Reading through this thread, I wonder a bit at the stories regarding SAS.
Consider that the usual requirement is in a piston to turboprop conversion airframe with the usual CG problems of a lighter engine's being addressed by sticking the new motor out a bit further toward the front.
This fixes up the basics of the CG numbers but has an undesirable effect on static stability, especially at low speed and high thrust .. ie, missed approach.
The propeller normal force (think about the change in airflow direction through the prop disc with the aircraft at a high body angle .. a bit like a wing and there is a significant vertical lift force in the plane of the propeller which provides a very undesirable nose up pitching moment. Add this to the higher SHP output of the new engine and things can get interesting rather quickly.
Without the SAS operating, this arrangement can (and does) cause a reduction in the usual static stability required pilot stick pull force as the speed reduces below the trim speed. I recall, from a flight test course, many years ago, that the Metro could find itself in a situation where the stick force gradient reversed .. not nice for the unsuspecting line pilot.
One then usually sees a limitation with SAS U/S whereby there is a power restriction for the missed approach to keep the prop normal force in a sensible paddock.
As another poster observed, the SAS usually provides a variable downspring elevator load in the affected flight regime to give the pilot the impression that he/she is seeing a normal static stability in the aircraft's handling. (Would engineers pull the wool over a pilot's eyes .. of cause we wouldn't).
As for the allegation that an Examiner purported to require a crew to disable what would be a basic certification-required system and then abuse the aircraft's handling in respect of the problem which the disabled system looked after .. such a demand would be not much short of gross stupidity, probably brought on by a severe dose of technical ignorance.
I presume that the said system involved AFM limitations .. and, with that presumption, did the Examiner require the operation to comply with AFM limitations or was he suggesting that the crew play untrained TPs ?
The closest I've come to this situation is with GA I/R renewals .. my standard brief included some words along the lines of "touch anything below (height and/or speed I nominated) and I'll close both throttles and land ahead". Strange, I was never put in the situation of having my resolve tested ..
More often it is the phugoid natural mode of motion that needs to damped out in order to allow the autopilot to achieve accurate height hold control.
By definition (assuming significant bits of the aircraft haven't fallen off or stopped working) , the phugoid is a long period minor nuisance pussy cat sort of problem and ought to need no outside assistance ... the SPO, however, can be a different animal.