The thrust was why can these problems with aircraft and systems not be trampled to death within weeks?
MoD got rid of the people and the system which would never let it happen in the first place. When it did happen, under a regime that actively encouraged it, there were many who saw it coming (e.g. RAF's own Director of Flight Safety) but the culture created by senior officers meant few risked their careers by raising concerns.
It is very difficult to explain after all these years how we felt when instructed to undertake a 5 hour drive, just to be carpeted by a 1 Star for having the temerity to meet legal obligations. And then being threatened with dismissal by his 2 Star boss for refusing to disobey illegal orders (to make false declarations about airworthiness and probity). My elderly boss, because he apparently couldn't get a grip of his staff, was given a new working pattern. Monday 0730 - 1800 in London, drive to Harrogate; Tuesday 0730 - 1800 in Harrogate, drive to London, and so on. Month after month, relentlessly driving him into the ground for simply supporting his staff who were stuck between a rock and a hard place - meet legal obligations and face the sack, or commit fraud and endanger aircrew. Some did the right thing, others didn't. This explains why some aircraft and equipments are robust, while others are (in the immortal words) "positively dangerous". It also explains why some problems became apparent immediately, while others crept up over many years.
None of this is new. No apologies for repeating it, but it was all in the evidence to, for example, the Nimrod Review.