Landing traffic is advised of a departure ahead, but at that time they (Uk/European+Japan?) are not cleared to land, they are instructed to continue approach. Only when the departure is physically airborne should they be cleared to land.

Telling the departure they are number one for departure after one landing every single time, is a waste of frequency bandwidth. The CG here hadn’t been either cleared for takeoff, or had a clearance to enter the runway, (from published transcripts). All they have been informed of is that they are first in the queue. It also builds other crew’s awareness that they have other traffic to depart before themselves.

Losing the “number one” phrase isn’t a good idea in my opinion and experience. The crew receiving that information can then place that in their mental picture. Eg they know that the aircraft taxiing on their left should be giving way to them etc, all subject to confirmation or query as required.

The big brown hole here as I see it, is the lack
of use of stopbars 24/7. If 24/7 use were mandated then crews would be conditioned not to cross any illuminated bar 24/7. That the C stopbars were unserviceable on this night is a moot point, as I understand it had they been serviceable, with the prevailing meteorological conditions (in excess of CAT2), that critical visual clue for the aircrew wouldn’t have been in use anyway. That means one of the final runway protectors, an illuminated “do not pass” stopbar has been deliberately omitted from operating procedures. The risk assessment for that would make interesting reading.

Absolutely, Luton includes backtracking too. Watching their ATC team and the aircrew coordinating and playing nicely is an education in itself.

IIRC, the 8 minute figure was from the moment of impact with the JCG plane, so the difference is somewhat smaller than you implied.

I presume this could mean that the confusion derived from saying "no.1" then? It would be a big leap of faith to assume a queue number indicated not only runway clearance but also takeoff clearance!

I guess you could throw in a few recommendations:

• use of stopbars at all times
• attendant for the runway incursion warning system at all times (and audible alert if false positives are low)
• single direction runways
• replacing queue numbers with another terminology that implies the lack of runway clearance
• use of transponder for non-civilian aircraft at all times in most civilian settings
• use of only a single radio channel at a civilian airport (e.g. no authority given to coastguard radio when ATC is empowered)

But the issue in this situation would seem to be that the pilot was improper because he did not request specific keywords that indicate runway clearance and takeoff clearance, so I wonder if there really is any need to change airport procedures beyond pilot retraining and possibly an attendant on the runway incursion warning system.

There shouldn’t be any confusion generated by using Number 1. It’s not part of, or a take off clearance, so it shouldn’t be a trigger for a crew to enter a live runway, or be assumed/confused as permission to enter a live runway.


I’m surprised that the stopbars were not used 24/7/365 when serviceable in any weather conditions. I think that will be a key finding in the end report of what went wrong. I’m very interested in why they don’t use stopbars 100% of the time when serviceable, if I understand their airport operation correctly.

Quick, positive safety action

"Japan issues improved emergency measures following fatal plane collision at Haneda airport"

https://amp-scmp-com.cdn.ampproject....haneda-airport

Fiddling while Rome burns.

Better taxiway markings and 24/7 stop bars make sense, but R/T procedure? Messing about with terminology in a communications medium in which messages can be misunderstood because of poor pronunciation or sound quality, missed because you're on a different frequency, or stepped on as at Tenerife?

The actual, central cause of this accident is that the CG aircraft was on the active runway and no-one but its crew knew. If it had been transmitting accurate ADS-B position info like every other aircraft on the aerodrome this incursion, whatever its cause, would not have been missed.

Only one rule is needed: that no aircraft not transmitting full ADS-B is allowed to use the aerodrome. So why are Japan's authorities ignoring this obvious, central problem? Exactly who is being protected from loss of face because the CG aircraft was inadequately specified, or SOPs were inadequate, or both?

I've counted six "good evenings" in the official transcript, basically one every 3 transmissions. Since there was time to squeeze those greetings in, I don't think adding "after one landing" or "we have [a] landing" when the situation warrants it would be too much.

Speaking of politeness, one thing I found a bit strange about the transcript was the last part of the readback from the -8: "Taxi to holding point C5 JA722A No.1, Thank you". No other readbacks from the transcript ended with a thank you. While the Japanese are known for being polite, that "thank you" could have some additional meaning. I understand they have been taxiing for almost an hour at that point, in which case the additional meaning of that "thank you" could be "finally!". Also, it may suggest that they did not expect further interaction with the tower. Or I might just be imagining things, and it's just pure politeness.

I am struggling a bit with the debate about use of "number one". Its inclusion in a transmission surely indicates that the aircraft is *not* cleared to enter the runway. Think about it: why would ATC say "line up 34R, number one for departure" or "cleared for takeoff 34R, number one for departure"? They wouldn't, because it would be implicit. The presence of those words must mean that you have been told to hold short. The only possible exception I could think of would be if cleared to line up full length behind an intersection departure, but then you'd be number two, not number one...

You’re not wrong regarding the greetings, however you’ll note that whenever the ATCO workload on and off frequency goes above a certain level, the first thing to go are those greetings and sign offs.

As I’ve written previously here, from current known transcriptions the tower ATCO was concise and accurate. They gave no clearance, instructions or implication that the CG should enter the runway.
I’m not throwing the CG crew under the bus here, but in terms of ATC communication, there’s nothing that stands out that would give the impression that they had a runway entry clearance.

Nail on head.

No this is not the central cause. The main cause of this accident is lining up without clearance., the non detection is just the next hole in the cheese. I just read the text from the Japanese news outlet posted by alf5071h. ( thanks for that) PR political stuff . but 2 things, if correctly translated, are interesting :First it says again that someone will now be monitoring the radar ( i.e. the SMR) 24/7. That would indicate that the SMR worked but the intrusion and the alarms were not seen by the TWR controller working the 34R position . So the Dash was most probably detected by SMR but the alarm not seen. You do not need ADS-B out to be visible on SMR.
The PR also says what was revealed was partial transcript , so it would be interesting to get a transcript of the Dash comms on the GND frequency prior to switching to TWR.

Anything specific you expect to find out on the GND comms ?
Don't know if you read this post of mine, which summarizes the last few minutes with GND; nothing much essentially.

yes I had read your post but it is just mentioning a brief transmission before switching tomTWR ,I miss the IFR pre departure clearance , with the squawk ,etc , especially how it was formulated .

I'd still put it the other way around. For whatever reason, or combination of reasons, a clear runway suddenly wasn't, and no-one knew. Of all the people who needed to know, top of the list was the A350 crew. CG being visible on ADS-B would have revealed it to them, all other factors notwithstanding.

Report on Nikkei website:

Japan tightens air traffic control and pilot protocols with new rules

KOJI MURAKOSHI and SARA MORI, Nikkei staff writers January 10, 2024 03:57 JST

TOKYO -- A week after a deadly runway collision at Tokyo's Haneda Airport, the Japanese government has rolled out safety measures that aim to prevent such an incident from happening again.

The incoming reforms will focus on air traffic control functions as well as on the aircraft operating side.

Transport Minister Tetsuo Saito told reporters Tuesday that his agency will move forward with permanent safety measures as quickly as possible.

"One of our biggest missions is to restore confidence in aviation as a mass transit system," Saito said. "The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism will launch full-scale efforts to implement measures to ensure safety and security."

For the time being, all airports in Japan will suspend the use of such terms as "No. 1" when issuing air traffic control instructions to aircraft and will use more precise phrases when communicating orders. "No. 1" refers to a plane that is next in line to take off, but it is believed that the crew of the coast guard plane misunderstood the term as permission to enter the runway.

Additionally, all air traffic control crews in Japan will have extra staff to constantly watch monitoring systems that warn about erroneous entry into runways. Extra staff has been in place at Haneda since Saturday, and other airports in Japan will add the dedicated personnel as well.

The monitoring system at Haneda was working properly during the night of the crash, but the air traffic control crew did not notice that the coast guard plane had erroneously entered the runway.

The transport ministry has also ordered airlines to make sure that aircraft crews confirm runways are clear before landing. The pilots on the JAL jetliner were unable to visually confirm the coast guard plane because it was nighttime.

The transport ministry is establishing a committee to explore further measures. One item on the agenda will be upgrades to systems informing pilots and air traffic control about the situation on the runways. The first meeting is expected to take place next week.

So, from now on, landing at night or in low visibility will be forbidden in Japan?

This makes no sense to me.

It's becoming more and more clear which each list of 'panic reactions' published, that they forget to mention one point on their agenda....
....the hidden agenda point, to keep 'Coast Guard' out of the picture...

So does this mean that arriving crews have to specifically ask ATC to confirm that nothing is on the runway? As in, prompt ATC to do a quick check of the monitoring tech in case they've forgotten? Are they making it the responsibility of the pilots to make sure the runway is clear? In low vis conditions? At night?

Can nobody just admit that a Japanese crew failed to wait for the words 'line up and wait' or 'cleared for take-off', and that Japanese ATC failed to monitor the equipment that was showing them the incursion - because it wasn't part of their job description?