A possible/likely scenario?
At first sight this resembles many other events, a lot of which have been catastrophic.
In that case, likely contributory factors could include
* The crew did not expect and prepare for a “minimums” approach, because the weather was reported basically “good” prior to top of descent. The weather is reported at ToD is 05018KT 9999 FEW014 BKN035 24/21 Q1018 A3008 NOSIG - that it doesn't sound like a very demanding approach if you're coming from winter in Canada to a Caribbean holiday resort, does it?
* Then, though there are now obviously some big showers around, a lot of the approach might be only marginally IMC anyway. Approaching MDA which is 2.5 miles out from the runway, the sea surface may well have been easily seen, so the pilots assume the runway would soon also become visible.
* With less favourable conditions now becoming very evident, there may also be a strong desire to get on the ground, rather than wait and possible divert with all the attendant disruption.
* So maybe both pilots just stayed head up looking for the runway. They're over an almost featureless water surface that's is merging into cloud and rain with no clear horizon.
* With the autopilot disconnected, that precipitation close to the runway decreases visibility, and maybe leads to an illusion of pitching up. In any case the descent rate increases without the pilots realising it, as both are focused on trying to see the runway and neither is concentrating on the instruments.
*Then something - radio altimeter callouts? peripheral vision? triggers the realisation that the surface is actually very much closer than it should be
* triggering low altitude go-around.
Optimistic/inadequate planning + deteriorating weather + minimal visual cues + plan continuation bias + absence of uninterrupted instrument monitoring to touchdown = a predictable nasty fright, but luckily, this time it's not as bad as LionAir in Bali or many others.
Last edited by slast; 28th Mar 2017 at 14:49.