FSF chose to publish the report based on a weak psychological study of human behaviour. The study indicates the difficulty, even the futility of attempting to universally correct specific human behaviour without considering context.
Thus the report expands to cover a range of subjects perceived to be associated with approach and landing accidents, collected under the title of failure to GA. The subsequent widespread view fails to identify the required background knowledge to enable definitive solutions; - more 'should do' opposed to 'how to'.
This is a typical scatter gun approach - "well we hit the wall", but with little hope of killing the bug. But what is the bug, what's the real problem; not GA, it's the need for consistent successful landings.
The FSF might better have revisited the widely acclaimed ALAR tool kit, update and emphasise the relevant proposals, particularly with the advent of TALPA, and the continuing inability of the FAA to mandate rules for landing performance.
Although the stabilised approach criteria originated from ALAR, it was intended as guidance for operators to adapt, particularly for the speed target which was energetically debated at the time, and subsequently identified as inappropriate in recent conferences; this is further complicated by operators using a recommendation as a rule.
The FSF might also encourage the FAA to consolidate advice and definitions relating to landing; there is little point in minimising landing risk by using new data (FOLD), but still refer to an ill defined 'landing zone' or the first '3000 ft' in older documents.
A key component of the ALAR tool kit was the pre-landing briefing where crews could identify threats and risks, mentally prepare for a GA, and consider the landing conditions. Thus any subsequent need for GA should be less of a surprise or have hidden threats.
It might even be possible to remove stabilised criteria if there was greater focus on the landing performance and aiding crews to understand the risks. A continued approach would be based on risk management for the landing, there should be no need for rules and 'either or' decisions; unacceptable risk - then at any stage of the approach don't continue with the intent to land.
Return the power of assessment and decision making (risk assessment) to the crew; particularly because they get many more landings right than not so.