HH: you have to be correct to be a pedant, otherwise you're just a spoiler:
... [UN Security] Council ... resolution 1267 (1999) ... demanded that the Taliban faction - never recognized as Afghanistan's legitimate government - turn [bin Laden] over to the appropriate authorities...
UN History of Afghanistan
[Edit: ORAC beat me to it!]
Leaping now to the defence of senior military officers on strategic decision making, it has to be said that they have surprisingly little influence on policy. There is almost an allergic reaction to the idea of the military having a say in Government decision-making with the result that the Foreign Office and its alumni in advisory posts, usually adopting a contradictory position of promoting Western ideals while resolutely supporting the Sunni Arab states, get to call the shots. As CDS during Libya, General Richards tried to point out the likely pitfalls of ousting Gadaffi, only to be told he was a 'purist' and promptly ignored. Since Trump's election I had wondered if military realism would finally get to, er, trump fashionable civilian idealism, but judging by the recent push against Assad I'm not so sure...
The exception I will make to the above (and perhaps the reason for those allergic reactions) is Iraq 2003, where a careful reading of Chilcot makes clear that there was a concerted effort by senior elements in the Army to get an armoured division involved as part of the usual "use it or risk losing it" schtick, and that proceedings were skewed by offers of forces that had been made without political authorisation. Look at the executive summary of the section below, plus paras 230 to 251 (especially 240) and 965 to 980. Barely-disguised self-interest at play. Bad, very bad; fortunately a new generation of young officers has grown up with the consequences and is determined not to make the same mistakes, which is why pronouncements like CGS's are not especially helpful.
Chilcot Section 6.1