This is an argument that has been made quite often but which overlooks a couple of important points. Whilst here are risks to people on the ground associated both with CAPS and an engine out glide to land. In the glide to land scenario, you have an aircraft gliding in silently at or above stall speed and carrying all the kinetic energy that implies. There have been several cases of people on the ground being killed by this, one example being this accident

In a BRS deployment you hear a loud bang as the rocket deploys, then you see a big red parachute and an aircraft descending at less than a quarter of its stall speed and carrying a tenth of the kinetic energy.

That’s why several CAPS events have been filmed: people had time to identify what had happened and pull out a phone to film it. By extension, they would also have had time to get out of the way if necessary.

I might also add that in 96 successful CAPS pulls over 20 years not one person on the ground has ever been injured. That’s not to say it is absolutely impossible in all circumstances, but it strongly suggests that the relative risk is much lower if CAPS is used.

There is also the fact that all pilots and passengers in these CAPS pulls have also survived whereas there have been plenty of fatal accidents in which pilots have not been successful in gliding to land.

I accept that this statement as written, may be correct, though I can think of at least one case where an unsuccessful CAPS deployment resulted in both occupant and ground fatalities. Perhaps, had the pilot been able to control the path of the plane to the surface, the pilot could have reduced the severity of the crash.

I can think of several CAPS deployments where it is a certainty that the use of CAPS has minimized the severity of the crash. In the cases which come to mind, had the airplane been over a more suitable landing surface, a gliding landing would also have worked. I can also think of a number of CAPS "arrivals" into a place where a successful glide landing was obviously possible too. Sure the occupants survived, and only a plane was wasted. That's okay, if planes and insurance are cheap. Neither of my planes are CAPS equipped, nor insured for hull, so while I'm flying, I tend towards making more of my flying lower risk in all respects ('cause a lot of it is my risk!), and I practice forced landings regularly, for my own piece of mind.

Of course, it is a pilot's choice to select a CAPS equipped airplane, and thereafter their responsibility to fly it in consideration of its design features and limitations. However, having an added safety element should not lure the pilot into surrendering control if a safe power off landing could be made. And... as the pilot has chosen to fly over people, but the people have not chosen to be flown over, the pilot bears all of the responsibility to not endanger people on the ground with the risks of the flying. If this means that the pilot needs to steer the plane such as to increase their personal risk, to reduce risk to innocent people on the ground, so be it. It is not the responsibility of people on the ground to accept risk, nor take action, to maintain their safety from an aircraft which is no longer in controlled flight. To me, that would mean that if a pilot has chosen to fly over a built up/crowded area, that pilot has 100% responsibility to steer a stricken plane well away from the people, even if doing so increases their risk. That's why landing on a smooth, yet crowded road is a much less good choice, that the risk of flipping over in the plowed field next to the road. The pilot has to accept the risk, not place it on other people....

I don’t disagree with any of that as a fundamental principle of flying safely. It is largely reflected in the training that CSIPs provide and is also part of the CPPPs organised by COPA.

The point about it not being the responsibility of people on the ground to get out of the way is quite right, but it applies equally to an aircraft gliding in at or above its stall speed. The accident link I posted, and a similar recent tragedy on a beach in Spain, are sad illustrations of the consequences of an otherwise apparently competent pilot getting that aspect wrong (I’m not sure, but think I recall reading that in the Spanish incident there may have been an instructor in the aircraft?).

They obviously didn’t kill those people deliberately, which means that they lost control at a critical moment. History suggests that in both cases, had CAPS been available (sadly it wasn’t!) there would likely have been a better outcome if that option could have been taken.

I agree that an airplane descending under a parachute may be a better outcome than an airplane in which the pilot has lost control. Indeed, both planes are out of control, but the parachute plane is certainly descending with less energy. An element of my point is that having the CAPS available should not relieve the pilot of maintaining skills at forced landing, and if a forced landing, maybe flying the plane under control, to a known crash, if doing so will evidently prevent a risk to people on the ground. Yes, generally, a plane should be ditched rather than landed on an occupied beach, landed in the plowed field, rather than a busy road, or flown and crashed under control into a vacant area of a city, rather than drifting down out of control into a random part of the city.

For the CAPS deployments in which the pilot survived a forest or ocean landing, or the passenger saved themselves following a pilot medical event, excellent! That's what it's for! But, where a flyable airplane (albeit unpowered) drifts under a parachute into a crowded place, where a controlled landing or crash with no risk to people on the ground were possible, I think the pilot is morally obligated to control its path away from the people as the first priority.

There’s not much difference between us although I would probably use CAPS more readily and earlier in an emergency than you. I do stress that the training is all about integrating CAPS into dealing with an emergency and very definitely not “see a warning light, pull the handle”.

I'd agree with this. Much easier for people to scoot out of the way of a relatively slow moving chute than a faster moving potentially almost silent aircraft

Bearing in mind, that there is zero obligation for a person to scoot out of the way of an airplane, other than perhaps if they are standing on a runway at an airport. It is the obligation of the pilot, both moral and legal, to maneuver the airplane to prevent hitting anyone - not unlike a car driver. There is never a driving excuse of "they did not get out of my way, so I hit them", 'same thing for pilots!

Given the option of scooting out of the way of approaching danger or waiting for another to divert the approaching danger, I'm scootin' every time!

Cheers,
Grog

I think it was in one of Kerns books the following is told. Pilot of a US jet fighter was trying to navigate his way through thunderstorms, ran into trouble and was forced to eject. The canopy fell to earth and hit a road construction worker, killing him in the process. The pilot was found liable in court, the outcome of trying to get through the thunderstorms was a predictable outcome.

Mike Patey's videos are always worth a watch, this one perhaps particularly so:

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/72377

Flyingmac;

Thanks for the link to the NTSB report of the Cirrus-Pawnee mid air. The Schweizer sailplane/glider that was being towed by the Pawnee was fortunate to have not been "collected" by the wreckage of the mid-air collision. The glider pilot stated that he noticed the Cirrus approaching and fearing that it would impactl the towline, he reached for the release just as the Pawnee and Cirrus collided. The glider pilot reported flying through a "ball of fire" immediately after the collision, but the glider was reportedly undamaged. In my limited experience and from what I've read, most aero tow ropes used in the U.S. are 200 ft. long, and at the reported climb speed of 70 mph, approximately two seconds would elapse while traversing from one end (glider end) of the tow rope to the other end (tow plane end). Had the ballistic chute triggered at impact (causing the ball of fire) it is quite possible (maybe even likely) that the glider would have hit the shroud lines of the ballistic parachute. With all that said, I don't think that the ball of fire was caused by the rocket of the ballistic parachute system, but by the collision itself. I think that it is more likely that the ballistic parachute was triggered some time after the collision and resulting ball of fire.

Just my opinion.

Regards,
Grog

I remember seeing footage of the aircraft on fire under the 'chute and two people jumping from the aircraft when the fire got too much. From what looked like a couple of hundred feet at most.
How genuine it was, I don't know. It seems to have disappeared.

Report on the mid air.

https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.a...0FA115C&akey=3