Hello Chris,
Yes, that pitch was too much in the coffin corner. But possible he targeted a pitch around UAS procedure: FL100 and up -> 5 deg/CLB (annexe.06)
However, the background of the subject is that "Pilots had no physical cues whatsoever about the aircraft dramatic loss of speed and energy" (apart the altitude reading, that came too late)
You know well that the pitch control movement of the sidestick is normal load factor or g command. The elevator movement is followed by the stabilizer to automatically trim the airplane to a neutral, 1g, stick-free stability. Naturally, if kinetic energy (speed) decreases then the Lift < mg, hence nose goes down (CG within limits). The natural longitudinal flight path was override by FBW trim setting change for constant flight path attitude, as initially commanded.
Airbus considers that no additional alerts about low speed/energy situations is needed at high altitude because large altitude loss due to stall cannot occur on Airbus Fly-By-Wire aircraft.
Well this accident proved that all the sky is not enough.