The United crew might beg to differ.
Indeed, there has been little said about the state of mind of those 'holding a/c crews'. Their cockpit temps might have risen a few degrees and bodies been shaking. Imagine a near-miss, as in 100', at FL250 with a hard left avoidance and perhaps a push. The cockpit climate would have been disturbed for quite a while. These guys were about to get airborne. I would not be surprised if it took quite a while for them to calm down and feel ready to fly. Did they wait for the 2nd approach, or glean it safer to foxtrot-oscar while the runway was clear? Why sit in the sights for a 2nd time?
I find it hard to believe there would have been anything on the CVR that would be useful in preventing a repeat of this event.
It's not what was said, but rather what was not said: i.e. a brief about the state of the runway environment, how they were going to conduct the approach, what they expected to see in the dark, what threats were created by a closed runway and a visual approach etc. that is why the CVR would be helpful. The prevention process would be that a more thorough planning, briefing & understanding of the unusual circumstances could have been successful.
Remember a crash investigation of a landing over-run in rain storms, perhaps Little Rock? The CVR revealed that the auto speed brake had never been armed and they aqua-planed off the end. The NTSB never heard the 'click' of the lever being armed. CVR's can be more useful than FDR at times.