SAR S-92 Missing Ireland

[louisnewmark]

I consider myself (and my employer considers me) to be a well-trained radar operator who routinely carries out radar approaches to moving shipping, fixed offshore structures, coastal locations and in confined coastal inlets etc. These approaches are almost always carried out in simulated IMC, and occasionally actual IMC, to minimum radar range. They are NOT simply oil-&-gas-style ARAs. Twice a year I practice radar approaches in assessed LOFT scenarios in the simulator.

I also consider myself (and my employer considers me) to be a well-trained SAR pilot who routinely flies radar approaches etc etc. I am ably assisted by moving maps with AIS and radar overlays, EGPWS, NVIS, very helpful SAR autopilot modes which greatly reduce the old-school manual flying burden, another equally-competent pilot/radar operator and a pair of well-trained and competent tech crew who can also overlay AIS and radar onto their moving map to oversee my efforts and chip in when necessary.

Those who know, know. Those who don't often either presume that their non-SAR techniques are used in SAR or, more regrettably, shout ever louder either to get a bite or to convince the uninitiated that they really do know. The danger of this latter approach is that the uninitiated might take the shouted ballcocks to be gospel truth, and if one of the uninitiated happens to be a lurking journo then a huge amount of avoidable hassle can ensue. As I said, those who know, know.

For what it's worth (and of course I may be wrong), I think it's probable that the accident radar was set up and being operated correctly for the conditions, and that overflight of the radar return at BLKMO was deliberate in the belief that it represented low-lying rocks that were not a threat. I also think that, in this case, release of the CVR transcript has been extremely useful as it will have spurred some vigorous discussions in every SAR crewroom and management office in both the UK and Eire, leading to positive safety outcomes well in advance of the full report's publication. I'm sure that this was the intent of the AAIU team - well done to them.

There are lots of learning points already arising from this accident but the big 'take-home' lesson is this: never, ever overfly a radar contact in IMC below MSA. Simple.