Ladies and gentlemen,
Please read the report in full before posting questions/ comments.
Mallard - 'dead leg, dead engine, correct yaw with rudder - that gets the ship airborne(you hope) then you have time to investigate the problem. Best now is to see if your colleague agrees'
You are right, dead leg, dead engine, correct yaw with rudder. BUT, that's once you are airborne. The 404 is perf C and the 310 also mentioned is perf E which means that if you lose an engine during the T/O role you are not going to be able to get airborne and reach the single engine climb speed (assuming max T/O weight etc etc). If it happens on the runway you have one option - STOP - on what's left, be it runway or not. Additionally, this aircraft was operated single crew, the other pilot was a 'second pilot' not a co-pilot and was not trained on type, he was there at the request of the charterer and assisted with the RT etc etc. Therefore there would be no reason for the commander to seek his opinion as he knew he was not qualified to give one. Again, it's in the report.
Glue Ball - 'never be in a hurry to shut down an engine' - in principle this sounds like good advice, but it comes down to perception of 'hurry'. Works on a jet (generally), but again, read the report. On this type of piston twin without auto-feather you do not have long to get the prop feathered before it will not feather as the RPM drops too low and then you are faced with an aircraft with 'significantly less than 50% thrust' due to the increased drag. This is why ongoing training on the type requires you to identify and carry out the recall actions promptly. I do agree that it is better to spend what little time you have identifying the correct engine and carrying out the drill more slowly than shutting the incorrect engine down quickly. But, read the report. The commander percieved he had a problem with the right engine, there probably wasn't any great yawing moment due to the left engine failing slowly - the AAIB said he was in an unenviable position, not just because he was experiencing an engine failure, but because of the nature of it, with associated confusion and misleading signals he received and the very little time he had to do something about it and because of the performance of the 404 at MTOW.
Undoubtably, the wrong engine was shut down (but they didn't discount a possible problem with the right engine which was not evident), but it wasn't as cut and dried as in your initial twin training where the a/c only has two on board (therefore very light), you know it's coming and the instructor retards a throttle fairly quickly leading to the 'obvious' yaw, and you do have some time, although limited, from above 500' and the s/e climb speed to react and carry out the required actions. John Easson really couldn't have been faced with a much worse scenario apart from worse weather perhaps.
It may sound like I am trying to defend the PIC, what I am trying to put accross is the perspective. Read the report, put yourself in his shoes, consider it all without the hindsight and then make your judgement, like the AAIB have and then all of a sudden comments from 'your training days' of little snippets of how to fly a piston twin may not appear to be quite as relevant.
I speak with some authority having conducted the same flight as PIC in the weeks before the accident.
Safe flying to all, and RIP to friends.
PP
[ 01 August 2001: Message edited by: Pilot Pete ]