Hawker Hunter down at Shoreham
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STEPTURN! Good post. Only a low time PPL myself, but with much Airshow viewing experience. Like you, lots of Oshkosh's, Farnboro's, Daytons etc.,. I always felt that pushing limits was very unnecessary, resulting in myself witnessing 11 crashes and 9 lives lost. Rather see the aircraft flying safely, and families living happily.
It depends how we are defining "pushing the limits". Flying a 1/4 clover isn't of itself something most would put in that box. However they might start to think it so with a lower starting height, minimal practice, minimal currency on type, time pressure, different conditions, different sequence so energy has changed, overfly constraints making positioning a focus....
None of that however should be solely on the pilots shoulders, he didn't go into that display alone and he shouldn't be abandoned after the fact.
None of that however should be solely on the pilots shoulders, he didn't go into that display alone and he shouldn't be abandoned after the fact.
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None of that however should be solely on the pilots shoulders, he didn't go into that display alone
What we're going to see is the regulators/supervisors making the edge farther from the ground and the crowd, because it is the pilot flying close to the edge, and by the time the pilot is flying, its too late for the regulation/supervision to affect change to assure safety.
I think that view has too narrow a focus as at its core is the premise that the pilot can't make a mistake when of course they can and do.
That was the irritation at the outset of this where some posting on this forum can't see the wood for the trees when any accident involves highly qualified pilots in reasonably complex aircraft [which if nothing else stifled debate]. How much of that view existed in the mechanism of regulation prior to this accident who knows but certainly some commentary from the AAIB doesn't seem kind as far as elements of the process are concerned.
Certainly the regulator kept no data upon those events that didn't end in outright disaster but were never the less sub optimal. So the learning process has little historical context beyond the anecdotal.
However it hardly seems fair to then push any failure solely upon the shoulders of the pilot if the general environment wasn't what it might be or is now.
The remedy is going to be complex not least because actually the reality of the matter is that those best able to find effective solutions are those more than likely doing it already and therefore potentially part of any failures in the past.
To say:-
Just means being able to crash into open ground because, for instance, if you haven't achieved enough height at the apex of a figure and pull through you hit the ground. However with the bald assumption that the pilot wants to live then reasons for doing such a thing is probably quite complex, and if it isn't then that raises more questions than it answers.
Perhaps the greatest pity is not having the debate a year ago.
That was the irritation at the outset of this where some posting on this forum can't see the wood for the trees when any accident involves highly qualified pilots in reasonably complex aircraft [which if nothing else stifled debate]. How much of that view existed in the mechanism of regulation prior to this accident who knows but certainly some commentary from the AAIB doesn't seem kind as far as elements of the process are concerned.
Certainly the regulator kept no data upon those events that didn't end in outright disaster but were never the less sub optimal. So the learning process has little historical context beyond the anecdotal.
However it hardly seems fair to then push any failure solely upon the shoulders of the pilot if the general environment wasn't what it might be or is now.
The remedy is going to be complex not least because actually the reality of the matter is that those best able to find effective solutions are those more than likely doing it already and therefore potentially part of any failures in the past.
To say:-
All the regulation, planning and supervision in the world won't help, if the piloting of the aircraft is "at the edge" and something does not go as planned at that edge.
What we're going to see is the regulators/supervisors making the edge farther from the ground and the crowd, because it is the pilot flying close to the edge, and by the time the pilot is flying, its too late for the regulation/supervision to affect change to assure safety.
What we're going to see is the regulators/supervisors making the edge farther from the ground and the crowd, because it is the pilot flying close to the edge, and by the time the pilot is flying, its too late for the regulation/supervision to affect change to assure safety.
Perhaps the greatest pity is not having the debate a year ago.
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However with the bald assumption that the pilot wants to live then reasons for doing such a thing is probably quite complex,
Some pilots are comfortable with more risk than others. I've known pilots who will accept more risk to present a good show - performance pressure. It's like the "get home itis" which will tempt a pilot to push the weather.....
Yes, I certainly assume that pilots want to live. However, "live", can mean different things to different people, pilots included. "Live" can be "on the edge", "adding 5 knots for the wife and kids" (on a long final), or anywhere in between.
Some pilots are comfortable with more risk than others. I've known pilots who will accept more risk to present a good show - performance pressure. It's like the "get home itis" which will tempt a pilot to push the weather.....
Some pilots are comfortable with more risk than others. I've known pilots who will accept more risk to present a good show - performance pressure. It's like the "get home itis" which will tempt a pilot to push the weather.....
Adding 5 knots for the wife and kids, living on the edge, grubbing around in bad weather is not the same as the example I gave of pulling through with insufficient height. The former could indeed be viewed as being on the edge and taking a punt. The later certainly leads to hitting the ground.
Insufficient height at the apex of (say) a loop is insufficient height - unless somebody excavates the ground it isn't going to change. Of course you do understand that, and it is certain that any display pilot more than understands that.
So in my example why would any pilot of great experience put himself in a position that guarantees he hits the ground?
As I said its probably quite complex, maybe elements within post 1051 could be possibly included?
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Can we just wait for the AAIB report before reverting back to comments about pilots taking risks, flying on the edge and pushing aircraft.
The AAIB have known since July what the outcome of their investigation was. They have I presume waited for other parties (CAA, maintenance, airshow, pilot) to make any comments/statements before publication and double checking of all the facts. The families will be among the 1st to know the outcome along with the owner and pilot and the their lawyer/s which is correct in the circumstances. Followed closely by the CAA and the Police/CPS and the airshow organisers and maintenance companies. Then the general public.
The AAIB have known since July what the outcome of their investigation was. They have I presume waited for other parties (CAA, maintenance, airshow, pilot) to make any comments/statements before publication and double checking of all the facts. The families will be among the 1st to know the outcome along with the owner and pilot and the their lawyer/s which is correct in the circumstances. Followed closely by the CAA and the Police/CPS and the airshow organisers and maintenance companies. Then the general public.
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[QUOTE FROM HEBOG "The AAIB have known since July what the outcome of their investigation was.
Is that a certainty ? It is well known that AAIB does not sit in judgement on guilt and blame. They will not be influenced in any way by other parties who have any form of interest in the matter.
In reminding us, Step Turn has well described a pilot`s crucial role in the circumstances of any causal chain of events that conspire to a catastrophe. How many times and in how many different ways has this been demonstrated.
So far as this particular catastrophe is concerned we now wait to see what sort of a role was played by the pilot. Where did he fit in the causal chain. That I believe is the single most crucially important item that is of interest to any pilot. So far as any pilot`s wish to live is concerned, their have been exceptions, mercifully few and only in the category of unhinged. So again I must agree with Step, it is as he says a matter of risk taking.
Pittsextra poses a rhetorical question, "So in my example why would any pilot of great experience put himself in a position that guarantees he hits the ground? "
The answer is, only because he simply overlooked the small print.
Is that a certainty ? It is well known that AAIB does not sit in judgement on guilt and blame. They will not be influenced in any way by other parties who have any form of interest in the matter.
In reminding us, Step Turn has well described a pilot`s crucial role in the circumstances of any causal chain of events that conspire to a catastrophe. How many times and in how many different ways has this been demonstrated.
So far as this particular catastrophe is concerned we now wait to see what sort of a role was played by the pilot. Where did he fit in the causal chain. That I believe is the single most crucially important item that is of interest to any pilot. So far as any pilot`s wish to live is concerned, their have been exceptions, mercifully few and only in the category of unhinged. So again I must agree with Step, it is as he says a matter of risk taking.
Pittsextra poses a rhetorical question, "So in my example why would any pilot of great experience put himself in a position that guarantees he hits the ground? "
The answer is, only because he simply overlooked the small print.
In most tragic events such as this one word springs to mind.....complacency.
I could post dozens of examples but this is typical.
Colin McRae blamed for fatal helicopter crash - BBC News
I could post dozens of examples but this is typical.
Colin McRae blamed for fatal helicopter crash - BBC News
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Generally, it's pretty difficult for an accident to occur, without a human error/oversight, somewhere in the chain. It is a certainty, that there have been aircraft accidents, where the unfortunate pilot was along for the ride, in an accident they had not caused, and could not prevent - hopefully, their role then becomes one of making the outcome better than it otherwise might have been. The pilot landing the Airbus in the Hudson river comes to mind.
But, for as much as I think about accidents during performances, for my observation, the pilot's choice as to how (and in what space) to maneuver the aircraft become more central to the outcome. In this case, it is very likely that had the pilot chosen to not fly a "G" maneuver, which included recovery from downward flight, The outcome of any break in the chain of causes would have been less severe. He would simply have more choice as to where to go with the plane, and at closer to one G flight, have more control of the plane.
As I flew today over Toronto in my 150, along a route directed by ATC, I spent much of my time thinking as to where I could tuck it in, doing as little harm to "the public" as possible, if something went wrong. I look at the sports fields, and shudder at the imagined headlines "pilot narrowly misses kids on sports field during crash". So I looked into ravines I could select. Much more messy for me, but no "public" visible either. However, through this, my circle of "could make it to..." was fairly large, and a forced landing, however messy the terrain might make it, would still be controlled.
Were I to have chosen a "G" maneuver during my flying there - even a tight turn, my choice as to where to go if something went wrong, would be reduced. In that location (over a built up area), a risk I refuse to take - I'm already at the limit of my comfort zone for handling an unplanned event just flying straight and level there. But that's me, other pilots might have a different threshold of risk in such a situation. We pilots are entitled to have differing levels of acceptance of risk, and discussing that in a accidents forum, seems okay to me.
But, for as much as I think about accidents during performances, for my observation, the pilot's choice as to how (and in what space) to maneuver the aircraft become more central to the outcome. In this case, it is very likely that had the pilot chosen to not fly a "G" maneuver, which included recovery from downward flight, The outcome of any break in the chain of causes would have been less severe. He would simply have more choice as to where to go with the plane, and at closer to one G flight, have more control of the plane.
As I flew today over Toronto in my 150, along a route directed by ATC, I spent much of my time thinking as to where I could tuck it in, doing as little harm to "the public" as possible, if something went wrong. I look at the sports fields, and shudder at the imagined headlines "pilot narrowly misses kids on sports field during crash". So I looked into ravines I could select. Much more messy for me, but no "public" visible either. However, through this, my circle of "could make it to..." was fairly large, and a forced landing, however messy the terrain might make it, would still be controlled.
Were I to have chosen a "G" maneuver during my flying there - even a tight turn, my choice as to where to go if something went wrong, would be reduced. In that location (over a built up area), a risk I refuse to take - I'm already at the limit of my comfort zone for handling an unplanned event just flying straight and level there. But that's me, other pilots might have a different threshold of risk in such a situation. We pilots are entitled to have differing levels of acceptance of risk, and discussing that in a accidents forum, seems okay to me.
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Re final report
Sussex Police v Secretary of State for Transport & Anor [2016] EWHC 2280 (QB) (28 September 2016)
Section 8
Originally, the AAIB also said in July that the final report would be out at the end of the Summer, this has then moved to the Autumn, which has now moved to the Winter (December) as this is when the families have been invited to Farnborough to hear the outcome.
Sussex Police v Secretary of State for Transport & Anor [2016] EWHC 2280 (QB) (28 September 2016)
Section 8
Originally, the AAIB also said in July that the final report would be out at the end of the Summer, this has then moved to the Autumn, which has now moved to the Winter (December) as this is when the families have been invited to Farnborough to hear the outcome.
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Awesome but Affordable
With but two days to go to the end of 2016 I wonder if AAIB will make good one of their several deadlines. The post-season airshow review by the CAA, in consultation with the industry, really does need it badly and the 2017 season is only a few months away.
Pittsextra
Agree with all your points - especially the one about currency. What if, due to lack of currency, an absolute note of the altitude at the top of the loop wasn't actually noted but just afterwards it "looked OK" (it nearly was)? We all know you can aileron roll out of that loop and recover until you're pointing straight down. Then you just have to pull as hard as you can without stalling-setting some flap if you remember. Wings were "waggling" just pre impact.
By the way - some of us from the 'Military " site have been invited to talk to Sussex Police about Pprune comments we made so be careful what you write. I will not be contacting them out of loyalty to a fellow airman.
Agree with all your points - especially the one about currency. What if, due to lack of currency, an absolute note of the altitude at the top of the loop wasn't actually noted but just afterwards it "looked OK" (it nearly was)? We all know you can aileron roll out of that loop and recover until you're pointing straight down. Then you just have to pull as hard as you can without stalling-setting some flap if you remember. Wings were "waggling" just pre impact.
By the way - some of us from the 'Military " site have been invited to talk to Sussex Police about Pprune comments we made so be careful what you write. I will not be contacting them out of loyalty to a fellow airman.
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AAIB to publish the report 12:00 Noon on Friday 3 March.
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There is a journalistic maxim: "if you want to bury/ minimise the impact of something, launch it on a Friday" (smaller Saturday papers due to more limited advertising; lower circulations as fewer commuters; a Friday is too early for the Sundays as the Saturday papers will have got there first; etc...).
While this is less relevant in today's internet age, and the report has zero risk of being ignored given its profile, the same principles apply.
So rather odd, given that (after more than a year) they had a choice of any time.
...Or maybe not.
While this is less relevant in today's internet age, and the report has zero risk of being ignored given its profile, the same principles apply.
So rather odd, given that (after more than a year) they had a choice of any time.
...Or maybe not.
