PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Self Regulation Does Not Work, and in Aviation it Kills!
Old 29th Mar 2017, 13:31
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Engines
 
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EAP, Crab,

Thanks for coming back - you've raised some really useful points. I'd like to clarify a couple of things - my apologies for not being clearer in the first place.

First, accident investigation - Haddon-Cave's recommendations were a surprise. My guess is that he noted the differences between the RN and the RAF and thought that the RAF could do better. He may also have seen accident investigation as part of the safety management cycle, and this led him to recommend incorporating the new MilAAIB within the MAA. I thought this was an utter nonsense. It’s still not been properly fixed.

RTS and RTSA – this is an important area, and I’m honestly concerned at some of the comments here. Perhaps I can help.

In my view, the primary role of military aircraft engineer is to provide crews with available and effective aircraft and weapons. Safety and risk management are important, but are secondary. (Crab, I’m truly sorry to hear that this appears to have been forgotten in your area). It’s the engineers that ensure that aircraft are designed, built, modified and maintained so that the risk of them exploding, falling apart or otherwise catastrophically failing while carrying out their mission is acceptably low. They also ensure that the systems within it are working and are ‘fit for purpose’ – that is, they can be operated and used in a safe and effective way. All this can be rolled up into the term 'airworthy'.

The RTS is a key document and It’s absolutely vital that it’s supported by a thoroughly prepared Safety Case, and is 100% accurate. It's the key 'Certificate of Airworthiness' for the user to put the aircraft and crews into harm's way. It underpins documents such as the Aircrew manuals, FRCs and ODMs. It also authorises the use of service modifications, as it sets out the Service Deviations clearing those mods.

Building an RTS is the responsibility of engineers. But it has to be built with and for the user. For example, if a system doesn’t properly or reliably show its status, the RTS must contain limitations or warnings that allow the crew to manage that risk in the air. Those have to be developed with pilots at every stage. The process starts with test pilots, goes on with OEU crew and completes with aircrew working in the RTSA. It finishes with accurate and complete aircrew manuals, FRCs, ODMs, etc. I’ve built a few RTS, for fixed and rotary wing aircraft, dark and light blue. In every case, I made damn sure that anything ‘piloty’ in nature was built with and for ‘pilots’. Especially anything to do with ergonomics and system operation. Crab, any engineer who doesn’t do this needs a good kicking. Have at it. I certainly didn’t think I ‘knew better’ than aircrew.

One of the problems in the 90s was that the role and responsibilities of the RTSA had become diluted and confused during the many changes in the relevant publications. JSP553’s definition, which tried to fudge the differences between the RAF and the RN, was an utter disgrace. I think Haddon-Cave recognised this, and made an honest effort to put the system right by giving the job of preparing the RTS Request (RTSR) to the engineers in the PT, but leaving the job of issuing it to a separate and independent RTSA function in the ‘Operating’ area within the MAA.

I remain of the opinion that giving up the RTSA function was culturally unacceptable to RAF aircrew VSOs. To them, the job of issuing an aircraft ‘release’ could only be undertaken by senior aircrew. I’m sorry if this offends, but in my 25 odd years I saw many examples of RTS documents that were just poor. Poor beyond imagining. Poor to the point where they presented an obvious hazard to crews. All of these had been signed off by aircrew VSOs.

The argument presented in the MAA RA that the RTSAs “… shall provide the Duty Holder (DH) chain with independent Air Safety assurance…’ is, in my view, risible. They cannot be, in any normal sense of the word, considered independent. They’ve failed to do it for too many years at too high a cost in lives.

Best regards as ever to all those trying to do the right thing,

Engines
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