EC120 Rolls in Durban
Join Date: Feb 2004
Location: Just west of here
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. . seen and not heard . .
Don't you just love those old sayings like that.
I particularly like the one that went something like - It's a bad workman who blames his tools.
WRL
I particularly like the one that went something like - It's a bad workman who blames his tools.
WRL
WRL
Join Date: Feb 2004
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It's kinda getting off the topic but hey, you just might have at last stumbled onto something you might be good at.
Truce?
Lets get back to slagging of at the tools and rules makers.
WRL
Truce?
Lets get back to slagging of at the tools and rules makers.
WRL
Join Date: Oct 2004
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It is with great interest that I have been closely following the debate surrounding the EC 120 B rollover which occurred on 9 September 2004. I must add though that things have digressed somewhat over the weeks as to the original questions asked as to why the industry had not been informed and still remain confused as to the nature surrounding this exercise. I therefore decided to reserve comment until a statement / further information was put forward by the manufacturer which has now taken place.
I have studied the letter from Eurocopter SA (ESAL); “EC 120 B INFORMATION LETTER”, dated 14 October 2004, compiled by the Eurocopter Southern Africa, Chief Pilot; which accompanied the “Fenestron Tail Rotor” theoretical pilots training complement/manual.
The Fenestron training compliment/manual was found to be most ambiguous and confusing in some instances; I am sure many of you will agree, yes!
I wish to be ‘nitpicky’ and elaborate on something of concern; under the “TRAINING” heading a statement is made; “The final part-the landing, is more subject to chance than actual skill.” I am eager to know if this letter was proof read and accepted by Eurocopter France as the statement could have future ramifications due to the interpretation thereof.
So, after watching this debate so closely over the past weeks I am dumb founded as to the exact nature of the Fenestron document that Eurocopter issued to the industry; is it possibly a smoke screen to distract everyone for the real issues at hand, seems so. What relevance; if any, does this document have with respect to the incident that took place on the 9 September 2004? The only deduction that I can come to is that the Eurocopter document, along with some nice diagrams and graphs explains to pilots that if you experience a yaw turn to the left, then you should push full right pedal and wait until the yaw rate is damped and stops. In a nutshell, all the document is really telling us is that if you are intending at keeping a steady heading and a left yaw turn is experienced, you must put in right pedal, great! So, if it (left yaw) continues, put in more right pedal and the turn will eventually stop! Wow, I thought I learnt that technique many, many years ago during my initial student pilot training; obviously not so; I will have to try that one out sometime to see if it really works, “lol”; and to think that Eurocopter has kindly gone to these great lengths and cost to compile a document to explain this very simple procedure to all us inexperienced helicopter pilots with zillions of hrs of flying time; thanks Eurocopter!
Pilots, best you all sit up and take note before you end up spinning around and around to the left in your ‘120’ until the aircraft either runs out of fuel or you crash – that will dampen your yaw rate!
So, what exactly does this document have to do with the incident; can anyone out there elaborate a little! Everyone has been warned that tail rotor control failure exercises on the EC 120 B, carried out in the conventional manner, as was the case with the unfortunate instructor and pilot on the EC 120 B on that day, may not be done – why why why !
Surely; if the techniques explained in the Fenestron document really work, then instructors can continue doing the conventional technique on the EC 120 B; yes-no; if you experience a turn to the left, put full right pedal in and the yaw will dampen and stop, as we have been assured in the document! The manual stipulates that in the IGE hover during a tail rotor control failure, chop the throttle and land. In the OGE hover and FWD flight, execute an autorotation – ok, accepted; but why the change in procedure from the norm! Surely we as professional pilots are at least entitled to know why this manoeuvre may not be carried out, or can it, nobody really knows! The flight manual does not have any warnings in this regard. Are there airflow problems over the fenestron at this critical phase or not! Why can conventional tail rotor control training practises not be carried out on the EC 120 B, or can they. Is there any answer for this anywhere; maybe we should chat to the numerous Gazalle pilots that experienced the same mishaps.
If there is in fact a problem, which I am sure everyone will agree that there is; then why have Eurocopter been so evasive in making mention of the fact that this training exercise in the conventional means is dangerous and not recommended. Their silence has cost the operator and pilots dearly; in addition, why is no mention made of it in the flight manual. I will bet that if there was a warning put out when the EC 120‘s first arrived in the country, the pilots in question would never have gone down that road which resulted in the EC 120 B crash. What’s also alarming is that CAA officials/instructors have attended factory courses in France and it has been unclear whether they in fact were ever made aware of the dangers involved thereof. This is evident as numerous pilots who had flown with the factory approved instructors on fenestron type aircraft before the accident, were never briefed on this; FACT!
I am very interested to know if there are any instructors out there that have, before the accident occurred and we were living in the dark ages then; had been doing tail rotor control failures on the EC 120 B in the old conventional way and gotten away with it, please come forward and exercise your right to be anonymous. I am sure there must be a couple. Many feel in this incident that the fenestron may have stalled during the final phase of this manoeuvre resulting in the so called full right yaw pedal input being totally ineffective; so prove us wrong!
Some food for thought; if the instructor on the EC 120 B did in fact experience a rapid yaw rate to the left during the final phases of the exercise and did in fact put full right pedal in to dampen the left yaw rate/turn and nothing happened, then we have some serious debate to continue with; could the gentleman and or someone with the relevant info come forward to elaborate on his exact actions.
The next question would then be to ask as to why the industry was not made aware of this fenestron anomaly and where did things fall by the wayside. What is Eurocopter hiding…………………...
I have studied the letter from Eurocopter SA (ESAL); “EC 120 B INFORMATION LETTER”, dated 14 October 2004, compiled by the Eurocopter Southern Africa, Chief Pilot; which accompanied the “Fenestron Tail Rotor” theoretical pilots training complement/manual.
The Fenestron training compliment/manual was found to be most ambiguous and confusing in some instances; I am sure many of you will agree, yes!
I wish to be ‘nitpicky’ and elaborate on something of concern; under the “TRAINING” heading a statement is made; “The final part-the landing, is more subject to chance than actual skill.” I am eager to know if this letter was proof read and accepted by Eurocopter France as the statement could have future ramifications due to the interpretation thereof.
So, after watching this debate so closely over the past weeks I am dumb founded as to the exact nature of the Fenestron document that Eurocopter issued to the industry; is it possibly a smoke screen to distract everyone for the real issues at hand, seems so. What relevance; if any, does this document have with respect to the incident that took place on the 9 September 2004? The only deduction that I can come to is that the Eurocopter document, along with some nice diagrams and graphs explains to pilots that if you experience a yaw turn to the left, then you should push full right pedal and wait until the yaw rate is damped and stops. In a nutshell, all the document is really telling us is that if you are intending at keeping a steady heading and a left yaw turn is experienced, you must put in right pedal, great! So, if it (left yaw) continues, put in more right pedal and the turn will eventually stop! Wow, I thought I learnt that technique many, many years ago during my initial student pilot training; obviously not so; I will have to try that one out sometime to see if it really works, “lol”; and to think that Eurocopter has kindly gone to these great lengths and cost to compile a document to explain this very simple procedure to all us inexperienced helicopter pilots with zillions of hrs of flying time; thanks Eurocopter!
Pilots, best you all sit up and take note before you end up spinning around and around to the left in your ‘120’ until the aircraft either runs out of fuel or you crash – that will dampen your yaw rate!
So, what exactly does this document have to do with the incident; can anyone out there elaborate a little! Everyone has been warned that tail rotor control failure exercises on the EC 120 B, carried out in the conventional manner, as was the case with the unfortunate instructor and pilot on the EC 120 B on that day, may not be done – why why why !
Surely; if the techniques explained in the Fenestron document really work, then instructors can continue doing the conventional technique on the EC 120 B; yes-no; if you experience a turn to the left, put full right pedal in and the yaw will dampen and stop, as we have been assured in the document! The manual stipulates that in the IGE hover during a tail rotor control failure, chop the throttle and land. In the OGE hover and FWD flight, execute an autorotation – ok, accepted; but why the change in procedure from the norm! Surely we as professional pilots are at least entitled to know why this manoeuvre may not be carried out, or can it, nobody really knows! The flight manual does not have any warnings in this regard. Are there airflow problems over the fenestron at this critical phase or not! Why can conventional tail rotor control training practises not be carried out on the EC 120 B, or can they. Is there any answer for this anywhere; maybe we should chat to the numerous Gazalle pilots that experienced the same mishaps.
If there is in fact a problem, which I am sure everyone will agree that there is; then why have Eurocopter been so evasive in making mention of the fact that this training exercise in the conventional means is dangerous and not recommended. Their silence has cost the operator and pilots dearly; in addition, why is no mention made of it in the flight manual. I will bet that if there was a warning put out when the EC 120‘s first arrived in the country, the pilots in question would never have gone down that road which resulted in the EC 120 B crash. What’s also alarming is that CAA officials/instructors have attended factory courses in France and it has been unclear whether they in fact were ever made aware of the dangers involved thereof. This is evident as numerous pilots who had flown with the factory approved instructors on fenestron type aircraft before the accident, were never briefed on this; FACT!
I am very interested to know if there are any instructors out there that have, before the accident occurred and we were living in the dark ages then; had been doing tail rotor control failures on the EC 120 B in the old conventional way and gotten away with it, please come forward and exercise your right to be anonymous. I am sure there must be a couple. Many feel in this incident that the fenestron may have stalled during the final phase of this manoeuvre resulting in the so called full right yaw pedal input being totally ineffective; so prove us wrong!
Some food for thought; if the instructor on the EC 120 B did in fact experience a rapid yaw rate to the left during the final phases of the exercise and did in fact put full right pedal in to dampen the left yaw rate/turn and nothing happened, then we have some serious debate to continue with; could the gentleman and or someone with the relevant info come forward to elaborate on his exact actions.
The next question would then be to ask as to why the industry was not made aware of this fenestron anomaly and where did things fall by the wayside. What is Eurocopter hiding…………………...
Join Date: Jul 2004
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Well done sir!
Someone has at least had the cahooners to stand up and spell it out instead of all the garbage earlier on in the thread where unrelated topics such as the Fox issue even crept in.
I have spoken at length with the two accident boys. They say again and again that they started to roll off throttle and the rate of yaw increased so fast that they had no option but to abort the exercise with pedal and to slowly open the throttle, all the while accepting the accelerating rate of yaw - even with full pedal - I hope they don't take offense to this as I may not have worded as they have.
SO the next debate is the issue of the exercise being done incorrectly as they should have done an autorotation! Why do an auto if the aircraft still has directional control down to the hover. Surely you are more at risk doing an auto (I presume the flight manual infers that you must train this exercise with a complete auto - I can hear the insurers screaming and slitting their wrists) than if you can actually bring it to a hover and as the flight manual says - roll off throttle and cushion the landing with collective.
Yes rototq is on the money with what he says - the training document is confusing.
Page twelve is where the big question mark exists - it says in a box on the bottom right corner of the page - Correct immediately - Don't let it run away on you!
Why are they so emphatic about this - well the two in Durban certainly saw why.
But then I guess they are bad workmen so are blaming their tools. Yeah right!!!!!!!!
So will someone please set the record straight - How is this exercise supposed to be done. Oh and of course please enlighten me - is the landing still more subject to chance than actual skill? So why teach autos at all - just tell the student to lower the lever and hope for the best - the ground will cushion your fall.
Can the CAA put out a brief on this exercise so we can all learn something and be safer.
Someone has at least had the cahooners to stand up and spell it out instead of all the garbage earlier on in the thread where unrelated topics such as the Fox issue even crept in.
I have spoken at length with the two accident boys. They say again and again that they started to roll off throttle and the rate of yaw increased so fast that they had no option but to abort the exercise with pedal and to slowly open the throttle, all the while accepting the accelerating rate of yaw - even with full pedal - I hope they don't take offense to this as I may not have worded as they have.
SO the next debate is the issue of the exercise being done incorrectly as they should have done an autorotation! Why do an auto if the aircraft still has directional control down to the hover. Surely you are more at risk doing an auto (I presume the flight manual infers that you must train this exercise with a complete auto - I can hear the insurers screaming and slitting their wrists) than if you can actually bring it to a hover and as the flight manual says - roll off throttle and cushion the landing with collective.
Yes rototq is on the money with what he says - the training document is confusing.
Page twelve is where the big question mark exists - it says in a box on the bottom right corner of the page - Correct immediately - Don't let it run away on you!
Why are they so emphatic about this - well the two in Durban certainly saw why.
But then I guess they are bad workmen so are blaming their tools. Yeah right!!!!!!!!
So will someone please set the record straight - How is this exercise supposed to be done. Oh and of course please enlighten me - is the landing still more subject to chance than actual skill? So why teach autos at all - just tell the student to lower the lever and hope for the best - the ground will cushion your fall.
Can the CAA put out a brief on this exercise so we can all learn something and be safer.
