I take exception to what you have written about the crash if VH-AAV because you demonstrate a disconcerting proclivity for making stuff up.
You initially posted that;
... in VH-AAV's case the PIC did a flat skidding turn,
The only skidding turn mentioned anywhere in the entire investigation report relates to the impact with the sea wall and that was subsequent to an impact with the water.
failed to retract the gear,
The undercarriage was already retracted when the left engine lost power, so you just made that bit up.
did not apply full power,
Correct, and as I stated very clearly in my post #137 "
what he failed to do was go to maximum power from the company required limited power take-off setting of 700°C ITT". This was most assuredly the critical oversight.
did not feather the dead engine,
He did feather the left propeller, so again, you just made that bit up too.
did not select flap up, ..."
He did raise the flaps, so, again, something else you made up.
You went on to say;
"... if the PIC had successfully carried out just "one" of the following, full power, or gear up, or flap up, or rudder to prevent yaw, or feathered the engine the aircraft would have climbed away, ..."
The PIC successfully carried out at least three of your just "one" of actions and the aircraft most assuredly did not climb away. In order to achieve anything even vaguely approaching positive climb potential the PIC needed to apply full power to the right engine.
Any old how, when your manifest misrepresentations were pointed out to you, you came back with;
he did retract the gear, but late,
It is beyond dispute that the gear was up before the engine failure, so you made the "but late" bit up.
he did not retract the flap till his IAS was approx 95k, putting him 26K below blue speed, (his blue speed flap out was 106k),
There were no flight recorders so how you came up with an airspeed, short of making it up, is anyone's guess (just by the bye, 106 - 95 = 11 not 26)
he eventually feathered the propeller very late, in ground effect,
All the evidence, including two eye witness accounts, has the left prop feathered a long before the airplane was descended into ground effect over Botany Bay, and the DoT found that "...
it was considered only valid to conclude that the pilot had most probably feathered the left propeller shortly after the left engine failed." So, you've made the late feathering in ground effect bit up.
Having been called on all of that, now you want to go with;
the flat skidding descending turn as observed by ATC,
There is no mention of ATC observing a flat, skidding descending turn, at all. You made that up.
the evidence given by ATC that it looked (through binoculars) like flaps were not retracted till the a/c was very low,
There is no mention of ATC observing flap retraction. You made that up.
The only conclusion as to why the left engine was operating at idle, although feathered at impact, was that the contaminated fuel had pumped itself clear by the engine windmilling for a considerable time, and the auto ignition then relit the engine. This was the conclusion reached by P&W after extensive bench testing.
Extensive bench testing? If P&W drew any such conclusion it was not documented in the investigation report. What P&W did find was that when the left fuel control unit and fuel pump were inspected water was found throughout the fuel nozzles, transfer tubes, flow divider, FCU outlet line and the fuel pump itself.
The IAS of flap retraction is conjecture, but is consistent with ATC observing the a/c sag into ground effect at flap retraction, something it certainly would not have done had the speed been at 121k.
ATC didn't observe the airplane sag into ground effect at flap retraction at all. You made that up.
And finally the well documented evidence of P&W, and Beechcraft, that if the PIC had done any ONE of the following, 1 applied power up, 2 flap up, 3 feathered the dead eng, or 4 centered the skid ball and flown wings level, the a/c would have flown away successfully.
As has been clearly demonstrated repeatedly, the PIC carried out at least two of the "any ONE of" actions and the airplane most assuredly did NOT fly away successfully. The critical action required was application of full power from the reduced power take-off configuration.
The final decision of the PIC to pull up and VMC diagonally across the rock wall and 34 t/hold was the single worst option available, at that precise time.
When you're at zero feet flying towards a 3 metre rock wall you tend not to have many options, at that precise time, but there's no evidence that the PIC did pull up. The DoT concluded that it was "...
probable that the aircraft struck the water first and then ricocheted into the sea wall" and given the water-strike damage to the right propeller it is more likely that the PIC attempted to steer around the southern end of the wall.
On the basis that good judgement comes from experience and experience tends to include its fair share of poor judgement, I have no problem with using other people's poor judgements as learning opportunities. What I do have a problem with is making stuff up. You claim to have "read the VH-AAV cover to cover, studied it, and used it as a training guide." and yet you have produced a litany of grossly and patently false statements regarding the PIC's actions/inactions. When you make stuff up that casts aspersions upon a person's professional competency and performance it is slanderous and defamatory.
If you're going to quote accidents in public forums how about exercising a bit of scholarship, get your facts straight and show a modicum of respect for dead colleagues? Surely, your professional responsibilities extend that far.
Cheers,
Mick