NO mikethepomme. Rather the reverse. As I pointed out early in the chain, the whole point of having radar is to increase safe capacity beyond that available without radar. But in doing so it must be recognised that any failure may leave an unsafe, overcapacity situation. The safety case is intended to examine failure modes (FMEA) and ensure there are systemic redunancies and excess capacities so that a failure does not necessitate traffic reduction precisely because in the time it takes to actually reduce traffic there is an excess beyond safe capacity.
The FAA actually carried out an extensive study on the subject before they introduced ARTS I - what, back in the '50's.
The latest info in the Sydney newspapers (they must be right??) is that the system failed to "uncombine" from night mode when called upon to do so, leaving but one console working.
A software change is being blamed. So clearly the safety case justifying the change, if it was prepared at all, did not address the failure mode that eventuated.
Sure, systems fail but safety is about ensuing the failure does not increase risk.