DA on a visual approach... right...
Argue with the FAA AIM on the subject. As shown in the diagram, for example, does an RNP AR procedure have a DA?
What? CSPR is not a "concept". CSPR just means Closely Spaced Parallel Runways,
Since you love to argue, that comment was in response to your CSPO comment.
And at SFO the 1.5nm separation did not take effect until 28L glideslope changes were made in 2013, as previously discussed.
Arguing with yourself again...
So, moving forward.
NTSB's formal investigations.
There is an Executive Section and Probable cause section.
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...s/AAR1402.aspx
Probable Cause
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crew's continuation of an unstabilized approach and their failure to monitor the aircraft's altitude during the approach, which led to an inadvertent descent below the minimum approach altitude and subsequently into terrain.
Contributing to the accident were (1) the flight crew's failure to properly configure and verify the flight management computer for the profile approach; (2) the captain's failure to communicate his intentions to the first officer once it became apparent the vertical profile was not captured; (3) the flight crew's expectation that they would break out of the clouds at 1,000 feet above ground level due to incomplete weather information; (4) the first officer's failure to make the required minimums callouts;
(5) the captain's performance deficiencies likely due to factors including, but not limited to, fatigue, distraction, or confusion, consistent with performance deficiencies exhibited during training; and (6) the first officer's fatigue due to acute sleep loss resulting from her ineffective off-duty time management and circadian factors.
I am pointing the phraseology used in this and most of the other reports the NTSB has formally issued
First off, the NTSB report wording put the fault directly with the flight crew?
It then goes on with the
Contributing factors. Specifially notice (5) and especially (6) in bold.
In reference to "fatigue, distraction, or confusion,"..."acute sleep loss resulting from her ineffective off-duty time management and circadian factors."
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...s/AAR1603.aspx
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...s/AAR1603.aspx
Asian SFO...similar phraseology
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crew's mismanagement of the airplane's descent during the visual approach, the PF's unintended deactivation of automatic airspeed control, the flight crew's inadequate monitoring of airspeed, and the flight crew's delayed execution of a go-around after they became aware that the airplane was below acceptable glidepath and airspeed tolerances.
Contributing to the accident were (1) the complexities of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems that were inadequately described in Boeing's documentation and Asiana's pilot training, which increased the likelihood of mode error; (2) the flight crew's nonstandard communication and coordination regarding the use of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems; (3) the PF's inadequate training on the planning and execution of visual approaches; (4) the PM/instructor pilot's inadequate supervision of the PF; and (5) flight crew fatigue, which likely degraded their performance.