Bubbers 44. The problem with this system is that residual pressure in the oxygen line can produce a brief satisfactory flow test. Regardless of that, the valve in question is positioned on the flight deck and is an item in the pre-flight checklist for the flightcrew to check regardless of what the engineer may or may not have done.

greg47
 

Im a friend and colleague with one of those charged from our Eva days . I lost touch with him when we went our seperate ways. Ive only just learnt hes in the fix hes in. I would like to get in touch to offer my support. Id hope he may read this and reply. Can anyone offer how i may be able to make some contact.

This was all discussed ad infinitum
 

Its not a mystery although there are aspects that will never be known.
It was crew error.Mis-identification of the intermittent warning horn whilst airborne(from the report).Light aircraft climbing @ 3000fpm so hypoxia onset was quick.Crew-training error also.Rapid depressurization is only scenario trained.No hypoxia training(alt chamber) either for civilian crews,only military.No dissemination of data from similar incidents(lingus etc) to B737 operators.Use of master caution system.Identify,priority to most crucial NNC,RESET.Risk of masking etc etc.It was a crew training accident,not CRM.The role language played in the crash.The role SOP's played in the crash.Slavish obedience of procedure over airmanship favored by modern airlines due poor training,invasive in-flight FDM,pressure from insurance companies,wrong guys becoming trainers etc etc.Its one of the misunderstood crashes of our time.

Forget all the myths;the engineer asking them if AUTO was selected.The discussion with Maintrol centered on equip cooling.Switch(es) position at impact...the male FA was a licensed pilot,he may have changed switch positions after everyone was already dead.Its immaterial.The rubbish about the airline and the country's CAA being unsafe to operate in EU.All red herrings.The crew Oxygen setting..doesnt matter,they never donned masks.

Keep it simple.Aircraft climbs,horn sounds,Captain retards thrust lever(s) to silence horn(wrong mindset-training issue),horn is never RESET,the first action(yes even before masks) to a cabin pressure problem.Horns,bells whistles quickly scramble the brain,especially so if theyre unidentified by the crew.Captain focuses on equip cooling and talks to Maintrol while plane climbs at 3000fpm and everyone dies.Master caution never reset seals their fate.FA's sit there while plane climbs,waiting to die.Weak Captain?Weak FO?(both very contentious issues because other crews have been caught in same trap-hypoxia onset is insidious killer)Boeing design?changes were made(red CAB ALT light,change to pre-flight checklist etc) but master caution system,if used properly,would have identified the problem.FA's were the last chance but acted in accordance with SOP's.

None of these guys should be on trial.For what?The system is what should be on trial.Airmanship,good training etc sacrificed at the altar of political correctness,SOP's and modern-day rote flying.Good airmanship and training saves lives,nothing else.CRM,SOP's etc,are very over-rated.Useful tools and they make the insurance companies and the politically-correct managers happy but both are of very little help when chips are down.Knowledge,judgment,experience..thats what counts.

Greg47
 

Try a search on 'Linked in' and send a message. Worked for me.

I took off from San Diego once and the outflow valve in the 737 went full closed as we were saturated with clearance info so opened up the outflow valve fully to comply with ATC instructions with turn and altitude changes. since we were taking off to the east. Finally when we had time we used manual pressurization to complete our flight. My FO just looked at the ceiling so lost him for a few minutes. If you are below 10,000 ft just shut pressurization down and aviate.

Helio Plane Incident.
 

The air steward had a CPL.
Why couldnt he descend the plane to 10,000ft so that the pilot can regain consciousness and save the plane?

From memory I seem to recall that by the time he managed to get into the flight deck they were nearly out of fuel. I suggest you read the report.
You can find it here - https://aaiasb.gr/en/aaiasb-reports/...87-112006.html

Local paper focused on the anniversary and the fact that four Management staff were indicted and found guilty. They all received reduced sentences and got off with no jail time after paying hefty fines.Highly emotive comments from families who lost loved ones but I did wonder why, what to me appeared to be pilot error, resulted in conviction of four Management bods.