Originally Posted by
Woolf
Although there are a number of quite significant contributory factors, I think the main point here is that regardless of whether a published procedure is followed or not, any low-level flight over water in IMC, at night or in marginal conditions MUST use the radar as the PRIMARY navigation aid. If a radar return cannot be positively, visually identified it MUST NOT be overflown. Besides islands there are plenty of moving marine obstacles that can easily reach 300ft or more which would not be on any map, chart or in any database. Whether radar guidance is achieved from front or back seats is a matter of procedure but it would be a designated crewmember’s responsibility to monitor and constantly verbally update the obstacle situation as seen on the radar. Although I know nothing of CHC’s procedures I would assume that this is SOP, especially for SAR.
Everyone makes mistakes, I’ve made plenty and seen very capable colleagues do the same. Most of the time some procedure, mechanism or technology prevents a tragic outcome, sadly not so on this occasion. I’m sure there is much to learn here.
For donkey's years we did exactly what Woolf describes but in two-crew cockpits (non SAR) using much more primitive equipment - because it worked.