Perhaps it would help things along if I focussed more on what could be done to improve the UK's military airworthiness. Alert - these are my opinions only, dissent is positively welcomed.
It struck me that we could take a look at how aircrew do their business - how do they achieve and maintain good standards of 'airmanship'? From my experience, it certainly included good clear rules. But far more important were good supervision and oversight. Plus really excellent training and a clear system for building experience. What they didn't do was rely on obeying their rules. I never met a pilot (or observer or aircrewman) whose proud boast was that they had submitted a 50 page document that proved that they were compliant with the latest set of rules. Nor did I ever encounter aircrew who said that they knew that they were safe because they always 'obeyed the rules'. God help me, I never heard aircrew justify a decision they'd made because 'you always have to think about how it would look in a Coroner's Court'.
We need to build a system that develops our young engineers in such a way that they get the information they need and build the experience they need, while getting the right level of supervision to stop them doing dumb stuff. We also need a better system of oversight (an engineers' equivalent of QFIs) to monitor what they are doing. How to do that? Well, my first stab would be to take some of the old Def Stand and recast them as 'Handbooks' - clearly setting out the key principles of airworthiness, and providing worked examples of how to achieve the right standards.
Next, I'd reinstate (in a modern form) the Modifications Committees, along with a recast version of the MF714/715 system (modification approval and progression forms) to help the PTs and other areas properly manage mods. I'd also make a rule that any acceptance of an aircraft, system, or modification would have to have a proper acceptance conference (along the lines of the old '555' system).
I'd also introduce a proper system of project reviews that brought in external reviewers to really 'scrub' the key stages, such as requirements approvals, V&V plans, and design reviews. (Incidentally, almost all aerospace companies already do these). In case you think I'm being overly bureaucratic about this, and just adding more layers of paperwork, here's what I saw happen over the past few years - this is happening on an aircraft near you right now....
1. Installing highly vulnerable civilian standard GPS systems in direct contravention of MoD policy
2. Deliberately disconnecting electrically operated weapon system from mandated safety switches
3. Failing to incorporate safety critical DA modifications for over three years (should have been done within 6 months). Then failing to record this failure on the Hazard Log
4. Failing to get expert advice from Dstl before specifying an all new INGPS primary navigation and flight control system. Result was an accuracy requirement less demanding than for an iPhone.
5. Installing a new radalt system with no (repeat, no) accuracy requirement
6. Letting the prime contractor decide what went in the SRD, and ignoring the warnings from the Requirements Manager
I'd help people get there by dismantling the runaway 'SQEP' empire that chews up man-hours, and restrict the MAA to one major update of each main RA series every 6 months.
Ok, I've doubtless bored enough people silly - any other suggestions?
Best Regards as ever to all those taking the time to get it right,
Engines