Future Carrier (Including Costs)

[KenV]

First, please understand I enjoy technical discussions and am not arguing against the premise of ballistic anti-ship missiles.

You have linked high speed with a precision problem, when the reverse can be true.
That depends on the nature of the warhead. I got the impression that the warhead being discussed 1) is "dumb" (no sensors, etc) and 2) is hypersonic (7000 m/s!) and derives all its killing energy from its kinetics (no explosives). For the warhead to have retained that kind of velocity all the way to its target it would have to be released/ejected from the sensor section at very high altitude, and since it's inert it must fly a ballistic trajectory from then on. That means the sensor(s) must have long range while seeing thru the heat of re-entry and simultaneously have extraordinarily high precision to direct the ballistic warhead to the distant target with any hope of hitting it. Modern main battle tanks have very high precision sensors and yet they have an effective range on the order of a few kilometers. The system being described would require orders of magnitude greater precision.

You also introduced a premise that the target position would only be known at launch and then lost over many minutes so requiring a new search. Modern targeting information can come from off-board sources and form part of the updated guidance solution.
It would appear that if tensions had escalated to the point that a hostile nation would attempt to sink a CVN, that both sides would engage in extensive EW. Maintaining a datalink to the missile during its flight in such an environment would seem to be highly unlikely. Further, the survival of the "off-board" sensor system that is tracking the CVN would also seem to be highly unlikely.

The Pershing example from nearly 50 years ago was to demonstrate the controllability and the ability for sensors to survive re-entry.
Pershing had an ablative heat shield to protect the radar sensor from a mach 8 re-entry velocity (about one third the velocity of this system's claimed terminal velocity of 7000 m/s.) The entire re-entry system did a 25G pull up maneuver after reentry to bleed speed, followed by a 30nm controlled glide. The radar did not switch on until the final terminal phase of the flight at considerably lower altitude to update the inertials so as to provide a 100m CEP for that final terminal maneuver. That is totally different than the system being described.

What was incredibly difficult all those years ago is considerably easier now - the hard miles have been done.
Indeed. But the system being described operates totally differently than the Pershing system and the resulting problem is orders of magnitude more difficult than the Pershing problem. So basically, the "miles" of this new system are much longer and immensely more difficult than the "done" miles. And BTW, the "done" miles were done by the USA, which has not shared that technology with its allies, much less its adversaries.

I would like to hope that the US could take and accept a hit on a CVN in harms way doing its job, without triggering total war - but you never know.
I believe you are correct and "hits" on various US ships over the past decades tends to confirm that. However, the system being described is of a "carrier killer", specifically designed and used not just to "hit" a carrier, but to sink it outright. Assuming it is successful, that to me is quite a different kettle of fish that will result in a rather devastating counter blow even if that blow is "proportional." For perspective, use of 59 Tomahawk missiles to destroy an air base was considered "proportional" for the use of a few chemical weapons against civilians. It would seem (but cannot be confirmed) that a "proportional" strike for the sinking of a CVN would be considerably more devastating.

The USN has flexed its muscles with CVNs rather effectively for many for peresepdecades in a rather one-sided use of firepower. It is understandable that potential adversaries have worked hard to provide a credible counter. Your point about them providing an effective area denial weapon is well-made and reflects current USN thinking.
During the cold war, the entire Soviet fleet was a sea denial system specifically designed to deny access to US carrier battle groups. In my opinion, anti ship ballistic missiles are a land based version of the same thing. They would be great for example to place CVNs in jeopardy in any kind of operation to retake Taiwan. But to prevent US projection of military power anywhere else? In my opinion, not so useful.