Originally Posted by
CONF iture
Had the elevators collaborated to Sully request anything better, and certainly not worse, was achievable.
Originally Posted by
CONF iture
When Sully touchdowned there were still 3.5 deg to even reach a-max .
Then you too agree with the original NTSB findings (and the FAA, see below) where they said flare was interfered with by the pitch-down terms by Airbus. I think its obvious. Also, note the CLmax was probably still ~5 degrees from where Sully pitched, in this case (above even the 3.5 deg margin to alphaMax). If you agree with the facts in the NTSB report such as flight data and statements they made about alpha-prot during the flare phase, then its hard to believe some others on this forum still can't see it. Its plain as day.
In summary, there is also:
http://www.tc.faa.gov/its/worldpac/techrpt/ar11-28.pdf (Bilbao, 2001)
"In some other incidents, crews wanted to land in a nose-high attitude (e.g., because of suspected nose wheel problems) but it was prevented by the alpha-prot feature, and the aircraft sustained preventable damage. The Mode cause code was assigned because of unsuitable control limitations imposed by the alpha-prot function."--- Although the FAA's statement about "Mode cause" isn't quite right, since its
not the Mode itself, its
the way the mode is constructed, which can be fixed easily in flare situations.
We've mentioned the Habsheim, Bilbao, & Hudson River A320 accidents already above, yet the recent Halifax, 2015 accident is very suspicious as well. The crew tried to pull up in time, but couldn't get the aircraft up in time. There is an accident report, yet I'm still looking for flight data plots to see if alpha-prot interfered with using the maximum amount of lift before impact close to the ground. Anybody know about that one? I do know there is a lawsuit being prepared now, so I might contact them to find out what they know about the pilot/aircraft dynamics in the moments of attempted pull-up before impact.
And I love the title of this paper, which gets to the
heart of all this flare-Airbus
"surprise!!!!" 
stuff: Sarter, N. B., & Woods, D. D. (1997). Teamplay with a powerful and independent agent: A corpus of operational experiences and
automation surprises on the Airbus
A320. Human Factors, 39, 553-569. Available from:
https://www.researchgate.net/publica...ountermeasures