Another note of support for Allan.

When I was an active mechanic (and flight instructor) we used to say that the person who died after signing the fewest things, wins (partially with this type of mess in mind, and partially with the more typical regulatory mess in mind). The corollary in General Aviation was to tell those whose planes you worked on to carry the airplane logs on board :uhoh:

Now that I'm a semi-active attorney, I see these cases on rare occasion. Should have been dismissed [at least against Allan] long before a verdict.

If the captain was well known as a CRM disaster waiting to happen [as some have implied on this forum], maybe some charges could stand against the management--that's a very fact intensive determination and tough to do in the politicized environment after a crash. I'm personally not prepared to take a stand one way or the other on the management, but the mechanic should never have been charged.

''If the captain was well known as a CRM disaster waiting to happen ...'' then he shouldn't have passed his last LPC because CRM is assessed during LPCs nowdays, isn't it??

Absolutely. However, how do you know in which position they were found by the Engineer?


Again, the report states that there is no evidence that the switch was left in the Manual position.

It is an assumption!:ugh:

There for the grace of...etc.

Every time I climbed into a Sim (military) the instructor had been there before me and put a fair number of the switches/dials/levers in the "wrong" positions.
Big smack on head if not picked up by me.

-sigh-

At 10,000 feet, if you have Pressurisation issues i.e., the press warning, then STOP CLIMB - Tell ATC - mayday if you will, consider: continuing the flight at that level FL100 or divert or go back. "we`re unable above FL100". Pan-pan-pan if you like, most advisable - Mayday, if you want so long as MSA is ok and FL100 is momentarily ok, Traffic, important, obviously ATC will give you a new squawk, probably, might even be 77. simples. But don`t go sailing up to cruise alt where TUC will get you. How come all the pax got the message and put their masks on but the crew did not - it did not seem to click. There is an an SOP.
Don`t climb.- and if you have to get back down again and, needless to say, get onto oxygen be as quick as possible. There is no oxygen drill in this whole flight, except from the cabin & pax who are more switched on than most. How much evidence did the crew need - "whats that?!" "Press bell/siren/noise"- "ok, stop climb, don oxygen masks and look for a lower than FL110 level, MSA? Pan or Mayday, job done - also one would be aware of what traffic is around and where it is

- again.

Gents, before we get into an engineer's vs pilots switch responsibilities, it should be noted that for the most part maintenance manual procedures are just that.

I.E they are procedures written for us maintainers to use, and very often are written with our safety in mind, hence switches do get left in positions other than normal operating position.

For example, we generally do not leave ground spoilers armed, but pilots do,
we do not leave thrust reversers armed, but pilots do. I could go on, but as others have said, ultimately the flight crew are responsible for doing their checks.

Reading some of the comments on this thread, and others, I can't say I'm tempted to throw the old 'Flightsim pilots' comment, as there are a load here who would probably be downchecked by Microsoft.

This really is a joke. In my current lot, we always laughingly say that when the 'Bus comes back from a quick MOT and oil change, if any setting is where it was before, it obviously relates to something that hasn't been checked. That's the way it's been for all my airborne life, but so what?

It's not up to the ground crew to set the flight deck up. It never has been, nor (pray God) will it ever be. Anyone who assumes every setting is going to be the way they left it is someone who has no business being there in the first place, or who has very minimal experience of real life. Switches and settings the way they were before? Before what? Quite a few would be in the wrong position for departure, as they would have been set for an approach and landing. Whose 'fault' is that then?

If an angineer has sat in the seat, do you not think to adjust it again to suit you? Or do you hit something solid, then blame the engineer because you weren't able to reach the controls?

Sympathies, as before, to everyone who suffered from this dreadful (and avoidable) tragedy. However, like it or not, the blame (as has been properly proven) lies front left and front right.

Hardly worthy of a response but yet I must.

By your way of thinking, pilots should be perfect, every time, all the time. As has been proven time and again, they aren't. They are human, fallible and flawed. If they weren't, systems like EGPWS, TCAS, configuration warnings, stick shakers and many, many others would not be needed. Neither would regulations - we'd only need one - thou shalt not crash.

You must be a great deal of fun to fly with - being so perfect and all. :suspect:

"By your way of thinking, pilots should be perfect, every time, all the time. As has been proven time and again, they aren't."

That's way God made checklists.

A little drift, but think it's worth a mention.

An old captain I used to work with many moons ago would always make sure his F/O could locate and operate the press contol panel in the correct fashion by touch/feel, no eyes allowed, his point being, vision/smoke/stress issues during flight, he wanted to know his F/O could operate panel blind.

He has long retired now, but not forgotton by many.

"Hardly worthy of a response but yet I must.

By your way of thinking, pilots should be perfect, every time, all the time. As has been proven time and again, they aren't. They are human, fallible and flawed. If they weren't, systems like EGPWS, TCAS, configuration warnings, stick shakers and many, many others would not be needed. Neither would regulations - we'd only need one - thou shalt not crash.

You must be a great deal of fun to fly with - being so perfect and all."


Obviously my CRM must be bad, because I never seem to be able to get my point across here.

No, we're not all perfect. I'm far from perfect, which is why I give so much credit to the right seat.

My whole point is that nobody is perfect, so to expect your steed to be delivered from engineering with the config perfect is as dumb as hell.

Just don't get some of you people. Nobody is perfect, that's my basic point. I'm sure as hell not, but nor is anyone else, that's why I take it as basic fact that I will need always to carry out standard checks.

Not bloody hard, is it?

Reminder
 

As it has slipped back down the thread, let me remind you:

There is NO EVIDENCE that the engineer left the PMS at MAN
There is evidence that he probably didn't
There is NO EVIDENCE that the aircraft took off with the PMS in MAN
There is evidence that both Audio selectors were at MASK
There is evidence that Both engine bleed switches were OFF
There is evidence that the PMS was AUTO at impact
There is evidence that the green manual light was out at impact

What does that indicate to those of you who know the system?

At the airline I was working for at that time (B737NG fleet), there came an order after the accident that we had to use the pilot´s preflight and shut down checklists to set the switches after maintenance. Now some rather complacent pilots had the opinion that because us engineers set the switches, they wouldn´t have to check for themselves.
The order would be ok if it was for the purpose of creating another line of defence against mistakes (another layer of cheese), but it will be absolutely be no help if the pilots then think that we should set up the cockpit for them.

Edit: Spelling

Aviation Safety Suffers Further Setback Following Helios Conviction -- HOOFDDORP, The Netherlands, April 26, 2012 /PRNewswire/ --

I think this is related

Ten Years for Alan Irwin....Insane
 

No I don't know the guy...but I know many like him and I am apalled at the thought he was charged, let alone convicted....

During my Apprenticeship as a 17yr old it was a "FAIL" to not have Power On checklist switches set correctly before putting power on an aircraft...No-one assumes anything when it comes to safety...let alone something done by someone else that has not been observed and cross checked...So how a non aircrew member can be made responsible for a Cockpit Switch is simply insane...pullng the wires off...now that is an offence:ugh:

Recently I have been told I must be more tolerant of "Southern European Culture"...Probably better simply not to go there anymore....

Airsnoop...any chance of some more info/evidence of what you are implying...PM will do...

BTW...I always thought the Pressurisation Horn went off at 15,000ft....but maybe confusing different aircraft/regulations....

Wasn't a SwissAir crew jailed after they departed an Athens (old airport) wet runway, due to extreme amounts of rubber at the rollout area? This was 10-15 years ago, I think. The people making these judgements are very misguided...it seems, in Greece, someone always gets it in the end.

More like 33 years ago! It occurred on the 08th October 1979.
At a trial in 1983 the Captain and First officer were found guilty of multiple charges including manslaughter with negligence, causing multiple bodily injury, and obstructing air traffic. The Captain received a sentence of 5 years and the First Officer 2.5 years. After an outcry from IALPA they were released on bail, and an appeal resulted in the prison sentences being substituted by fines.

Wow time flies! Thanks for the correction.

Yes Indeed
 

Hello Idle reverse Yes I can confirm I am the EAC Geordie engineer from the good old days.

GO TO ABAT4t2's LINK
 

Have just read the link ABAT4t2 introduced above - please go to it, read it, and take action before you find yourselves in a Greek prison.

Time for all of you who fix or fly into Greek airspace to go to your top management and get them to decide whether it's really worth it.

A last thought in this post - can someone name and shame the judge as her decision is detrimental to air safety and is a latent condition that could be causal in a future accident :=