New York).
All these were granted by UBA to enhance its cash flow and augment working capital requirements. There was also a bank guarantee facility of $10 million for the Umrah and Hajj operations.
By late 2007, VNA’s board then determined that its exposure to UBA was too high and advised the management to look for cheaper ways of refinancing the airline.
The decision coincided with VAL’s decision to sell down its equity in the Nigerian company from 49 per cent to 7 per cent.
VAL, like all airlines around the world, was contending with the harsh operating climate and was under pressure from its equity partner, Singapore Airlines, to divest from other loss making ventures.
On the advice of Afrinvest still in 2007, VNA decided to undertake a private placement, followed by an initial public offer at a future date.
The airline was convinced that through this arrangement it could raise $300 million, which would enable VNA settle its loans and still have working capital to pay at least for two of the brand new Embraer aircraft it had ordered from Brazil.
In the interim, attempts to sell VAL’s shares through a private placement were proving unsuccessful.
Initially, VAL tried to sell the 42 per cent of the shares in VNA for $85 million to UBA without the knowledge of the board of the Nigerian airline.
The sum was later negotiated downwards to $55 million despite the objections and court injunctions by the company’s shareholders, who were by this time aware of the deal.
When that failed, the shareholders later consented to the sale on the condition that First Bank of Nigeria (FBN) Plc partners UBA in the transaction.
FBN, however, got frustrated with delays and pulled out, leaving UBA as the sole interested party for VAL shares by April 2008. UBA then offered VAL $24 million for its shares and $11 million to pay for the outstanding royalties for the use of the Virgin brand, totalling $35 million.
As all this was going on, VNA was haemorrhaging badly, compelling its management to seek the assistance of Afrinvest to acquire the shares and re-inject the proceeds of $35 million from the sale into the VNA, pending the time the private placement and IPO takes place.
But UBA went to court to stop the deal with Afrinvest, and insisted that it must be part of the transaction.
In order to save the airline, UBA and Afrinvest agreed to partner on the deal by acquiring the 42 per cent VAL was offering for $35 million.
Both firms (UBA and Afrinvest) were meant to hold 50 per cent each of the shares that were to be sold by VAL, and warehouse same as underwriters to the transaction until such a time they could be offloaded through a private placement and IPO.
But the timing for the transaction couldn’t have been worse. UBA and Afrinvest had consented to pay for the shares on September 30 2008, but failed to pay the amount owing to the global credit crunch.
In frustration, VNA went back to UBA for another facility that was needed to pay for the first Embraer aircraft which was ready for delivery.
Given the stricken situation in which it found itself, VNA’s board had to sign away a full asset debenture of all its assets as part of the conditions under which its facilities would be rolled over by UBA and fresh funds amounting to $35 million be made available for the Embraer aircraft.
Today, VNA is indebted to UBA to the tune of $203.5 million, was compelled to lay off several workers late last year, suspended its long-haul flights in January, has seen its aircraft fleet reduced from 10 to five, and is in danger of losing the Virgin brand.
On top of all these, it is still grappling with how to recapitalise its operations.
Sources on VNA’s board who have been privy to the airline’s attempts to get out of the woods, said the situation got to a head, forcing Clifford and other expatriate executives to resign after failing for almost three years to turn the airline around and make it competitive.
A non-executive director of VNA, who confirmed Clifford’s resignation, feigned ignorance of the resignation of other key staff with the airline, maintaining that they are contract staff whose contracts may not have been renewed on expiration.
He defended UBA’s role in the entire Virgin saga, and explained that had UBA not insisted on the full asset debenture, it would have been in violation of CBN credit guidelines.
“UBA played a significant role in funding the company, without which it may not be alive today. Its demands were not out of the ordinary as any other bank would have done likewise under the same circumstances,” the source said.
The director was confident that VNA can still be turned around, and that plans were underway to conclude the deal on the sale of VAL’s share which would then be sold through a combination of a private placement and IPO.
“The environment today is different from what it was a year ago. We are confident that the company can still be recapitalised to enable it pay its obligations to UBA and expand the business,” he said.
On whether VAL will withdraw the Virgin brand, the director said VNA’s directors had advised the British airline not to withdraw the brand as this could devalue VNA and dampen investor interest in its shares.
VAL, he said, had accepted the advice in good faith.
“As long as there is an acceptable plan for payment of the backlog of royalties due VAL for the use of its brand and safety standards are adhered to, VAL has no intention of pulling its brand,” he said.
Announcing Olumide as the new CEO in a press statement yesterday, VNL Chairman, Mr. Felix Ohiwerei, said the appointment had been approved by the board.
Olumide, who joined the airline late last year as Deputy Managing Director, had the oversight responsibilities for Commercial Planning, Sales and Marketing, Cargo, and Corporate Aviation and he brought with him 25 years of aviation experience as well as a brief period in banking.
The new CEO is an aviation professional who earned a Bachelor of Science degree from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Florida, USA in 1980 after which he joined Aero Contractors in 1982.
Following many successful years, he was appointed the Deputy Managing Director in 2002 at which point he transformed the original company vision from an exclusively B2B model to the more demanding and more modern B2C approach.
Prior to joining Virgin Nigeria, Olumide had a brief stint as a banker with the Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), specifically in the area of Transport Infrastructure project development.
Making the announcement in Lagos, the outgoing Managing Director, Clifford, said: “I am thrilled that Capt Olumide is taking over from me. We have worked together in these past months and I am certain of his capabilities. He worked with me firstly as the Chief Commercial Officer and as Deputy Managing Director.”
Clifford also said: “Virgin Nigeria Airways will indeed be repositioned as he comes in as Chief Executive with years of experience in airline administration especially now that the business has been restructured to focus on its profitable domestic and regional service”.
Reacting to the appointment, Olumide said: “I am coming on board at a period when the global airline industry is going through challenges but with the rest of the hard working team, I am sure we will further position the airline and make it safe and profitable.
“We will keep premium to safety and passengers’ comfort at all times and our passengers should look forward to an airline that adds value. This is our promise”.
The hitherto Scattered CB clouds of change are finally overcast.Three more to go, and the clean up exercise will be complete.Join Date: Oct 2005
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And the cookie came crumbling!!!!!!I wont say i said so some months back!!!! Hahahahaha.
Hopefully, our brother olumide will be able to make the required changes to see the airline to it's next level.
I see them passing the buck now that the ship has sunk though.
This shall be an uphill task for the man.
Good luck to you all though.
Hopefully, our brother olumide will be able to make the required changes to see the airline to it's next level.
I see them passing the buck now that the ship has sunk though.
This shall be an uphill task for the man.
Good luck to you all though.
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Coming to think about it, and as an outsider and former VK enthusiast, Conrad Clifford was a total failure. He was out of the loop from "internal processes" and I doubt his heart was in the project. More like VS's eyes/fingers in management. If only he put 1/2 the committment McTighe puts into Arik Air, we would have a functional and perhaps profitable operation by now...
Don't get me wrong I never met Clifford but had the pleasure of meeting the Arik MD. That guy wakes up at 0300 every day to check on the LHR ARRIVAL and can be seen on the ramp regularly sorting out problems. If that's not committment I don't know what is?
Don't get me wrong I never met Clifford but had the pleasure of meeting the Arik MD. That guy wakes up at 0300 every day to check on the LHR ARRIVAL and can be seen on the ramp regularly sorting out problems. If that's not committment I don't know what is?
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Sadly, VK's possible demise will not make much of a difference as Arik and other airlines can come in and fill the small gap it occupies now.
W3 is starting LOS to Johannesburg on June 1, 2009. The gaps are getting filled.
I don't know of anybody who has recently left W3 for VK, but there has been the other way.
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VK
Sadly if this trouble swallows VK, it is aviation in Nigeria that will suffer; we will go back to those dark days. VK have been a yardstick for airlines even the CAA.
VK drove this industry to the significant development it has achieved in the last four years!
Sincerely
VK drove this industry to the significant development it has achieved in the last four years!
Sincerely
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flying paddy,
either that or..... this was the plan from when Dapo stepped n.
the position of Deputy MD was created for him. it didn't exist before so It could be true that the presence of the previous management was what held back any potential investor.
I guess the next few weeks/months will be interesting to see. either Virgin crashes and burns (as a company i mean) or some serious money will be invested to save it.
either that or..... this was the plan from when Dapo stepped n.
the position of Deputy MD was created for him. it didn't exist before so It could be true that the presence of the previous management was what held back any potential investor.
I guess the next few weeks/months will be interesting to see. either Virgin crashes and burns (as a company i mean) or some serious money will be invested to save it.
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job searching again..
hey guys im a tanzanian flying a caravan in arusha with company tht i strtd out in november and things r nt gng well here as here well..i hve close to 400 hoursTT and just a lil over a 100 on the caravan..just want to know if virgin nigeria is stil hiring low timers n need some advice from some fellow aviatiors..help willb much appreciated..happy landings..
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People are looking to go to TZ and get jobs u,u're thinking to go out to get urs.I'm sure with the new ATC coming u may get a chance too,but hey follow opportunities wherever they're.As for VK u're in the right forum to find out if they're hiring low-timers or not.Good luck mate
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Sadly Half the Haters here either could not get a job with VK or were Fired by VK ....The way the company operated gave some Industry watchers concern but can we name one Airline in Nigeria that is not in a crisis or one waiting to Happen ,Nigerian Pilots are the only Pilots i have come across that don't care if ground staff are underpaid or don't get salaries at all 
VK and Aero changed that ,Over the Years we have seen that Pilot Management in Nigeria Airlines rarely work life expectancy of a Pilot managed Airline is Six years of Mismanagement the Only problem VK has today is someone is telling them to Account what about the other Big boy on the block.....OIA what ever you heard about HMJ s 30% true i think he is a nice person from whatever perspective he was just too strict for some Lazy Pilots
....The way the company operated gave some Industry watchers concern but can we name one Airline in Nigeria that is not in a crisis or one waiting to Happen ,Nigerian Pilots are the only Pilots i have come across that don't care if ground staff are underpaid or don't get salaries at all VK and Aero changed that ,Over the Years we have seen that Pilot Management in Nigeria Airlines rarely work life expectancy of a Pilot managed Airline is Six years of Mismanagement the Only problem VK has today is someone is telling them to Account what about the other Big boy on the block.....OIA what ever you heard about HMJ s 30% true i think he is a nice person from whatever perspective he was just too strict for some Lazy Pilots
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: South Africa
Age: 54
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SACAA pilots....
Did VK take on any South African SACAA guys last year or were all the guys taken for P2 or P1 positions, FAA or JAR...?
I am still waiting for an explanation from them about an employment offer that was withrawn early last year.....apperantly due to there been no NCAA approved training facility in SA.....
Did they guys ever get out of the hotels and into better accomodation ?
I am still waiting for an explanation from them about an employment offer that was withrawn early last year.....apperantly due to there been no NCAA approved training facility in SA.....
Did they guys ever get out of the hotels and into better accomodation ?
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Jordan
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I need Answers
Please mate, can you tell if the Canadian License and South African license has different priority in terms of getting job in Nigeria. Is any of the license rated higher or tend to get job faster. Please advise
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: ???
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flyingvikings. Any ICAO licence is acceptable to the Nigerian CAA.
you will find however that the Validation of Any licence in Nigeria is very frustrating. patience is the key.
As for the airlines.. I don't think It makes too much difference which licence u possess.
you will find however that the Validation of Any licence in Nigeria is very frustrating. patience is the key.
As for the airlines.. I don't think It makes too much difference which licence u possess.
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Jordan
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Thanks
INSOMNIAC-
In this case it is best I go to South Africa for the training hence it is $8,000 cheaper than Canada. I actually was scared of little opportunities with the SA license. Thanks for the answer mate.we are destined to fly
In this case it is best I go to South Africa for the training hence it is $8,000 cheaper than Canada. I actually was scared of little opportunities with the SA license. Thanks for the answer mate.we are destined to fly