And imagine how many more platforms for all the above[and the manpower to man them] if there weren't two massively useless lumps floating about doing SFA
The above? Shooting aircraft down - best done by carrier based aircraft. (and F-35B has demonstrated the ability to cue ship based weapons). FODPlod mentioned an ASW frigate - well ideally you need ASW frigates (with towed array sonar)
and ASW helicopters. Really you need multiple helicopters - based aboard a carrier. Multiple helicopters and a large flight deck might be useful for disaster relief/delivering aid or Search and Rescue. I also think a carrier plus aircraft might contribute a lot to defence engagement.
Does the employment of the CVS throughout the 90s/early 00s count as SFA?
For a large part of the 1990s, the main UK military effort was in Bosnia. A carrier was deployed continuously in the Adriatic for those years, with both Sea Harriers and Sea Kings doing all sorts of stuff, including enforcing the no fly zone over Bosnia, doing reece, and ground attack - the Sea Harrier participated in NATO air attacks against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995. On here, many have been dismissive of the small number of Sea Jets embarked, but turn a blind eye to the fact that the RAF contributions ashore had similar numbers of aircraft, but without the mobility or swing role. The embarked ASW and AEW Sea Kings also contributed to operations. Remember, Yugoslavia did have an air force and a navy, and NATO naval units were conducting Maritime Interdiction Operations to prevent arms smuggling, so keeping a handle on the surface picture was important.
In the late 90s carriers took part in various other activities, including helping police the no fly zone over Southern Iraq and at least a couple of stand offs with Saddam Hussein. I think that RAF Harrier GR7s were embarked for the first time during one of these crises, hence the inclusion of the Joint Force Harrier concept in the 1998 SDR. After Operation
Desert Fox in December 1998, HMS
Invincible was sent to the Arabian Gulf as (so the media said) there was a missile threat to the RAF base in Kuwait and the UK wanted another option. On her way back to the UK,
Invincible got diverted to the Adriatic to participate in the Kosovo operations.
In 2000, the UK intervention in Sierra Leone involved HMS
Illustrious with both types of Harrier embarked, a fact that may not have registered with the UK commander ashore, Brigadier David Richards (later a Knight, a General, and CDS - and now a Peer). The political and psychological messages sent by deploying large warships close to land should also be remembered, as well as constant presence, large numbers of helicopters, command and control facilities, medical facilities, and others. I seem to remember that
Illustrious made a high speed dash across the Atlantic, but had to wait for the slower
Ocean to catch up.
In 2001,
Illustrious once again deployed with both Harrier types embarked, for the SAIF SARREA II exercise in Oman. Following the 9/11 attacks in the United States, she was retasked to act as a helicopter carrier (
Ocean needed to return to the UK for maintenance) and disembarked her fixed wing aircraft (and grey Sea Kings?). No land based UK fast jets took part in the initial strikes against the Taliban either, although submarines did.
In 2003,
Ark Royal acted as a LPH for the invasion of Iraq. The Iraqi air force was mostly dead and buried after over a decade of sanctions and a no fly zone, and Kuwaiti/Bahraini/Qatari airbases were used by the US/UK/Australians. Not that that stopped the US Navy from deploying FIVE carriers.
Since then, our main military involvement has been Iraq and Afghanistan. Apart from the lack of an opponent with an air force or navy, they both lack any length of coastline, Afghanistan being land locked, Iraq having only a tiny coastline - not that this prevents carrier based aircraft operating in both places.
In the last few years we have used
Illustrious and
Ocean in what might be regarded as carrier roles, such as using multiple helicopters to deliver
aid in the wake of natural disaster in the Philippines in 2013, participating in a
major NATO ASW exercise (with lots of embarked helicopters (in 2014), participating in a
similar ASW exercise in 2016, and more recently
commanding CTF 50 in the Middle East, the US task group charged with strike operations.
I am ignoring things that might considered LPH roles, such as BALTOPS year after year or amphibious deployments.
Regarding manpower - see the answer below to HH.
Originally Posted by
Heathrow Harry
TBH I expect they will spend almost all their time doing all the things that FODPlod has said.........
My concern is (and always has been) not that they are useless but that under current (and foreseeable) financing levels they will draw away funds and personnel from the rest of the Navy to our overall detriment
The last defence review was fudged by politicians promising not to cut Army numbers - the rumours said the RN could expect a manpower uplift of 1500 - 2000 or more personnel.