PC12 down in Nevada
 

Single-pilot medical transport operation.

https://nypost.com/2023/02/25/care-f...nevada-5-dead/

Early photos
 

mynews4 dot com/news/local/5-dead-after-careflight-helicopter-crashes-near-stagecoach

ROD 32,640 ft/min - wow.

The upset here happened promptly, and the IFLOC went into a severe vertical departure pretty promptly. Those are very high rates of descent for an aircraft of that design. The GS is modest as the descent angle is very high, CAS is high. The system architecture and the availability of ADSB data suggest that electrical failure/instrument failure is unlikely the primary cause, flight crew incapacitation by hypoxia is unlikely at the relatively low altitudes that this occurred at, it hadn't spent great time above 10K, and stuff went odd at 05:11:41z and bad around the 19,000' - 19,400' reported altitude range. Flight crew incapacitation from an emergency medical event is another matter.. Spatial disorientation in turbulence may be a factor as it can always be.

An initial inflight break up would be a possibility, the RH outer wing panel would be a target for close scrutiny, but this aircraft would most likely have failed in flight later, close to the final impact point, it would be surprising if all pieces came to rest at the one location anyway. Pilatus make a strong aircraft, but rotors and waves can make for bad days out.

Sad end to an intended lifesaving exercise.


https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....c1a2ae55fc.png
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....d36922e5e4.png

Juan's analysis on Blancoliro raises some interesting points, that is the right hand turn at 05:11:41z has hallmarks of a spatial disorientation event. SPIFR, in turbulence and accelerated flight, particularly with rain/snow impacts on a windscreen, and with light reflection off cloud layers, getting disorientated is quite possible. It's unpleasant enough multi crew, but single pilot, it's nice to have a good APLT and a really nice set of ADIs and standby's.

An "ear-witness" heard the plane overfly her house, the last few seconds of its trajectory, with a high pitch engine noise and several 'backfire' sounds, before the final thump noise.
They tried to locate it in the surrounding fields, but it was snowing and low visibility, and passed by a few times 20ft or so away, without finding it (so I presume no post impact engine fire - not implying fuel starvation)

blancolirio's take
 

Interesting video. He raises the correct question. Why make this flight? Terrible weather, night , heavy turbulence, icing, single pilot. Why not wait till the morning? If history is any guide in the am it was VMC.
Reno has big hospitals etc , hard to know what SLC has that justifies this move.
An astounding 50% of life flight operations are pre scheduled patient transport.
Where I live, in the mountains, there is an astounding number of life flight helicopter moves for non urgent care.
We will likely never know why that flight was made.
Very sad.

The last data point I see has a ROD of 25984 ft/min, which works out to 295MPH, or 256kts. Of course CAS is lower, but that's just the vertical component and Vne is 236kts--the PC12 is not a slippery speedster. I'm assuming this plane did not arrive at the ground in one piece.

I was thinking the same thing. The Youtube image of the fuselage on the ground behind the emergency vehicle, with the cabin door open, does not look like an airplane which sustained that rate of descent....

But then it doesn't look like a helicopter either....

• Night
• IMC
• Icing
• Bad weather
• Single pilot

Pick one…..

Some scene pictures I see (in daylight) seem to show the cabin ended up relatively intact (although somewhat flattened vertically, and with the cockpit separated at the bulkhead). But no crater filled with shredded aluminum.

Not consistent with most the VVIs recorded, which to me implies:
1) break up in flight, with the cabin/fuselage then falling approximately level at a lower terminal velocity, and belly-flopping.
2) almost successful last-second pull-out for which there was not enough altitude or time (violent belly landing).
3) attempted pull-out resulting in (1)

Note that I'm NOT denying the recorded VVIs, just that there may have been a change in the dive in the last few seconds. Or the ADS-B transmitter was falling at one speed, and the separated cabin at a slower speed at impact.

Exactly. We have a good picture of the gross situation (LOCA spiral), but the NTSB will have to sort out all the possible contributing factors (e.g. A/P - did it kick off due to turbulence, or just choose a really bad time for an old-fashion electronic fault? Was there an AH failure?)

Could be the sounds of break-up in the air - wings or tailfins snapping off. And/or hitting the ground before the rest of the plane "thumped."

Could be compressor stalls (which are, in effect, backfires) in the turboprop engine due to disruption of intake airflow by overspeed, or ice blocking the intake).

NTSB says the plane broke up in flight:
https://www.kolotv.com/2023/02/25/ca...s-lyon-county/The path shown in post #7 shows a spiral descent of approximate diameter 1/2 mile. The distance between Seneca and Seminole roads is 1/2 mile according to my guestimate from Google Maps

NTSB wreckage pictures:

An ex Life Guard pilot in the same area as this accident happened. Among many flying jobs I have done, I believe air ambulance job is the most rewarding as well as demanding. Except some air ambulance operators in Canada which use Metro or B1900, almost all turboprop aircrafts in this industry are flown by single pilot. In some cargo operations, B1900 was approved for single pilot ops as well in the US as far as I know. So, it can be done. I am afraid the industry won't change their practice of single pilot in PC-12 after this accident, regardless of the finding of NTSB investigation.

It is easy to get pumped up and become too mission oriented in air ambulance ops. While we learned about the White Knight Syndrome of the early days of Medivac ops, it ain't easy to say "No, we can't take-off in this weather." to the flight nurses and patient, and his/her family who occasionally shows up to the airport.

Sad day, indeed.

Any tips on maintaining minimum ice speed in the climb for this particular model ?
Any thoughts on Va, Vb for this particular model ?
Some aircraft have very large differences between cruise and Va , Vb this particular model may fall into that group . If the tracking speeds are accurate he was already forty knots over Va in an area of reported light to moderate chop turbulence and an area forecast to have moderate to severe turbulence warning .

This was the witness interview, on which my post was based.

The in flight break up was likely to have occurred in this event, the question is if a failure precipitated the dive or not, and I suspect that the relatively close proximity of the liberated components indicate they failed in the descent rather than at the start of the event. The odd wiggle off route, recovery to track and then odd flightpath in vertical and horizontal components are suggesting either vertigo or a medical event to the pilot. Causation may come out quickly, but would suspect it will take time. The outer wing failure will be a point of concern to determine if the failure was in overload or from pre existing cracking.

Guessing a transplant. Heart, kidney, liver...... time is of the essence....

If design maneuvering speed is 166kts as I think it might be, then he was right about at that speed during the climb right up until the first deviation from course. I'd think that minimum speeds in icing wouldn't be higher than Va, but I don't know. My first thought in weather that bad is possibly severe icing causing a severe trim problem--perhaps after a failed/assymetric deicing operation--causing the AP kick off and hand the plane back out of trim and perhaps in an unusual attitude.

I don't know but I've been told by someone involved in a different Medivac operation years ago that the pilots are not briefed on the patient's condition or the urgency or necessity of the flight. The reason, of course, is to prevent them from being heroic and flying when they really shouldn't. Many of these flights are end-of-life situations where the patient is relocated for comfort and convenience, not transplants or extremely urgent care. As uncomfortable as the question may be, I would like to know the situation of the patient in this case, but I'm betting that we won't find that out.

The NTSB sent a full investigation team of 11 members to the site and held a news conference on Sunday to discuss their initial findings.The investigators said part of the right wing, the horizontal stabilizer and elevator all separated from the plane and found about 1,200 yards from the main wreckage.

I have looked but found nothing. I have some exposure to these operations and most of the movements should have been done by land. It is an extremely lucrative business.
Rates of $ 30 k per flying hour are not uncommon.

In general, patients in fixed wing air ambulance operations are more stable than those who need rotor wing medivac. In my opinion, those who fly their choppers are true unsung heros. I would also like to say flight nurses in this field are equally or even more courageous and skilled in their own profession.

From Reno to SLC in the snowy wx by PC-12. Who knows what was the true reason for this medivac ops. As 20driver mentions, I have heard many stories of lucrative deal in air ambulance ops, especially with Native American/First Nation contracts.

I did Medical air ambulance in Eastern Canada for a number of years, it was demanding flying however trips were cancelled due weather and there was no pressure to complete the trip, we simply waited until it was operationally safe to go.

This post from B2N2 is right on the money!

• Night
• IMC
• Icing
• Bad weather
• Single pilot

Pick one…

I flew aeromedical in WA in the PC12 - the 45, 47 & 47E (NG). The 45 AP would regularly drop out even in light turbulence (but could be reset by the pilot). Additionally, the pilot (& medical crew) always knew the patient priority.

Regretfully, management dictated that low priority patients would be transferred at night despite advice from the pilot body that low priority patients should only be transported by day. Management’s main concern is getting the patients collected, rather than the safety of aeromedical crews. In north-west WA, if the one & only engine stops, you’re likely to be in big trouble given the lack of available landing areas with lighting.

Unfortunately, one of these types of accidents will have to happen to drive change…

Just my 2 lire’s worth of how things are done on other parts of the globe.

RIP to all involved in this tragedy…

VH-MLE

What would be the impact of all night flights being multi engine multi crew? That would seem to be a start.

The information that is out there suggests that the plane was kept in hangar until taxiing out, and deicing was neither needed nor performed.

VH-, I manage and fly my own medivac jets, and I concur with you wholeheartedly. I enjoy the tasking, however, I often will amend a tasking schedule for common sense, while expeditious handling is desirable as a patient outcome, so is getting there in one piece, and in international medivac which is all that I do, a divert can be a major problem to the patients care. "Just say no" is easier to say than do, but is in the interest of the patient, medical team, and the operation. I have lost too many medical friends in helo and fixed wing medivac ops to conditions that were avoidable with some care. The regulations that apply to medivac and air ambulance are in general nonsense, and do not achieve anything more than dry ink by regulators, they do not reduce risks in what can be critical operations, often they increase risk.

NPSHI - Eastern Canada
I used to fly into Kingston Ontario regularly and there was often a Medivac on the ramp. Usually a B 1900, twin pilot.
The conditions those companies operate under is completely different than the US. They are a cost plus service contractor to the Health Service who are pretty stingy.
Even then there was waste but no price gouging.
The pilots told me they were never put under pressure. The biggest issue was often inbound to native reserves with gravel strips , no ATC or local weather.
They seemed to like the flying. As they were all young it was a stepping stone job.

I was referring to in-flight operation of the boots.

Victims of Nevada medical plane crash identified - CBS News

Slightly more up to date news, the pilot apparently learned to fly when he was about 40 years old. Patient was 69, and his wife 66. Medics 32 and 27 .All very sad.

Pretty well sums it up !! Possibly pick 2 to ensure a poor outcome .

NTSB video of crash site
 

I have plenty of time in BE100/200 types for Air Ambulance work and there were no single pilot operations with those aircraft types.in the locations I worked amongst the various operators. Also not aware of P12 operations as well as that aircraft type wasn't suitable in Eastern Canada(Maritimes).

Right wing appears to have failed mid span, inboard of the aileron inner span. Is there a spar splice in that area? The failure looks to be quite chord wise.