Besides the airworthiness and serviceability aspects... As someone who experienced the protracted nonsense of simple Boscombe Down tasking moving to "soft-charging", "hard-charging" and then full QinetiQ ownership, what this report emphasises is the associated fragmentation and compartmentalisation this process caused. Frankly, Boscombe staff didn't know if they were full-bored or countersunk; and the report reeks of it. The only beneficiaries were those who suddenly found themselves multi-millionaires by virtue of the position they held in DERA at the time.
This has resulted in an over-complexity of what was already a bit of a minefield. Not unlike what the MAA have created in the regulatory domain - 7 years after creation they have yet to address Haddon-Cave's central point. Failure (in fact, flat refusal) to implement perfectly good regulations. Here, the problem is failing to implement what are now labyrinthine regulations (some forced by the above sell off), with numerous examples cited of people thinking others were responsible for critical activities. We've been there before, one recent example being no one knowing who was responsible for the Hawk safety cases (Red Arrows XX177).