Originally Posted by
Self loading bear
I have watched the video, indeed interesting. Outside the video they say that they know what happened but in the video they bet on 4 horses: different types bearings; better detection of smaller spalling particles; preventing or signalling shock loads when in transport and preventing dirt ingress while not mounted in aircraft.
All four good measures but they also cut TBO to a quarter and maintenance is limited to Airbus approved maintenance centers.
(Was this not always the case?)
This is only right if they would know and could prove that all these 3 or 4 cheese holes have lined up in this crash. (I.e. Dirt ingress has caused spalling on a previously shock loaded surface of a higher stressed bearing type)
But removal of the more vunerable bearing type is not the complete solution?
I am willing to give credits for the measures they have taken.
But I think they still not know precise.
The maintenance and inspections they have implemented will probably eliminate a sound business case for commercial use?
Perhaps somebody can give insight in what this means on Cost per seat Mile (not down to the penny but more or less relative to S92)
SLB
I’m only a simple ex EC225 driver, but how many of the “4 factors” were present in both fatal failures? The manufacturer of the bearing?
Is that a mirror, almost hidden by all this smoke?