It would seem a careful review of the Cougar Accident Report is needed.
For a start....read up about the descent profile that was flown and the time line.
Correlate that with the CVR data that was released.
Then try to fathom what was not released involving the discussion with the Cougar Base....which until released will have to remain subject to conjecture.
Ask yourself why it was not released.....and ponder what might have been said that a lot of people do not want made public.
Anyone care to enlighten us as to what the content and detail of that still private discussion was?
We thrashed this about years ago shortly after the tragedy and later upon release of the Accident Report.
Mis-stating the facts does not serve any good purpose.
As to SA "selling a three Bag System".....who bought it? If it was not the right Kit for the Tasking offshore Newfoundland....then why was the aircraft being operated with it installed?
Prior failures that did not result in Oil Loss....how is that pertinent to an event where Oil was in fact lost?
If the Norwegians, almost five Years later find the ECL re Oil Loss are still "confusing" then who why has that Operator and others not resolved the ambiguity or problems with those Procedures? Don't most Operators write their own Checklists and Procedures....then they must be approved by the Authority they operate under?
The FAA Certification Requirements were met....or so it would appear as the Aircraft was certified and put into and remains in service.
We all can agree those Standards are not as they can and should be....and should be improved and made to improve the safety of the Aircraft and Occupants.
There were design faults with the 92 just as there have been with every aircraft ever built. Sadly, far too often we learn of them in very tragic circumstances.
Pointing the finger in a single direction does not afford much progress in improving the situation. I can see many facets to the MGB designs we see in modern Helicopters but don't see as being "only" the manufacturer's load to carry all by themselves.
It involves everyone in the process to look for problems....in design, manufacturing, testing, certification, and maintenance. It is a long Chain with many Links.....and as we know....one Link fails...the Chain fails.
Just as in the 225 situation with the MGB....we all can accept a proper design should be adequate to prevent two "Extremely Remote" events of aircraft shedding whole Rotor Systems but yet we see the results of exactly two such events in a fairly short time.
For sure....we need to reconsider this "Extremely Remote" concept.
Is it really possible to design a Helicopter that is failure proof?