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Old 20th Aug 2003, 20:15
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CD
 
Join Date: Jan 2000
Location: Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
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cyrano_de_bergerac wrote:

I think the lesson of past aircraft fires is that you have to be aggressive in diagnosing and supressing the source.

Even very recently, cabin crew don't always seem to understand that.
Hi cyrano...

I think that the NTSB document you really wanted to reference is NTSB Safety Recommendations A-01-83 through -87 ~ Recent In-Flight Fires. This document contains the specific training failures that you implied in your post, such as:

The captain instructed her not to use the Halon extinguisher, indicating he was concerned about spraying Halon in the cabin.
Flight attendant No. 1 reported that the smoke became so dense she could no longer see the forward galley. However, neither flight attendant made any effort to locate the source of the smoke or to use any of the firefighting equipment available to them.
Flight attendant No. 1 asked the passengers if anyone had a knife that could be used to cut the ceiling panel. A passenger produced a knife and cut a circular hole in the blistered area of the ceiling panel. Flight attendant No. 1 then fully discharged a Halon fire extinguisher into the hole.
The Safety Issues section is very interesting and highlights some of the specific problems that exist in the FAA training standards:

In the American incident, the flight attendant did access the area behind the ceiling panel, but the method used (that is, having a passenger cut a hole in the ceiling) risked damage to electrical wiring and other cables that may have been covered by the paneling. In addition, although the flight attendant’s action successfully extinguished the fire, access to the area behind the panel should not have been dependent on the actions of a passenger, either to provide a sharp instrument for cutting or to cut the hole itself. (of course, you don't have to worry about reliance on a passenger now due to the security measures...)

The Safety Board is concerned that, in two of the occurrences described in this letter, crewmembers hesitated to use Halon extinguishers. In the Delta incident, the captain specifically ordered a flight attendant not to use the Halon extinguisher because he was concerned about Halon being sprayed in the cabin. In the AirTran accident, an off-duty crewmember chose not to use the Halon extinguisher because of his concern that it “would take away more oxygen” from the cabin.

Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:
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