I'd like, if I may, to add a few observations to this thread - which i hope generates some interesting discussion. My view is that there are two issues to be looked at. The first (as ever) is deciding policy and requirements. The second is aircraft numbers. Policy and requirements are nearly always influenced by politics, national and inter-service. Nationally, the UK Government decided in SDR 98 that it wanted to field a credible maritime strike capability from two big carriers. At the same time, the MoD decided that the best way to get to the aircraft side sorted out was a Joint Force of RAF and RN Harriers and Sea Harriers to develop new concepts of operations for both strike and air defence roles, both land and sea based. This would (it was hoped) inform and guide the procurement and deployment of the new aircraft (Future Joint Combat Aircraft). The carrier programme has, via a series of fits and starts, begun to deliver. The UK's F-35B procurement programme (which was significantly delayed as long ago as 2003) is now delivering. The bit that failed was the Joint Force concept, and here we come to inter-service politics.
I have heard from a number of friends that the angst of JFH is in the past, the RAF and the RN are working together on F-35B, and it's going to be OK. At the level of SO1 and below, I'm sure that's true. I have posted many times that almost all of the RAF people I worked with over many years were professional, dedicated and damn good. My concerns are based on the basic 'ethos' of the RAF as it affects their senior leadership.
I don't subscribe to the 'devious crabs trying to stitch up the FAA' view of things. But my view is that the truth is worse. The RAF senior leadership (my opinion here) doesn't 'oppose' naval aviation - it just doesn't really care about it. Again, my view. The RAF's leadership has been trained, developed and influenced by the goal of 'independent air power' since 1918. That is, air power replacing other forms of warfare (land and sea) by virtue of its overwhelming advantages (as seen by the RAF). When faced with a choice, again and again over the years, the RAF has put resources into land based air power rather than air power that relies upon a ship. To repeat, I don't see these as 'devious' decisions - they are perfectly logical if your aim is the application of independent air power. So, the MoD has to come up with a logical set of requirements for a split fleet. That will, I suspect, generate some unfortunate inter-service stuff.
And so we come to deciding allocation of resources, or in this case, numbers. (To correct a previous post, the RN Sea Harrier fleet had about 33 active aircraft out of around 52 airframes. It actually had new build aircraft in storage to support the active fleet in the planed 'out years'. But that was to support two front line units comprising no more than 8 aircraft per active carrier. What the UK wants to do with F-35B is something much more capable). My old friend Evalu8ter (as ever) is 'spot on'. If the 'top line' figure really is 138, then a 50/50 split of around 70 As and 70 Bs looks (to me) sensible - depending on the requirements. These fleets should be able to achieve significant efficiencies is they adopt a joint supply organisation, a joint training system, and joint OCU. 'Joint' should also extend to the vital areas of developing mission support and mission planning facilities.
Operational control and management of the As should rest with the RAF, but the Bs should be handed off to the RN. It makes no sense at all to try to control and direct F-35B operations from a remote land based HQ - and that is what the RAF will inevitably (and understandably) seek to do. Handing operational control to the RN also (again my view) makes better sense for allocating the 'duty holder' roles for 'air safety' management in the 'MAA world' the services now work in.
Evalu8ter is also absolutely right about looking at the F-35C - longer range and better endurance. And a proper refuelling probe. But at a higher cost than the A. And the C carries around a hell of a lot of steel and structure that does nothing but allow cat and trap ops.
My thoughts, to wrap up:
1. 70 Bs for two carriers sounds about right, and the idea of getting USMC assets on the decks is a great one. We'd just need to sort out a few (not insignificant) issues around weapons supply, security and disclosure issues and safety management. The FAA has a good chance of solving those with the USMC.
2. The UK F-35 buy will probably increase. The '138' figure is a historic one, based on the need to replace both GR7/9 and Sea Harriers. Factor in reducing costs and a further run down in the Typhoon fleet in favour of F-35A/C, and I could see the Uk's total F-35 buy going to around 170 or 180.
3. Joint support and training systems for all the UK's F-35s, separate operational command structures to ensure the best delivery of combat effect from land and sea.
4. Solve the AAR issue. Honestly, I can't see the RAF being seen as a credible strike force if it can't refuel it's own aircraft.
Ok, sorry for the length, I'm done. looking forward to responses.
Best regards as ever to those running the spreadsheets up in town, it's always a thankless task.
Engines