SASless
I'm loathed to 'answer' questions you have your own answers to! But yes I have read the accident report in great detail.
You might not have realised it but you have conceded that if Sikorsky had actually designed the S-92A to run for 30 minutes after a loss of lubrication, the crash would not have occurred as they would have reached Cape Spear.
This latest EASA NPA does not change that at the time of certification a test with a loss of lubrication (not just a bit of the oil) was already required (see TSB footnote 84).
Despite your question below about what the FO said, in fact the FULL CVR transcript was not published by TSB so we can't examine the whole discussion between the crew and also with their ops centre. Perhaps Sikorsky's sale of the 3 float bag configuration to an operator flying over the Grand Banks may have prayed on their minds. In March in the Atlantic with 3 float bags a capsize and some fatalities was very possible.
The Canadian press had a field day when it emerged that the original marketing material used in Canada HAD claimed the MGB could run for 30 minutes after an oil loss. The TSB also have a section in their report about social media. I wonder which site they were thinking of
oh: Perhaps that material and the Program Managers claim of 3 hours was an influence in delaying a decision despite the RFM?
Perhaps three S-92A incidents just the previous year with oil system anomalies that did not involve oil loss may have also clouded their judgement.
A Norwegian accident report 4 1/2 YEARS AFTER the Cougar accident considered the Sikorsky checklists on oil loss were STILL confusing
http://www.aibn.no/Aviation/Publishe...ts/2015-11-eng
I must correct myself. The S-92A gearbox that failed on 6 August 2002 (see TSB page 100) when the test was done the normal way followed by the rest of the industry failed after 11 minutes not 10 as I implied below. A long way less than 30! Its only after that that Sikorsky "revisited" the requirements as the TSB put it and focused on what would not be "extremely remote".
The Cougar accident shows that one failure mode claimed to be "extremely remote" was not.
But the oil loss in Canada was not the first such oil loss on the S-92A. The previous year one occurred in Australia. That should have rung loud alarm bells that a key certification claim was false. If we apply the logic that some apply to other helicopters and their gearboxes, the S-92A should have been grounded until the root cause of that failure to meet certification requirements was fully understood....