Pretty standard procedure is also making sure, as PIC, you have sufficient runway ahead of you to take off, wouldn't you agree?

Seems that "pretty standard procedure" was in short supply on the flight deck that day.....

EASA well explained in a few words. Yes , the problem is not EASA , it is the States who decides on implementation . EASA is not an accident investigation agency , it only makes rules , and the States have individually to implement them . The ( common ) training syllabus is made by EASA but the numbers of hours to train and later maintain the licenses is up to the States. And some are failing . Changing that will be difficult , Think Hungary for instance. or even France if you want an ATC example.

On pilot training and MPL, I was very skeptical when the scheme was devised, but I have to admit it works well if it is applied as it was designed for, Again EASA offered the rules to do it , but it is for the airlines to decide how to make it work. The Lufthansa group heavily relies on MPLs and from what I hear it is a success.
What some low cost airlines are dong with Pay to fly or PP2F, and atypical contracts is the flip side of the coin .

Hope that the final report details, what the real cause of this poor decision making was. The PIC failed airmanship. In my opinion it is not much about the rules. If physical there is not enough runway ahead of you, you don't try. And there was plenty of doubt. ATC asked, two crew in row 0. The runway out of their window must have looked short. If you do thousands of take offs, I think they should have an idea how it should look like. And if the numbers don't add up too, why did they try. What was the real pressure behind this decision. And why failed the CRM process.

That may be so but I was purely commenting on Tech Guy's post re the ATC contribution of handling the traffic situation on and around the airport.

Happens all the time. Usually because a flight or flights ahead are not ready to go when they get to the takeoff position. They could be waiting on weights, flight attendant demo, passengers in the Lavs or a minor issue they need to review in the Mel.

Or for sequencing traffic on same SID, sequencing for wake turbulence separation, CTOTs, etc

this practice should be banned. Whole departure runway should be used for every passengers carrying aicraft, period. Some precisely defined exclusions could be accepted (for turboprops), everything else is just waiting for **** to happen.

Using full length does not necessarily mean more runway left at rotation, quite often it just means more use of derated thrust or a delayed v2 climb profile and you rotate roughly same place anyway. You would have to ban engine flexing too for your suggestion to be actually be worthwhile. And it doesn’t eliminate human error either.

First is like a small downslope and then the terrain is getting lower toward access road. After the access road terrain goes uphill. Highway is on higher grounds. The difference is about 10 meters or so. Not so big, but it plays important role - Embraer basically was in ground effect after the end of the runway. If the access road was in level with the runway - it would be a disaster.

Indeed , an anecdote : The first time I jumpseated on a A380 ( out of FRA taking off on 18 ( 4000 m ) I was extremely surprised and even a bit worried at first to see that the take off roll was started with only the 2 inner engines, and only when passing 60 Kts were the 2 outer engines throttles moved fully forward , then a rotation almost at the extreme end of the runway I was explained later it was a flex take off and due to the very long runway available, they only needed to add power on the outers at 60 Kts , to avoid possible FOD ingestion on the outers which were hanging over the runway edges,
They could easily have taken off with much less runway ( we only needed 2800m at our T/O weight on that flight) . Difficult to make a judgement if you are not the PIC of a particular flight and do not know the numbers.

Anyway this accident here is not an intersection accident , it is a take off distance/weight miscalculation one , a bit similar to the 2003 Singapore airlines 747 that attempted to take off with a TOW error of 100 tons. ( and a 330 in Australia that did the very same a few years later) so all human errors as you correctly mention. and not procedural ones.

As already discussed, the data doesn't support that conclusion. The aircraft was around 175-200 feet AAL by that point.

OK, now we're getting somewhere. Your initial statement was "highway is on higher ground, so they were about 6m above highway". With 'highway' being the E70 highway, which they crossed near the Lukoil service station some 2km from the airport perimeter, the "6m above" that you indicated, was impossible, as already indicated previously by DaveReidUK.

Regarding the airport access road (some 550 meter from the 30L perimeter fence) on the other hand, there you have a point. If that would have been 10 - 15 meters above runway level (with the same 10+ meter tall trees), the outcome could have been totally different.
But an even far simpler 'what if' could have been catastrophic, if the runway design and approach-lights for 12R would have been the same as 12L, then the E195 would not have encountered only 3 lonely centerline approach-lights poles (as the rest of the dozens of lights are all embedded in the concrete), but it would have hit a forest of approach-light poles, striking the wing and engines all over the place. They would never have made it off the ground...

it is fortunate that those who actually have responsibility for making such decisions will consider all parts of the aviation system and will look at the results of the investigation before determining what changes might be appropriate. Knee-jerk reactions rarely achieve the desired outcome.

It was an Emirates A340 (not 330) in MEL back in 2009 and it was a major mistake by the flight crew and a minor miracle that it happened where it did (they had plenty of grass beyond the end of the runway with no obstacles in order to gain speed and climb out, after one hell of a tail scrape mind you.

it's a bit similar to A340 in Melbourne regarding to consequences but the cause was not similar, the both cases you mentioned happened because of weight miscalculation but in Belgrade we had total disorientation of the pilot(s) regarding to runway position

Here is the visual explanation I did. I am driving here almost every day. Green shade is the "hole" or "downslope" that starts after the runway end and goes all the way down to the access road, then the terrain starts to go up. Brown shade is highway - it is well above access road, some 10 meters. Red arrow is takeoff path. Yesterday I was able to watch normal takeoff so from that perspective it would be disaster if the road is not in ravine.

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....b9148495c2.jpg

I have no argument with your description of the topology.

Only with your conclusion:

See my post #211.

Cosmo NS posted:

"Here is the visual explanation I did."

Thanks for this map . Very clear and is wellworth a thousand words!!

IB

...except it shows take off from a disused runway.

ok. Now I’m slightly puzzled. I would normally expect the take off path to start on an be roughly in line with the runway.