I am aware of that but thanks for writing. I think what was originally trying to be conveyed was that the safety board was hoping/excited that more countries would attend because they were intrigued by what findings they could gleam from the destruction of an entire aircraft.

Do you want further explanations from me or the pilot?

Interesting related article on calls for more ATC staff at Haneda. (Japan Today articles often self-destruct shortly.)
In wake of JAL crash, air traffic controllers call for significant staff increase - Japan Today

That accords with reports that were in the Nikkei newspaper (as consumed by my better half, I don't have an eng or jp lang link!) not long after the crash. There was an article reporting the ATC changes Haneda had apparently spontaneously made following the crash. They'd got rid of the "you're #1, you're #2" style of callout, and had dedicated a controller solely to monitoring the "runway occupied" indicator system that they've already got. If I recall correctly, the article was saying that this system had been in place for a long time, but because of the number of movements controllers had apparently become desensitised to it.

Interesting that the Japan Today article is talking about labour shortages. Are there any developments (technology, practices, procedures) going on in ATC to decrease the work load, increase the capacity? I can see that "more people" could help, but I can also see that "more people" could make little real difference.

No , from the pilot , on how he could misunderstand " Nr 1" with "Line up and wait "
@ msbbarratt :Oh yes plenty of developments , but in ATC when you reduce the previous workload the released : free" capacity is immediately filled by accepting more aircraft so very soon it is equal workload in the end. I am talking is busy facilities of course.
That said, nearly every busy facility at one stage or another does not have the staff to man all the working positions as you cannot economically man all positions 24/7. So choices are made to have max manning during peaks and reduced manning during low periods. Most ATC incidents occur during low traffic ( statistically ) . In some places , (, in some busy facilities in the US to take an example) , you can have a systemic shortage that you cannot even man all positions during low traffic without using excessive overtime . More workload. but this another story.
.
Here it is not a pure ATC incident , although , once again the ICAO standard phraseology was not 100% followed,, and the SMR display was not manned and the audio alert was off or not working. Contributing factors at various degrees, but not the cause of the accident . With the information released so far the cause seems to be laying solely with the Dash captain entering an active runway without a clearance. .But I am waiting to see the CVR transcript to make further comments. .

That is a good question that should be analyzed. I find in the general culture of the people posting on these forums(which is mostly my culture) to be rife with unsubstantiated speculation, people saying things as fact when they don't know it is fact, leading to a lot of bad information being stated, and an unwillingness to admit having been wrong. It is a real downside of our culture. In addition, there is a significant percentage of our culture that is not willing to start harsh truths because it will hurt people's feelings even if the cost of that is damage or lives. The former three items are long-standing issues that have been around for probably millennia. The last one is a more modern thing that can be just as destructive, especially in an area like aviation. A good example is the automatic praising of the crew and then it turns out that the crew made significant errors or the condemning of a crew and then discovering that they were other unknown circumstances that were beyond anyone's capabilities. All based on assumption and wishful thinking.

Current leaks to the Japanese press indicate poor cockpit discipline by the Coastguard crew who were apparently very chatty. This is believed to have distracted the pilot's attention causing him to line up on the runway and not at the entrance. The Coastguard is introducing strict protocols to avoid a repetition.

Wouldn't contradict anything we know so far. Just the "not at the entrance" is strange, but probably meant as "not line up at the entrance". Since it's a leak info, don't put too much meaning into the words.
Let's see when (if) we see official statements.
Am I right the usual 30-days inter report is overdue?

Going from memory, it seems when I fly general aviation aircraft at towered secondary airports in the US( it has been several years) that the ground controllers are very specific in ensuring that pilots read back the runway number and to hold short of that runway. Seems like a simple solution to replace “taxi to holding point”.