Here’s where these rule making processes go wrong, and why.
We start with an accurate statement about a risk: If information or data published about an aerodrome is incomplete or inaccurate, the incompleteness or inaccuracy could cause an aviation disaster.
That statement is correct, in the abstract.
But the next step is where it goes wrong: Given the potentially disastrous consequences, any regulation that mitigates the risk of incomplete or inaccurate information or data in AIP is justified.
Although that second statement may make perfect sense to some - usually the people on a mission to make the world risk-free by regulation - it is fundamentally flawed logic that produces regulatory over-kill and unintended consequences as a matter of practicality.
First, the statement fails to take account of the fact that the incompleteness or inaccuracy of some aerodrome information may have no or negligible consequences. Certainly the safety of the operations with which alpha centauri is concerned do depend on complete and accurate information. But many other operations don’t. Further, not all incompleteness or inaccuracies necessarily result in increased risks to safety.
Secondly, and probably more importantly in this case, the logic makes assumptions about human behaviour, which assumptions are disconnected from reality.
We know how to get the data and information complete and accurate: Make the people who provide it criminals if they don’t provide data and information that is complete and accurate. Brilliant! And it’s even worse in this case: Make them criminals even if the incompleteness or inaccuracy had no actual impact on safety. Extra brilliant!
The response of potential information providers in the real world? You can stick this up your ar*e.