I think that if most posters are satisfied that "the aircraft performed as commanded", then the investigation is not complete. So many legitimate conclusions are foreclosed with the lack of design consideration discussion, regulatory expectations, and a solid basis for "safety takeaway" is not possible?
Concours,
Yes, the aircraft did perform as designed, however in retrospect there was room for improvement. Aside from the pitot system that was overly sensitive to ice crystal blockage, the stall warning shutting down while the aircraft was still stalled, and the THS continuing to run in the aircraft nose up direction after aircraft reached a stall warning AOA, (in Alt 2b), there were a number of human interface factors that should be addressed. The crew was slow in recognizing the change in flight laws, they stopped hearing the stall warning due to the stress of the moment, and, frankly, the method of presenting altitude on the PFD is not as friendly as an old fashioned steam gauge altimeter, thus leading to slow understanding of just how fast they were falling and what levels they were passing. Some means of better telling, under stress, what the other crew member is doing with the controls is probably appropriate since that was a factor in at least 2 accidents.
The "fix" for the accident seems to have been more in the aircrew training direction rather than in making improvements in the actual aircraft. Those presently flying the aircraft are in a better position to say how comfortable they are with the training adjustments that were made subsequent to the accident.