...and presumably the Eclipse flight was flown entirely gratis, out the kindness of the heart, seeing as being a privately 'N' registered jet, not on an AOC, there was no legal mechanism for the hire of the aircraft?

Aeris Aviation don't have an AOC, it's an aircraft sales company. Now they could have lent/leased the aircraft to Channel Jets who do have a Guernsey AOC and operate Eclipses, but to the best of my knowledge you can't substitute a 2-REG aircraft with any old privately owned and operated N-registered aircraft and charter that when it suits you.

From AIN dated 10 Jan 19:

Granted that this is only an interim report - but it must surely be unsatisfactory that the details of Mr Ibbotson's FAA PPL and EASA PPL are still unclear and not on record somewhere. The AAIB report says they appear to have been in the aircraft and consequently lost.
The report makes also it clear that Mr Ibbotson SHOULD have been paying for half the cost of the flight AND that he was required to have "common purpose" to fly to Cardiff that night.

As anticipated, the report clarifies that this WAS an illegal flight. At the very least it was an illegal private flight by Ibbotson. It is also clear that the flight cannot have been operated legally as a charter, even though we shall have to wait to see if - as seems likely - and to what extent this was an illegal charter by an uncertified operator using a private pilot.

I'm not sure there will be a definitive cause established for the accident itself. But if by lifting the lid on this sordid arrangement the cowboy operators get their wings clipped, that will be a significant contribution to flight safety.

Exactly, the fact that the interim report focuses attention to the illegality of the flight is reassuring. I feared that the AAIB might 'cop-out' and merely investigate the mechanics of the crash. They have provided substantial insight into the direction of their investigation. In light of the fact that the pilot is still missing and his family still grieving, they've made a very a strong statement.

The legality of the flight is a very important aspect- if you fly illegally or in a "grey area" you will be brought to book. The fact that this operation was carried out 'under pressure', as part of a substantial 'commercial contract', at night, by a PIC with only a PPL without night or instrument certification during VMC, in an N registered plane without an AOC, without 'common purpose' while the pilot was 'all expenses paid' plus presumable remuneration. If any one of those factors were different then this may not have happened. If the pilot wasn't under that pressure his decision making might/should have been substantially different. The radar track in itself is likely to provide the technical explanation for the crash. Pilot was out of his depth.

What's the difference between this and an unlicensed car driver high on drugs driving into roadworks- the technical cause of death may be improper airbag function etc etc. The root cause was that the driver was not qualified to undertake that journey. He didn't see the signs, or take the necessary avoiding action, that if he were properly qualified (and without additional stress) would have been expected to have taken.

If you don't think legality is an issue, then why should anyone bother paying for flight lessons to begin with, paying insurance, adhering to regulations, paying for Certification as an Air Operator? Are they simply just 'costs' for the sake of it? Or do they ensure that those certified have an adequate level of training, adequate adherence to relevant regulations and an assurance to operate only with safety (and the safety of any passengers) as a priority?

Wow, that pilot had approximately 3,700 hours, so he definitely did know what he was doing. Nobody could ignore all things told over so many hours.

And why the F<self-censored> did he descent instead of going through the rain or turn back to Guernsey?
Yes, it would be nasty and one would have to apologize later, but he was low enough to be clear of icing and had a capable aircraft.
This flight path ... failure of the autopilot followed by spatial disorientation of the untrained pilot?
Where was the autopilot mounted in the aircraft, any chance in this mess to determine the final setting?

Mike Flynn are you sure that's correct, I understood the UK night rating on a PPL to be UK FIR only, same as the IMC

Hi Positiverate20

Where did all that come from? The AAIB report said nothing about “The fact that this operation was carried out 'under pressure', as part of a substantial 'commercial contract', “ unless I missed something. The AAIB report confirms that the pilot held an FAA licence, so flight in an N registered aircraft across an international border was Ok, and the FAA doesn’t prohibit cost sharing flights. The only questions are whether the pilot’s licence and ratings were valid and how much of the cost was he planning to pay? If at least half then it’s within the FAA regulations.

As for pilots taking passengers flying, if examiners think that a GST candidate isn’t fit to take non-pilots flying then they shouldn’t give a pass on the GST.

What would you do, make PPL solo flying only? They don’t do that with cars, so why aircraft?

The last 30 seconds show a tight 180° turn to the right and a 2500' descent. This is neither a turn to land nor an engine failure, it can only be a disorientation, a pilot attack, or a stall/spin due to icing.

Some detective work will find out the pilot's recent flying hours in the absence of his log book.. The airfields he flew from and to will have a record in ATC of the actual departure and arrival times of his aircraft. Maintaining night recency for instance can be done by simply doing three night takeoffs and landings in quick succession at one airfield.

That points to one thing I find surprising. The electronic FAA IACRA system is a rather strict system to keep records of issuance, initial activation and all check rides for licenses. I wonder why they did not put the investigation results on the US history in the report, as they must have the data by now. We know from the database a FAA piggyback 61.75 license was issued, but when was it first activated by an initial flight review - mandatory to render the license valid, and what comments show the records of subsequent BFR check rides - mandatory to keep the license valid? If there would be surprisingly no entries in the database, the 61.75 would have never been enabled for flying.

How true, I was an engineer, and led large projects which involved hiring people. Often I encountered applicants who had 20 or 30 years of 'experience' , but who on deeper enquiry had obviously had the same years 'experience' 20 or 30 times. Airline pilots with many thousands of hours may have only actually handled the controls for a tiny fraction of that time. I am a glider pilot with over a thousand hours during which my hands were seldom off the controls for more than a minute or two. There is increasing evidence that this lack of hands on is a contributary cause of some of the accidents we see to commercial flights.

Did he enter the sea in a spin?
 

No, the Night rating has no restrictions. However he did not have one so its a moot point.....

Actually being a skydive pilot myself, your stick and rudder skills improve enormously so I doubt the pilot was lacking in that regard. It's hands on flying all the way.
However I did find that others skills withered from lack of use. I sure wouldn't like to to find myself over the Channel at night in weather without recent practice and I actually held an Instrument rating with plenty of hours in actual IMC.

The possibility of spatial disorientation followed by in flight break up is what the report seems to imply. It's a common enough outcome, inadvertent entry into IMC on a VFR flight.

​​​​​

So basically, whatever other information comes to light, it was not a legal flight.

I am not so sure about the inflight break up. The sonar seemed to show the wings were still attached and he was pretty low, rather spatial disorientation and high speed impact with the sea, causing the engine to break off and the tail to collapse on the fuselage. Figure 7 seems to show more damage on the right, so perhaps still in a right turn, possibly a spiral dive? Not sure what to make of the outward parts of the wings having broken off, perhaps someone has an idea? Inflight breakup would likely sheer-off an entire wing?

Yes I agree entirely. It's chilling in a way... the old saying, in IMC a VFR pilot has only got 3 minutes to survive. This pilot requested descent to return to VMC.

The initial radar return in the AAIB's track was at 2013:32, 3 minutes 2 seconds later at 2016:34 was the last radar return at the crash site.

Here is an extract from the PA46 Malibu Pilots Operating Handbook.
2.34 ICING INFORMATION "WARNING" Severe icing may result from environmental conditions outside of those for which the airplane is certified. Flight in freezing rain, freezing drizzle, or mixed icing conditions (supercooled liquid water and ice crystals) may result in ice build-up on protected surfaces exceeding the capability of the ice protection system, or may result in ice forming aft of the protected surfaces. This ice may not be shed using the ice protection systems, and may seriously degrade the performance and controllability of the airplane. During flight, severe icing conditions that exceed those for which the airplane is certificated shall be determined by the following visual cues. If one or more of these visual cues exists, immediately request priority handling from Air Traffic Control to facilitate a route or an altitude change to exit the icing conditions. Unusually extensive ice accumulation on the airframe and windshield in areas not normally observed to collect ice. Accumulation of ice on the upper surface of the wing, aft of the protected area. Accumulation of ice on the engine nacelles and propeller spinners farther aft than normally observed. Since the autopilot, when installed and operating, may mask tactile cues that indicate adverse changes in handling characteristics, use of the autopilot is prohibited when any of the visual cues specified above exist, or when unusual lateral trim requirements or autopilot trim warnings are encountered while the airplane is in icing conditions. All wing icing inspection lights must be operative prior to flight into known or forecast icing conditions at night.

May be of interest to a previous post about auto pilot malfunction. AS the above reminds us more to the point is pilot`s knowledge about the use and limitations of the auto pilot.

I am surprised by some comments here that assume that the interim report states the illegality of the flight.

I don't read any of that in the report.
It says that, if the flight was organised as a cost sharing flight, the FAA rules would apply ; i.e. pro-rata cost sharing and common purpose.

However, it is pretty obvious that the costs were neither borne by the pilot nor by the passenger.
Possibly by the operator or by a third person.
As the operator does not hold an air carrier certificate, this is a PART 91 flight.
As per FAR §61.113, in such a situation and if the aircraft transports passengers or goods, the pilot MUST hold a CPL licence.
If the aircraft were not carrying passenger or goods (eg: a ferry flight) and the pilot were not receiving any compensation, the flight would have been legal.

So the conclusion is the same : the flight was very probably illegal because the pilot was not holding a commercial licence.
However, this is inferred from other elements than just the report contents.

right but does the FAA also not state that the direct costs are borne by the OCCUPANTS of the craft (up to a maximum of six) on a pro-rata basis? A third party paying for the direct costs would not seem to meet the cost-sharing criteria.

skyrangerpro,

the interim report confirms that

you're right of course, this wasn't a cost-sharing flight, but that's not to say it it wasn't being flown under the auspices of being one. The FAA state for a cost sharing flight that the direct costs are borne by the OCCUPANTS of the craft (up to a maximum of six) on a pro-rata basis. A third party paying for the direct costs would not meet the cost-sharing criteria. But then the corollary of your point is that the pilot knowingly flew a commercial flight and portrayed it as such without the necessary licence which I find extraordinary.

I have been saying for years that the laws requiring licences and log books to be carried on board the aircraft are bonkers, precisely because this means they're likely to be unavailable when they'd be of most interest.

Presumably Bruce Dickinson the chairman of Aeris was also unavailable. Do I remember he also owns an airline of sorts?

The Mail make much of the aircraft changing hands 4 times on the same day in 2015 but this is probably quite usual in the case of a N reg going into trust. I am not sure how the Mail can be certain that Cool Flourish Ltd are the beneficial owners, company returns do not readily confirm this as likely, no great change in the asset situation in 2015 as I recall.

I disagree. Night VFR request good skills of instrument flying. The pilot and the aircaft had everything to cross safely the showers line level through the clouds.

Trying to keep clear of the clouds means putting A/P off, turning and banking, which increases the risk of spatial disorientation. Had the pilot be asleep with autopilot, the aircraft would probably have reached Cardiff by itself...

What a total waste of time and energy this whole thing will become. No doubt we can spin our wheels for the next - what? 2, 3 years before a final report gets published and all for what exactly?

The AAIB and others will consume huge resource and present a lovely comprehensive report to tell us what? The Met looked marginal for his planned flight and his ratings and the cost sharing element is parallel to that. BUT to what end is all of this? Cost sharing pros/cons have been done to death, pilots are aware of the rules, the CAA are aware of the rules and even if there is some item of question in this flight so what the pilot is dead.

What would be a better use of time and resource would be free the AAIB to investigate the remainder of what is on their book in a more timely manner and any resource impact for the CAA to spend time and energy going through the rules they have to ensure they say what they think they mean, oh and maybe do the odd ramp check.

This set of weather data, available before the flight SCREAMS to any sane PPL, even with IMC and Night ratings, and current, and experienced etc etc "Don't Go!" Or at least it does to me. My ex CFI friend says to me that my competence exceeds my confidence and that is the way I like it! If and I say if I had been slightly tempted to do this journey at this time, I would have routed via SAM in clear air, and had a get out of jail free option there. Alas the pilot had a chance to change his mind when overflying Guernsey and didn't take it. In general I like a direct routing but in weather like this, it's best to chunk the journey into safe sectors and be prepared to abandon at any time. I have, of course, had get home-itis in my flying career but this accident reminds us that we all must have a the willingness to "just say NO".

Yes, I am all in agreement with everyone talking about the legalities or lack thereof in this journey but let's learn from this and examine ourselves whether flying privately or commercially.... If you have any nagging hesitancy about any element of a flight, stay on the ground!! And stay on the right side of the competence Vs confidence equation, it's served me well and I intend for it to continue to keep me and my friends alive a long while yet.

Pittsextra, you appear to be missing the rationale of accident investigations by the AAIB.
Ibbotson knew exactly why the accident occurred, if only for a few brief seconds, obviously by then it was far too late for him to get a second chance.
However, others might learn from the investigation, which btw is not to apportion blame.