The question has never been answered and the CVR transcript does not appear to reveal why a descent to such a low level was made so far from the target HLS given the SAR AFCS has preset programmes to descend from 2400’ to preset hover height as low as 50’? This was used in anger so often and trained for almost daily at the UKSAR bases where the airframe in question served for 6 years. Were lessons such as this from UKSAR ignored? Is there a ‘we know what we’re doing’ or ‘we know better’ attitude given apparent screen setup, use of and navigation by rearcrew almost non existent until too late a stage contrary to known best practise in UKSAR given that was the ideal place to draw relevant experience from? CRM questions arise from the transcript but also what about SOP’s for provision of top cover and appropriate fuelling, again a practise UKSAR conducted successfully post RAF Nimrod retirement. It appears the mapping issue is clouding what actually may be the real hazards involved in low level IMC offshore operations and best practises.