Probably burned a lot while troubleshooting at low level

In last years checkride scenario at my airline we had to alternately extend the flaps and gear. It does take much more time, especially the flaps.

I don't see any such message in the list?

I don't know if there is such a message or not (you're getting well outside my area of expertise), but there are no SOP that call for the flight crew to check STATUS messages.* STATUS was intended for use by maintenance, not to inform the flight crew. Now, there is nothing to prevent the flight crew from check STATUS messages, but there are no procedures that call for that action.
*There have been a few short term procedures that instructed the flight crew to check the STATUS page - but that was a stop-gap until the EICAS s/w could be updated to include an ALERT level message for the item in question.

They reported an hour and a half of fuel when they first declared an emergency after about 30 minutes of trouble shooting. They then reported one hour of fuel after the fly by and canceling one attempt at landing. Weather was good in MEM that evening, probably didn’t have an alternate. Two hours fuel for a 45 minute flight seems reasonable.

May be a different Standard of Preparation?
I remember this, because on my entering the snag, the Engineer checked the "STATUS" page and there was a message that both of were unfamiliar with. A check in the Maintenance Manual indicated that the message refers to the failure of the emergency system. If I remember right, it's activated after 30 seconds of the Hydraulic pack operation and a failure to unlock the Uplocks.

tdracer
Look, it's PPRUNE, not amendments to QRH or FCTM!! Just sharing experiences.
But you are right. We have now become 'people of the book".
The preface to the QRH, explicitly warns pilots, not to use Maintenance level knowledge to trouble shoot. Interestingly, it also goes on to say further, that if at the end of the non normal check list, if the situation is undesirable, one may use such knowledge. But do'nt expect any kudos.
Regards

Sorry, wasn't intending to be critical - just point out that it would be difficult to fault the FedEx crew for failing to check STATUS since there is no procedure that would have advised them to do so.
I have no issue with a crew - seeing something unusual - checking STATUS to help figure out what's going on. It occasionally came in handy when troubleshooting something particularly tricky or obscure when the flight crew told us that after something happened, they checked STATUS and saw message XYZ...
I suspect the warning to not use Maintenance knowledge to troubleshoot traces back to the Alaska MD-80 that crashed off LA when the jackscrew stripped. There is a strong belief that if the crew had simply diverted and landed at LAX - instead of trying to troubleshoot the issue so they could continue on to Seattle - it wouldn't have ended in tears.

Could be. Interesting that, at this stage of the flight (final approach), I believe the request was for the RFF to know what the fuel contents were from a fire perspective, not endurance (which would be in a normal initial emergency call ). So, X thousand pounds/gallons would probably have been more useful.

Blancolirio channel vid here:

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....2777ed6f2.jpeg
Took this photo last night. This is the P-6 panel behind the F/o’s seat

As per the AvHerald/Preliminary report (avherald.com/h?article=50f4076e&opt=0):

Looks like electricity was involved with regards to the alternate gear system, but not in the way that we thought..... How interesting.

Compromised hydraulics hose and alternate gear control wiring - quite the holes (literally) in the cheese.

How frequently is alternate gear extension checked? Is it done at every gear swing and, if so, what check is that included in?