yxcapt,
The factors you quote are the normal factors embodied in the certification data and would appear in your DC9 AFM Section 4 (Performance). A long time since I played with a DC9 (and, to my continuing regret, I never actually flew it) .... so my recollections are quite hazy as to specific numbers.
In regard to your question on sim exercises, I have long been concerned that, for some aircraft (and the 737 is one) the operation can get back to the minimum limiting speeds under some circumstances. This is fine if the training setup exposes crews to the problems near the limits.
My concern is where the normal operator's training program doesn't expose crews to the quite critical handling problems under conditions which may be permitted or preferred by the operator's SOPs. An extreme case would be where an operation emphasises overspeed V2 takeoffs but permits the use of minimum speed schedules at light weights while only training routinely for the overspeed situation.
What I do, subject to available time, is get the crews to have a progressively more critical look at these limiting cases. It is absolutely imperative that the environment is friendly, relaxed, low pressure, capital T(raining) or P(ractice) .. otherwise the pilots get too concerned with the potential for making a "mistake".
For the Vmca concern, after a good standard has been demonstrated for routine operation failures, I set
(a) a very low AUW (with minimum fuel) for which the min speed schedule is back at, or very near to, Vmcg and 1.1Vmca
(b) SL, standard aerodrome conditions so that the thrust output is maximum
(c) and use rated thrust for takeoff
and then run the guys through the following exercises in a progressive manner so that we avoid having counterproductive inverted crashes .. although the occasional Vmca departure results which is then frozen at a suitable point. (Sometimes the stunned looks are quite interesting).
(a) arbitrarily higher than minimum speed schedule (V2 margin, say 20 kt) at max forward CG with V1 failures
(b) minimum V1/Vr/V2 schedules at max forward CG with V1 failures.
(c) repeat for the more critical failure during the rotation just as the deck cutoff angle denies the crew external visual cues and the aircraft lifts off. This maximises scan and dynamic handling difficulties. All subsequent failures are done for this condition
(d) repeat for a mid CG
(e) repeat for max aft CG
(f) if the sim has a birdstrike modelled, repeat with the birdstrike instead of a fuel cut.
(g) if we have time, after the guys are comfortable here, we do the same with a requirement to track the reciprocal localiser.
At these very low weights, the aircraft goes like the proverbial cut cat (high T/W) and by the time the failure cuts in, the actual airspeed is considerably above V2. However, the effect of bank angle on sideslip and, in turn, the "real" Vmca, is sufficiently sensitive that, if the pilot is at all slow in aggressively controlling bank excursions, the "real" Vmca rapidly increases and bites him with a resulting yaw/roll departure into a stunned frozen inverted attitude ...
After a few practice runs it all becomes a bit of a doddle with the aircraft tracking the localiser and the guys very relaxed and super-confident because they have seen and conquered something approximating the worst which might reasonably happen to them.
I can sleep well - confident that that crew isn't very likely to figure in a Vmca departure or a low level obstacle splay divergence accident. From the viewpoint of the crews (and I have had almost nil negative feedback - mostly enthusiastically positive) subsequent "ordinary" sim checkride engine failures then become a walk in the park.
The other concern is minV1/Vmcg failures with a strong crosswind. Many simulators don't model this to any extent but those which do can be used to leave the crews in no uncertain knowledge of the problems and the potential need to abandon the takeoff at a speed in excess of V1 .. that being better than having an out of control aircraft rolling itself into a ball somewhere off the side of the runway.
If we might go back to your first statement ... this sort of bare bones statement (ie not containing useful qualifications for the exceptions which can bite) in the Flight Manual or other impressively official document is the real crux of the problem. Certification requirements try to put a fence around a problem but necessarily have to approach that goal often in an artificial non-real-world way.
[ 05 February 2002: Message edited by: john_tullamarine ]</p>