Originally Posted by
sunnywa
I have been following this thread and have learnt a lot about radar theory and EGPWS use, so I thank you fellow pilots out there for teaching me some new tricks. If I can maybe raise a few points ( I am a SAR pilot with similar systems in my aircraft type):
1. Many posts have been critical of the descent profile and why they made such a long flight at 200ft. I suspect that because the APBSS approach is not an IFR procedure, the crew realised they would have to get visual below the cloud (300-400ft) to then track toward Blacksod via the APBSS guidance (I would love to know the purpose of the APBSS, VFR vs IFR, what is it there for?). To do this descent, many operators have a 'no closer' clause in their OM so I would think they have to descend clear of all land (looking at the map, it might be 5-10nm) to get visual below cloud before they then would be allowed to turn back towards their fuelling point. If they were any higher, they would have been IMC and since there appears to be no IFR arrival plate to Blacksod, then this would not have been feasible.
2. NVG would have definitely been a final safety feature as they (I believe) would have seen the large rock ahead of them. I have flown a lot of NVG over water and even on the darkest nights, the contrast should have alerted a scanning pilot as to their danger.
3. Some people have mentioned lack of talk on the CVR as complacency. I don't believe this for a second as this crew were at low level, in the dark and in an unfamiliar area. I bet their arousal level was through the roof.
I look at this sad and preventable accident and see much to learn on a personal and organisational level. I am not going to armchair quarterback the crew as I am honest enough to think that some of the decisions made would have been the same if I was in the aircraft. I think the basic problem was the crew did not realise the BLKMO was 300ft high and for some inexplicable reason, they did not see it on radar. If only Blacksod had an IFR RNAV approach, this accident would not have been occurred and four fine persons would still be doing the job they loved.
I too have been closely following and have learnt from this sad thread.
1) In my operating area (Australia), regulations are very specific with regard to the way we must operate in IMC (IFR) and VMC (VFR). If you can't maintain visual reference with the ground or water, navigate visually, maintain aircraft attitude visually, you are operating in
IMC. When operating under the IFR, I can
ONLY descend below MSA when following a prescribed, approved, promulgated procedure. This may include a company procedure that has been formally designed and has been approved by the regulator.
To my mind, this route, was never an IFR procedure and was never intended as such. Remember that they descended to 200' & hit Blackrock
BEFORE the start of this route. It seems to me that for whatever reason, this crew has paid the ultimate price for placing their lives in the hands of a "procedure" that was not fit for the purpose it was used for.
2) NVG would most likely have enabled visual flight & would have almost certainly allowed the crew to have picked up the light, if not the island itself, as they approached Blackrock. I currently spend quite a lot of my time below 200' at night over-water in low visibility conditions and appreciate the level of SA they can provide in concert with radar, FLIR, LNAV, Searchlight etc.
3) Low level, low visibility navigation must employ all available resources, from Mk 1 eyeball (looking out the bl**dy window), to all the bells & whistles available in a modern, 4 crew, SAR configured aircraft.
I for one, try to put myself in the position of this crew, as I know I can & do make errors, & ask myself what I can learn to be safer in the future.