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Old 16th Sep 2017, 05:57
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At ease
 
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Originally Posted by Robert Cooper

15 September 1940. Every fighter squadron was committed in battle, the RAF had no reserves.
Originally Posted by Hempy
Neatly dramatised by Churchill (and the movie), but when Park replied 'there a none' when asked what reserves he had, he was only speaking for 11 Group. Although the RAF were no doubt stretched between 13:45 and 15:45 there were squadrons in 10 and 12 Groups available to call on.
Anyone who has a good understanding of the Battle will understand what "Robert Cooper" was suggesting in his post re; reserves made by AVM Park.

Hough and Richards take up the story @ pp 250/251 of the below source:

The Battle of Britain

By Richard Hough, Denis Richards


By 6 September every Hurricane or Spitfire squadron that could reasonably be used in 11 Group or the two 'hot' adjoining sectors (Duxford in 12{Bader Wing}, Middle Wallop in 10) was either serving there, or had been serving there in the previous month. There were no further fresh squadrons fit to take the place of the battered ones. As Dowding later wrote: 'By the beginning of September the incidence of casualties became so serious that a fresh squadron would become depleted and exhausted before any resting or reformed squadron was ready to take it's place'(9)
https://books.google.com.au/books?id...sation&f=false

Following on from the above is Dowding himself:

[the source I link to below enables me to cut & past the text directly, rather than me having to type it myself as I needed to above, so I will use a larger portion of it]

Battle of Britain in the Words of Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding

(from page one of eight)

The Shortage of Pilots

[.....]

By the beginning of September the incidence of casualties became so serious that a fresh squadron would become depleted and exhausted before any of the resting and reforming squadrons was ready to take its place. Fighter pilots were no longer being produced in numbers sufficient to fill the gaps in the fighting ranks. Transfers were made from the Fleet Air Arm and from the Bomber and Coastal Commands, but these pilots naturally required a short flying course on Hurricanes or Spitfires and some instruction in formation flying, fighter tactics and interception procedure.
I considered, but discarded, the advisability of combining pairs of weak units into single squadrons at full strength, for several reasons, one of which was the difficulty of recovery when a lull should come. Another was that ground personnel would be wasted, and a third was that the rate at which the strength of the Command was decreasing would be obvious.
I decided to form 3 Categories of Squadrons:
  • (a) The units of 11 Group and on its immediate flanks(including Duxford and Middle Wallop - At Ease italics), which were bearing the brunt of the fighting.
  • (b) A few outside units to be maintained at operational strength and to be available as unit reliefs in cases where this was unavoidable.
  • (c) The remaining squadrons of the Command, which would be stripped of their operational pilots, for; the benefit of the A squadrons, down to a level of 5 or 6. These C squadrons could devote their main energies to the training of new pilots, and, although they would not be fit to meet German Fighters, they would be quite capable of defending their Sectors against unescorted Bombers, which would be all that they would be likely to encounter.
The necessity for resorting to such measures as this indicates the strain which had been put on the Fighter Command and the pilot training organisations by the casualties which the Command had suffered in this decisive Battle.
[.....]
http://spitfiresite.com/2010/04/batt...eplytocom=1501

It is therefore to be understood that Park was referring to the 100 % commitment of all fully fit squadrons(except for the few (b) squadrons which were in any event a further distance from 11 group airfields and would arrive if called on even later than the Duxford Wing).

The remainder were not fully operational or indeed were reduced to the status of training squadrons.

The a,b,c, categorisation of squadrons implemented by Dowding as outlined above is otherwise known as the "Stabilisation Scheme", references to which are to be found on the 'net with very little effort involved.

Last edited by At ease; 16th Sep 2017 at 06:32.
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