Originally Posted by
Engines
Pop, Random and others,
Perhaps the combined knowledge out there among the PPruners can shed some light on this issue, and hopefully avoid generating heat.
My take (and I'm happy that others might not agree) is that the Air Cadets 'pause' scandal is, at its source, a failure to properly manage and execute the technical and engineering activities required to maintain airworthiness. Those activities span a wide range, and it's almost certain that a number of agencies will have been involved.
1. The MoD procurement agencies (would have been the PE 'back in the day') should have ensured that the aircraft they bought had an airworthy and controlled configuration, and also that when the aircraft were 'taken on charge' (now THAT'S a useful phrase seldom held these days) they were properly supported by the appropriate arrangements with 3rd and 4th line (service depots and the manufacturers) plus the manuals and any special equipment required at 1st and 2nd line.
2. So, first questions -
a. who were the MoD departments acting as the 'Type Authority' for the ATC gliders? Anyone got that information for Mod(PE), then DLO, Then DE&S?
b. Who was supervising the repair work at the depots?
c. Did they have appropriate PDS contracts with a properly authorised Design Authority?
d. The big one - did they have a current Safety Case? On what did they base the CA release?
3. Following on, we get to the RTSA, in this case I'd guess ACAS.
a. What steps did his staff take to ensure that the RTS was supported by all the evidence required, and how often did they review it to ensure that it was still safe?
4. In service, the 1st and 2nd line maintenance of aircraft is controlled and supervised by the engineering staff at the appropriate HQ department. As I posted before, there were any number of changes, but as far as I can determine, this was at various times RAF Training Command, then 22 Group. Lower down were HQATC, 1FTS, 3FTS, then 2FTS. So, next questions -
a. which RAF (or ATC) HQ engineering staffs were responsible for the maintenance of the ATC gliders?
b. How did they meet those responsibilities?
c. What checks did they carry out?
d. What reports did they prepare?
5. The final link is the actual maintenance at 1st and 2nd line. I'm assuming (possibly incorrect try - please correct me) that volunteer staff involvement would have been limited to no more than 'daily checks' (AFs and BFs in modern parlance) with any actual fault rectification and inspection being undertaken by technically authorised personnel. I understand (from Wiki) that VGS units had a VRT Flt Lt as a 'Technical Officer'. So, next (easy) questions -
a. who did what?
b. Did volunteers make MF700 entries?
c. Were they allowed to clear MF700 entries?
d. What did the VGS 'Technical Officers' do?
e. What did regular RAF technicians do?
f. When did the aircraft go back to 2nd line?
g. Who supervised the (contractorised) 2nd line work? HQ? MoD?
Can anyone provide some answers to these questions? Information is power, people. The better the RAF understands what has happened, the faster it can make sure that its not happening somewhere else.
Best regard as ever to all those making ATC flying safe,
Engines