Originally Posted by Luray
(Post 11502177)
I am not an airbus pilot so can't verify latest report on that incident. Rumor is that they misunderstood fcom. FCOM states that you need 180% of extra fuel ,but they just multiplied it by 1.8
Silly mistake but incredible luck. |
Originally Posted by Luray
(Post 11502177)
I am not an airbus pilot so can't verify latest report on that incident. Rumor is that they misunderstood fcom. FCOM states that you need 180% of extra fuel ,but they just multiplied it by 1.8
Silly mistake but incredible luck. |
Originally Posted by vilas
(Post 11503958)
The original news said the crew managed to raise the gear only the doors remained open. So there's something wrong here.
Sadly the Russian establishment are strangers to truth so we will probably never find out exactly what happened. |
Originally Posted by Magplug
(Post 11504059)
Sounds like the crew are telling porkies to cover up a monumental cock-up.
Sadly the Russian establishment are strangers to truth so we will probably never find out exactly what happened. |
Originally Posted by Luray
(Post 11502177)
I am not an airbus pilot so can't verify latest report on that incident. Rumor is that they misunderstood fcom. FCOM states that you need 180% of extra fuel ,but they just multiplied it by 1.8 Silly mistake but incredible luck.
See a fuel penalty of 180% and assume the fuel burn will double. Nope, with doors hanging (additional +15% over FMC baseline), it triples. Ugly trick the mind plays, all the other factors are in range (mostly) of 15-30%, so the 180 sure looks like a double. Badly wrong. OTOH, S7 had a good training team and proficient aviators before, used to meet them and vigorously discuss things at a nearby ATO when the times were good. When we wanted to friends with them again. Remember fellow flyers, debating and arguing is only purposeful if gain something for our own consicience out of the excercise. For Airbus? Clearly built better than a local tank! (and yes, the old standard of forced landing with the gear out proved well) |
Originally Posted by bpmsmith
(Post 11503934)
Whenever a penalty is greater than 100% (e.g., 180%), the clearest information for someone under pressure is to show the multiplier (e.g., 2.8x).
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Originally Posted by Black Pudding
(Post 11502454)
180% of extra fuel on top of what the original fuel to divert is a lot. If divert fuel was 2000 kgs, it’s now 5600 kgs (correct me if I’m wrong). If you don’t have it, you don’t have it.
Meant to say, quite likely there never was more than 6.5 when the diversion started. With the triple burn this would suggest an equivalent of 2.2 on a normal day, i.e. about 50 minutes [or markedly less] from resuming ZFW state. In case that happened, kudos to crew for taking the necessary actions before running out of the juice competely. |
And I hear they are now planning to fly it out. Looking at aerial photos, whatever the crew got wrong, they chose the right field.
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Originally Posted by kms901
(Post 11504644)
And I hear they are now planning to fly it out. Looking at aerial photos, whatever the crew got wrong, they chose the right field.
|
Originally Posted by kms901
(Post 11504644)
And I hear they are now planning to fly it out. Looking at aerial photos, whatever the crew got wrong, they chose the right field.
|
Originally Posted by FlightDetent
(Post 11504192)
Every airline I saw train this or trained, the first batch of people do exactly that.
See a fuel penalty of 180% and assume the fuel burn will double. Nope, with doors hanging (additional +15% over FMC baseline), it triples. Ugly trick the mind plays, all the other factors are in range (mostly) of 15-30%, so the 180 sure looks like a double. Badly wrong. OTOH, S7 had a good training team and proficient aviators before, used to meet them and vigorously discuss things at a nearby ATO when the times were good. When we wanted to friends with them again. Remember fellow flyers, debating and arguing is only purposeful if gain something for our own consicience out of the excercise. For Airbus? Clearly built better than a local tank! (and yes, the old standard of forced landing with the gear out proved well) |
There was a Gulfstream which forced landed on a race course in Ireland and was subsequently flown out after a temporary runway was made for it, so the precedent is there. Strip out the seats, load minimum fuel, flaps 3, TOGA and away you go. A few hundred metres of temporary road if the field is a bit soft.
|
Ethiopian did just that in Arusha with a 767 ,:
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Originally Posted by ATC Watcher
(Post 11505113)
Ethiopian did just that in Arusha with a 767
So, not a "Russian" phenomenon. |
Originally Posted by tdracer
(Post 11505417)
... and was flown off that same levee a few days later
By the way...Captain Dardano announced his retirement last week ;) https://www.aviacionline.com/2023/09...ntent=cmp-true |
Take off may not be so easy without a prepared surface. Remember this airplane was leaving three ruts in the ground down to walking speed, and landed with Zero fuel. To get it out you will need to add enough fuel, for the 180 kms flight. Also they will have to repair the faulty hydraulic system as well.
Pictures on another web site show that some of the rescue vehicles were also making ruts in the ground. |
So what we are saying is..... Not only did the crew incorrectly calculate the fuel required for a gear-down diversion to Novosibirsk, but they also incorrectly calculated the landing distance required with a G HYD failure at Omsk which precipitated the flawed diversion decision in the first place! They really did not do very well.
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Originally Posted by Magplug
(Post 11505746)
So what we are saying is..... Not only did the crew incorrectly calculate the fuel required for a gear-down diversion to Novosibirsk, but they also incorrectly calculated the landing distance required with a G HYD failure at Omsk which precipitated the flawed diversion decision in the first place! They really did not do very well.
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Originally Posted by Hawking
(Post 11505806)
As I am informed the first officer calculated it correctly and reported to the captain, that Omsk runway sufficient enough. Captain decided to divert to Novosibirsk because there is a good repairing facility available of another (S7) airline
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Not the first time a well thought out operational decision has gone wrong or the books were wrong. A Trident 3 took out the approach lights during a night take off from Malta with the stick shaker going as the manuals had used a take off distance 1 km too long.
A sister ship diverted to Madrid after an engine failure after take off from Malaga but had to do a late go around due to a typical Spanish ATC cock up; unfortunately it was outside of the WAT limits and continued to descend ..the captain accelerated down a valley, cleaned up to min drag and managed to carry out a circuit. In this case the numbers were in the books but needed to be extracted from the take off charts. Slightly off subject but similar I had to do a go around inside the OM on a route check..following SOP left the speed dropping with go around thrust and everything dangling..after thinking I would probably get a stick shake if I retracted the land flap and a gear warning if I raised the undercarriage I decided to lower the nose first..nothing was said in the debrief nor were procedures ever changed.. At least the crew made a good decision putting her down in a field |
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