The South China Sea's Gathering Storm

[Heathrow Harry]

Key Findings

The United States Will Likely Find Itself Forced to Shift From Deterrence by Denial, Based on Direct Defense of Its Interests and Allies in the Western Pacific, to Deterrence by Punishment, Based on the Threat of Escalation

• The United States may be able to reduce or delay reliance on escalatory responses by shifting to less vulnerable platforms: longer-range precision strike drones and vessels to carry longer-range drones and submarines, along with the further dispersal of bases and force flows.
• The United States can encourage and assist allies and partners in the region to increase the range and capabilities of their own air and sea defenses.
• Barring unforeseen technological developments, it will not be possible for the United States to confidently and indefinitely rely on the direct defense of its regional interests.

Recommendations

• The United States should focus on deescalating localized clashes in East Asia.
• The United States should move sooner rather than later — before its power position in the region diminishes further — to constructively engage China across a range of potential flash points, such as conflicting maritime claims in the South China Sea, cross-Strait relations, issues on the Korean Peninsula.
• The United States should maintain a dense network of diplomatic relationships with China while strengthening channels for crisis communications, including regular leader-to-leader, military-to-military contacts.