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So lets review this...
Imagine that I'm recruited by XYZ airlines with the following:
Nb. The co-pilots I fly with are, likewise, similarly qualified, albeit with maybe less overall experience. By the time I'm flying the line, all the required training, experience & recency items have been ticked. The requirements of the Ops Manual have been fully complied with (this being a manual which is certified / approved / overseen by the local CAA; as is the whole operation). One day I take-off, have a technical problem with the aeroplane and, for whatever reason, it appears that I don't correctly diagnose the problem (it happens!), following which all on-board die. Given that all due diligence (by the management & the local CAA) was achieved for my (& my FO's) recruitment, training & subsequent oversight... whom is now responsible for me crashing?
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AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
3.1.6 EASA, JAA and ICAO 1. Despite several EASA, JAA and ICAO audit and follow up audit findings performed on Cyprus DCA, there was no enforcement of implementation of action plans in order to meet its international obligations in the shortest possible time. 3.2.2 Latent causes 1. The Operator’s deficiencies in organization, quality management and safety culture, documented diachronically as findings in numerous audits. 2. The Regulatory Authority’s diachronic inadequate execution of its oversight responsibilities to ensure the safety of operations of the airlines under its supervision and its inadequate responses to findings of deficiencies documented in numerous audits. /.../ |
Talk about "out of the frying pan, into the fire" :eek:
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Other guilty parties
And what about the regulators, who spectacularly failed to regulate this complete shower?
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You mean our own dear CAA? Nada. They claimed not to be responsible because they made recommendations which were not carried out by the Department of Civil Aviation in the Transport Ministry (which had hired them because they had zero aviation regulation expertise themselves).
Ridiculous situation: CAA finds crap airline to be crap and reports upwards. Cyprus authorities refuse to do anything at all (we don't know why but the airline owners were pretty well connected locally). But in the face of official inaction the CAA inspectors could, contractually, do nothing, even though they knew that British citizens were risking their lives daily on the airline. Most curious was how the inspectors recorded a raft of serious violations right up to the time Helios was due to get it AOC (it needed a variation so as to be able to operate another 737). Suddenly, all the problems disappeared and Helios got a clean bill of health followed by its AOC. Within weeks the inspectors were reporting more serious violations and the cycle of critical report followed by DCA inaction resumed. In sum, IMO, it is not only a case of regulators failing to spot what was going wrong, but of allowing an airline to begin operations which should never have flown. The rumour mill says that CAA acknowledges it "dropped the ball" on Helios. Not very inspiring. |
Helios Crash
Cyprus Mail Tuesday 24 FebruaryHelios trial set to open old wounds
By Elias Hazou But will justice actually be served? A HIGH-PROFILE trial opens in Nicosia on Thursday, when the five parties accused in the Helios case are due to appear in court to enter a plea on charges of manslaughter and reckless endangerment leading to the deaths of 121 people. The state prosecution’s case essentially rests on their ability to prove that the two aviators – Captain Hans-Jurgen Merten and co-pilot Pambos Charalambous – were incompetent and that, consequently, it is the airline’s fault for employing them and allowing them to fly. It has been more than four years since a Boeing 737-300 jet operated by Helios Airways out of Larnaca smashed into hilly terrain 40km outside Athens after running out of fuel. All 121 people on board were killed, making this the worst aviation disaster in Cypriot history. The precise indictments are known only to the parties concerned: the state prosecution and Helios’ defence team. It is known, however, that the two chief charges, which apply to all five of the accused, are manslaughter and “causing death through a reckless, careless and dangerous act.” The five accused are: Andreas Drakos, chief executive officer of Helios; Demetris Pantazis, general manager; Giorgos Kikidis, operations manager; Ianko Stoimenov, chief pilot; and Helios Airways as a legal entity. But legal circles are already pointing out that the prosecution’s approach is flimsy at best. Under Cyprus law, manslaughter is defined as “causing death through an illegal act” – begging the question of what constitutes an illegal act where flying planes is concerned. There’s also a great deal of speculation that manslaughter may have been thrown in as a peace pill because, unlike negligence, this offence must be tried in a criminal court. Since the burden of proof is on the prosecution, all the defence needs to do is demonstrate that the two pilots were in fact competent. It’s a process that’s sure to turn ugly for the relatives of the deceased airmen. The prosecution will argue that Captain Captain Hans-Jurgen Merten had “difficulties in communicating” and that his co-pilot Pambos Charalambous was not proficient in carrying out pre-flight and take-off checklists. Moreover, Merten is said to have missed an alarm systems test two months before the crash. But the now-defunct airline dismisses the negligence charge and insists that both pilots were fit to fly. Helios acknowledges that Pambos Charalambous was found to “experience difficulties coping under pressure,” but says it did take corrective action in this regard, by rejecting Charalambous’ application for promotion to the rank of captain. “The airline feels it is not to blame for anything. We maintain that the accident was down to a manufacturing fault on the specific model of plane,” said Christos Neocleous, a lawyer for Helios. The fact-finding probe had primarily blamed the two pilots, but also cited the shortcomings within the airline as well as Civil Aviation as latent, or underlying, reasons for the crash. The report by Air Accident Investigator Akrivos Tsolakis found that the airflow valve was set at a 14-degree angle from the manual position, allowing for partial pressurisation. For this type of Boeing, it should have been set on auto before takeoff. According to the report, on the night before the accident, ground crew had reset the switch to manual, but on the fateful day the pilots apparently omitted to conduct the pre-flight checks. The problem was compounded in the air, when the pilots misread an alarm for a takeoff configuration glitch, because the sound emitted for that is identical to the one for a decompression problem. Helios say the problem with the alarms – which has been documented by several other airlines – is the manufacturer’s fault. They point out also that, in the wake of the Cypriot accident, the United States’ Federal Aviation Administration has instructed Boeing to take corrective steps. Having mistaken the alarm for a false takeoff configuration warning – which could not be the case, as the plane was already airborne – the aviators were troubleshooting in the wrong direction, while all the time the plane steadily depressurised, leading to the onset of hypoxia. The investigation in Cyprus has taken quite a different path from that in Greece (the actual site of the accident), where a preliminary judicial investigation found five people were liable to manslaughter charges. They have not been officially indicted. According to reports, three of the five persons are the same as in Cyprus: Pantazis, Kikidis and Stoimenov. Under EU law, they cannot be charged or tried on the same offence in two different EU countries. The other two persons are Helios’ chief operating officer Bryan Field and engineer Alan Irwin. Irwin was the last engineer to inspect the aircraft on the night before the flight. According to the charge sheet filed with an Athens court, the pressurisation checks conducted by Irwin were “imperfect, unorthodox and non-compliant with the relevant maintenance manual…” Elsewhere, the same document states that the engineer “…in a completely irresponsible manner did not follow the proper [control] procedures, but rather improvised.” It goes on to say that the entries recorded in the maintenance logbook were “vague, incomplete and contradictory.” Though the trial in Cyprus is scheduled for Thursday, it is more than likely that the District Court will adjourn to examine the file in order to decide whether the case should be referred directly to a criminal court. Nicolas Yiasoumi, a spokesman for the victims’ relatives, told the Mail that come Thursday, the families and friends of the deceased would be at court. “We are concerned [with the trial]… but let’s wait and see,” he said. Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2009 |
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I do wonder why the bashing team is avoiding this thread....nobody has yet made a comment about this thread to be of interest...20 over posts bashing a guy that posts something related to lightning...
I do not believe that the court case is the ultimate solution...why some many people died...a very avoidable accident...we need to find the root causes... |
'will justice be served?'
What kind of a statement is that? seriously..... No matter what the final outcome of the findings, unless the reason any a/c goes down is because of unlawful interference... then why try 'get revenge/ justice' on the pilots...? Everyone makes mistakes, its in all training syllabus', crm course etc... Its inevitable!! Hence the reason for all the new training coming into play to cut out as much as possible! The pilots obviously tried their best to keep the plane airborne and land it safely, whether it was a mechanical failure, or a human error etc... It wasn't intentional, therefore 'justice' should not be served... Any pilot put in a position where no engines were operative of no flaps, whatever it may be, will do there best to get the plane down safely... and absolutley NO ONE can say anything otherwise, unless they themselves were in that same position as the pilots... Anyone can say, o of course, yea, keep her steady rate of descent, land on a nice hard patch o land.... but doing it is a different thing... there is only a few people on this earth how could possibly say they've been there done that...! So find out the cause of the accident(s), and try to ensure it doesn't happen again, but don't jump on the pilot(s) back and start blaming them for doing a bad job... Get a life! |
Anyone can say, o of course, yea, keep her steady rate of descent, land on a nice hard patch o land.... but doing it is a different thing... there is only a few people on this earth how could possibly say they've been there done that...! So find out the cause of the accident(s), and try to ensure it doesn't happen again, but don't jump on the pilot(s) back and start blaming them for doing a bad job... Get a life! Each and every single job has its own challenges and difficulties. You (and I) are trained in order to perform to our best. Albeit my job is not piloting, I always assume I am doing my best, as well as I am confident you do. The big question mark is...are we confident that our colleagues (mine and yours) are always up to the task? Have we taken all the counter measures to minimize the effect of mistakes? Your statement implies that everything was done by the book... I am strongly against criminalization of accidents, but we should have an open mind and accept that mistakes/errors can be made, and learn from it in order to break the chain of events... |
Wake up people.
We need to find the root cause The root cause was self regulation and corruption in the regulatory system. Is it confined to Cyprus no. Will it happen again, already has.....Spanair. Treat the cause and you remove the illness. It really is that simple without 550 pages of rubbish |
I dont like to see this dragged through the courts.They wont get anywhere with the charges as there was no "illegal" act.Both pilots were not only qualified but experienced.
-Captain's communication skills?If the Captain had come straight from Interflug to Helios,then perhaps.But he had worked in several western airlines prior to Helios so I dont see any mileage in that one. -First Officer's alleged incompetence;the Company rejected him for command.They didnt act rashly by promoting him purely on seniority number. He was kept in the right seat. Only possible areas of contention: i)those listed in the report ii)no specific challenge/response item for pressurization controller(now changed) iii)no visual warning to supplement the aural warning for decompression(Cabin ALT red light on main instrument panel now retro-fitted) iv)no dissemination of data from previous similar incidents(seen most recently in the Spanair case as well)..these incident reports spoke of the crew being "confused" by the horn and one involved entry into flight-deck by a FA to report mask-drop.If properly disseminated to all 737 operators,corrective training would have prevented the Helios tragedy.Perhaps,at the time,there was a belief amongst other 737 operators that their crews couldnt possibly confuse the meaning of the intermittent horn,that it was such a rudimentary error,it wasnt even worth noting...perhaps.Prior to Helios,the only decompression scenario trained in the sim on a regular basis was the rapid one at 350.Very few operators,if any,trained the more insidious scenario as well. v)The rumored mis-match of Mertens and Paralambous..it was alleged that they didnt get along.If the records prove that in addition to this they were both "weak",then they clearly shouldnt have operated together. IMHO,(iv) is strongest bone of contention.Others are weak and hard to substantiate.On the face of it,Boeing's cabin decompression warning system is unambiguous.Legally,it would be a tough nut to crack. |
Guys...
My bottom line here is 'Everybody must take responsibility for their actions' If the last step of the maintenance manual procedure says 'Outflow switch to Auto', then the maintenance person has to take some responsibility that that action was not completed. If (as it is) the FOs preflight procedure says 'Outflow valve must be selected to Auto', then the FO has to take some responsibility that that action was not completed. If (as it is) the NNC for Cabin Altitude Warning was not completed, as it wasn't, then the Captain must take responsibility for not initiating that NNC. If both the pilots didn't recognize the relevance of the aural warning, then the airline training/checkout people, as well as the pilots themselves, must take some responsibility for that. If the Captain didn't recognize the aural warning (as he seems not to have), he should have followed common sense procedure and initiated a complete flight deck instrument check, that's every indication they can see! (That would have found the cabin altitude/diff pressure indication actually showing what was happening + the outflow switch out of place!) This can also be initiated by the FO, if that indication/auto switch had teeth, it would have bitten him, it is so close to his face, should he had just looked at it! For my money, they were not competent to operate that airplane, given the evidence aired so far! Cheers...FD...:uhoh: |
Rotorhead, you say that:
The pilots obviously tried their best to keep the plane airborne and land it safely, whether it was a mechanical failure, or a human error etc... It wasn't intentional, therefore 'justice' should not be served... Any pilot put in a position where no engines were operative of no flaps, whatever it may be, will do there best to get the plane down safely... and absolutely NO ONE can say anything otherwise, unless they themselves were in that same position as the pilots... The point is, they weren't; Through a combination of all or any of the following; ignorance, lack of understanding, inaction, omission, errors on their part and of the Tech the night before, they were either comatose or dead and had absolutely no control of the outcome of the flight once they had passed out. They, and the rest of the victims, died because of an inadequate and badly run system, from the regulators, to the management, to the trainers who signed off apparently sub-standard pilots and to the pilots themselves who were deluded enough to think they knew how to fly. Flying is more than smooth PAs and greasy landings. It is a thorough knowledge of all the associated elements and they evidently had no idea what was wrong at the time, in spite of the warning horn blasting away for several minutes. Why shoul we not apportion blame in this instance? |
[I][/Prior to Helios,the only decompression scenario trained in the sim on a regular basis was the rapid one at 350.Very few operators,if any,trained the more insidious scenario as well.
True , the insidious case is very rarely practiced , but I had a case about 4 years ago in a 300 series . The aircraft was permanently operated between UK and Iceland at FL 280 Northbound and FL 290 Southbound (Schedule times and MNPS issues , single FMC operation). One day we crossed into Scottish FIR and decided to climb to 330 to try and avoid turbulence . While climbing , the Cabin Alt Warning sounded . Both pilots on 'O2 , Comms established ' seconds later. No ambiguity there. ( After much trial and error , it was found to be a cracked Heat Exchanger . If at 290 , the cabin was climbing to just short of 10,000' at a rate on the Pressurisation ROC indicator of under 50' per minute - virtually undistinguishable to the naked eye , and definitely undetectable to a healthy ear either ). Only noticed after the Cabin Alt Warning set things off. For info , cabin pressure was never anywhere near 14,000' , and never uncontrollable. In the cabin - a complete non-event.) FYI switching pack to HIGH forces cabin to descend. Safe flying KK |
Rubik say 'Why shoul we not apportion blame in this instance?'
BECAUSE ITS ALREADY HAPPENED, THE PILOTS ARE NOT AROUND TO TAKE 'THE BLAME', AND ITS NOT GOING TO CHANGE A DAMN THING, NOR BRING ANYONE BACK. They should find out the cause of the accident, and highlight it to all pilots worldwide to ensure it doesnt happen again, thats the only thing that need be taken from such incident! |
no answer to the core problem
A few years ago I posted on Flight International my concern regarding this case.
Absolutelly no impact with the situation:ugh: Crews are not trained to deal with hypoxia symptoms. Unlike military crews that are trained in a hypobaric chamber to know and understand their OWN symptoms. Civilian crews are left with a few chapters in the Human Performance and Limitations, a lot of wording, but zero training. Of course something like CRM spread like fire all over the world, it is cheap, anybody can became a crm facilitator and outrageous amounts of money can be charged with a minimum investment. Or the MCC training that in my point of view is a bit a duplication of training, as any Type Rating multi crew adresses it, but of course a lot of simulators are used and students charged for it, sometimes, again huge amounts of money. I have been a TRI and do not see the benefits of a couple of extra sim sessions versus a full MCC course. On the contrary an hypobaric chamber involves a huge investment and a huge liability if something goes wrong during practice. Thousands of crews are flying in pressurized airplanes without any PRACTICAL training regarding hypoxia. Just wonder whom many lives will be lost until regulators find this type of training essential like CRM or MCC. |
Rotorhead, they have already decided the cause of the crash was due to the crew's mishandling of the warning.
Now we are discussing the rights and wrongs of bringing those responsible to a court to ascertain if any criminal or negligence charges should apply. I see nothing wrong with that. People get put in prison for dangerous driving, why shouldn't guilty pilots, if they are found to be negligent, also be punished for causing death by negligence or dangerous flying? I admit that they are not here to receive any punishment but that is not the point. Blame needs to be apportioned if we are to learn anything from such an incident. The guilty should pay for the consequences of their negligence, or not? |
That aircraft should NEVER have been in the air with it's fault/s.
Just the same as a car on the road with no MOT!! Full Stop!! |
Rotorhead412
Join Date: Mar 2008 Location: A land not far from here. Posts: 53 The pilots obviously tried their best to keep the airplane airborne.. No they did not. They FAILED to wear oxygen masks when low cabin pressure signal went beeping, they FAILED to react appropriatelly by descending to safe height, they generally FAILED in many simple procedures that do not require some special training... And, the chief captain did not understand ENGLISH. |
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